(ce) Information Securit:, The tufermation security, particufar’y document cortrol, wot a
internal functiwn of TG T.1, mainly handled by the Mail and Reaseds Sectior of J-1, with Tuy
Secret control being retained in the Oifice of CTG 7.1. Policies followed in docun.2at control
were munitored by the Classification Officer as security Haison to be certain that practices
were in conformanc? with the appropriate AEC or military regulation as previously coordinated with J-2 of Fi¥ S:iVEN and the Security Office of TG 7.5. The security Haison representative reviewed all such ccordiacied ducumencts befors {ssuance to be certain that they were
realistic and did nut maieriully interfere with operations. Incidentally, J-4 of TG 7.1, working
with TG 7.5 aad the Classification Office, disposed of considerabie classified material.
3.15.3
Photcygraphic Control
Control of photogranhy, ina sense, was part of the security liaison function but was of
sufficient magnitude to be considers! a separate responsibility. In addition to the current review for classification of photographic records, it was necessary to acvise on special practices
er
a.
2
&
relating to security control of photczraphic materials. To avoid the excessive tentative mark-
ing of photographs as Secret Restricted Data pending official classification in accordance with
JTF SEVEN regulations, the Classification Office kent substantially current with all phctography, thus avoiding unnecessary security procedures and pessible confusion as to the actual
classification of such material.
The change of procedure for this operation which permitted some Scientific Task Group
personnel to take their ownpictures instead of using the official photographic units, TU-8 and
TU-9, introduced some new Security problems. It is believed that the whole photography system
must be reexamined. Associated «ith the problem of photography is the control of binoculars
and telescopes. The present strict controls on these optical instruments are time-consuming
and fruitless in view of the ready access to similar official optical equipment, e.g., on the
bridge aboard the several ships of the Task Force,
Legal Advisory Problems
As in the past, the Classification Officer provided preliminary legal advice on patent matters, income tax, and miscellaneous investigations. The Classification Officer spent a considerable time as a Claims Board member and proceSsed claims fur contractor employees of
the AEC.
Organizational Matters
The original classification guide was prepared at the home station of the Classification
Officer, submitted for review by several of the participating organizations, and approved by
AEC and DOD authorities. Preoperational classification questions were handled by AEC Headquarters in Washington, the Classification Officer, and the classification representative of
Livermore. When the Task Force moved to the Forward Area, a representative of the Classification Officer opened up the Classification Office in the Task Force Headquarters. About two
weeks before the first detonation, the Classification Officer with one associate undertook the
operation of the Classification Office with the aforementioned associated activities. Meanwhile,
the home representative of the Classification Officer, supported by AEC Headquarters and
Livermore’s classification representative, handled the numerous Stateside problems associated
with the operation. For most of the period the Classification Office was comprised of two
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3.15.5
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3.15.4
persons, with a third man partof the time.
3.16
TECHNICAL REPORTS
The primary responsibility for completion and editing of technical reports is one handled
Stateside in the postoperational period. However, a good practice adopted in this operation was
the preparation, while in the Forward Area, of current summary reports for each detonation,
55