Pe a deenhower: Papers, 1953-62 | Be, ; (Ann Whitman file) — dacs [id a ek 4 3 “ Pw it wn _ WUE ound otea Se. “a te a « . they would never agree to the creation of a unified -Germany unless it were controlled by the USSR. Nor, on the other hand, should the United States accept a unified Germany except as part of an integrated Western European community. We simply could not contemplate re-unifying Germany and then turning it loose to exercise its tremendous potentialities in Central Europe. Accordingly, we should get rid, once and for all, of the idea that the re-unification of Germany is in and by itself an objective of U. 5. policy. Everything depended on the context in which Germany was re-unified, because you could not neutralize a great power like Germany permanentiy. After paying tribute to the formidable capabilities and energies of the Germans and their extraordinary comeback from the devastation at the end of the war, Secretary Dulles again warned that we could not close our eyes to the fact that this great power must be brought under some kind of external control. The world could not risk another repetition of unlimited power loosed on the world. Summing up, Secretary Dulles stated that we should not accept re-unification of Germany as a goal under any and all conditions. It would be obviously disastrous to accept re-unification on the Soviet terms. But it would also be bad to accept it without any external limitation. We must therefore be flexible as to the terms on which we would find re-unification acceptable, and to do our best to keep the Germans happy until we have achieved a suitable re-unification of Germany. General Cutler pointed out that the policy paper as written carries out exactly what Secretary Dulles had been arguing for. Paragraph 44, with its suggestion that the United States should study alternatives toward achieving German re-unification, was a long-term matter. It was looking ahead to a situation in which, as a result either of German internal policy or some move by the Russians, U. 8. forces were kicked out of Germany. Secretary Dulles replied by stating his strong objections to the idea that the United States would accept neutralization if it could thereby achieve a unified Germany. The point of the mat- ter was that the Germans would never stay neutral. They will ei- ther go with the West or go with the East or play off the one against the other, which could put us in a very serious situation. Secretary Dulles added that the possibility of a neutralized and unified Germany had been explored in the State Department over a very long time, and the verdict was that the State Department was opposed to it. It would not help much to explore the matter all over again, as suggested in paragraph 44. _8- ri ‘ 4 “her We 7 Wibes.S tesley ue MOP SECRET