where these requirements were not satisfied prior to departure for PPG, they were completed as soon as possible after arrival of personnel at PPG. Security policies for Operation Castle originated with CITF SEVEN and TG 7.5. TG 7.1 made suggestions and comments on policy matters as requested but was not responsible for promulgation. Once policies were established the J-1 Section of TG 7.1 disseminated the information to members of the Task Group. 3.15 3.15.1 CLASSIFICATION ACTIVITIES Classification Several classification items unprecedented in past operations were involved in Operation Castle. The inclusion of two firing sites, one at Enitwetok and the other at Bikini, almost 200 miles distant, required a representative at each site. The probiem of native evacuation from other atolls and the accompanying medical program at Kwajalein introduced unanticipated classification problems and resulted in even another source of classified material. The fact that two separate laboratories participated in the program of devices to be detonated required decentralization of the preoperational activities. However, a uniform classification policy thsoughout the Task Force was ensured by the designation by the AEC and CITF SEVEN of t}.2 Scientific Task Group representative as over-al) classification authority. It is to be noted that classification practices were more realistic during the present operation, Based on experience from earlier operations, the Castle classification guide recognized as no higher than Official Use Only those items of no security significance. Incidentally, the President’s speech before the United Nations, the Ivy film declassification, and the routine announcements madeafter several of the shots all contributed materially to the avoidance of many problems and the more realistic approach to security classification. Another important factor in the maintenance of respect for security and classification was the support given by the Security Section of the Communications Staff (J-5) of JTF SEVEN. Early in the operation that section was briefed on classification policy by the Classification Officer, and agreement was reached that apparent violations of communications security would be reviewed by the Classification Office to avoid improper allegations of security violations that in the past proved unnecessarily disturbing to the alleged violators, with the consequent disrespect for all security procedures. Good first-hand guidance for proposed general classification-guide changes was provided by the meeting at the test site of the Nuclear Weapons Classification Subcommittee of the senior reviewers, The Classification Group undertook the review of Forward Area files for regrading in accordance with Executive Order 10501 and implementing AEC directives, particularly in the regrading of Restricted Security Information material. 3.15.2 Security Liaison In accordance with the policy of avoiding duplication of effort and maintaining uniform security standards, the Scientific Deputy and CTG 7.1 eliminated a separate security (J-2) staff within TG 7.1. Reliance is placed on the security education programs of the respective home stations of the several participants and the over-all program of JTF SEVEN and the AEC TG 7.5. (a) Physical Security, The physical security aspects in so far as AEC materials are concerned were almost exclusively the function of the Security Office of TG 7.5. The Classification Officer indicated operations, areas, and equipment that involved security significance and the Security Staff of TG 7.5 provided the physical security protection and access procedures, including a badge system. (b) Communications Security. The communications security was handled by the J-5 (Communications) Security Section of JTF SEVEN, with close liaison as noted earlier with the Classification Office. 54