2. Avoidance of inadvertent contamination of populatkd islands or transient shipping 3. A rapid evaluation of the relationship between fofecast and actual cloud travel utilizing aerial tra€king of the fallout radiation cloud. Initial radsafe planning was based on the limited Pacific] Proving Ground (PPG) experience. Only ll nuclear tests had occurred In the Pa- cific and of these only 2, during Operation IVY, were large-y eld devices. The IVY experience did not indicate the widespread radiologic 1 contamination that could be caused by a large-yield weapon. BRAVO, th@ nation in Operation CASTLE, contaminated the shot islands to first deto- fhe extent that one observer concluded "Operation CASTLE must be reporte nightmare of radiological safety test operations" (Reference as the 7, Pp. 6).* Nevertheless, the organization and planning proved flexible eough to accommodate even this unanticipated major radiological contam: nation and the additional precautionary measures and monitoring efforts sarily ensued. hat neces- No personnel were allowed to live on any part of Bikini Atoll throughout the remainder of the test series, but were h used at Enewetak and aboard the task force ships. Access to the Biki i Atoll was restricted to those with official duties, and lengths of visi S were controlled. The radsafe planning and safety criteria used by CJTF 7 a dad the task units, as they evolved to meet the objectives of CUJTF 7 durin the opera- tion, are the subject of this chapter. RADSAFE PLANNING Radiological safety was a major joint task force concern during the planning and operational phases of the CASTLE tests. Origina! planning * The author of this comment, after an additional 25 years exferience in the field of radiation protection, no longer holds this viey, but rather states that the radiological safety problems of CASTLE presqnted a challenge in protecting the 17,000 task force personnel that wag admirably met (Reference 18). 75 ST