, Paperss i7os-08 wwenhower? : (Ann Whitman file) - BGSSy OESaT ORAMPOSB NEE Ne i DY Agreed that the Council on Foreign Economic Policy should review U. S. policy with respect to COCOM controls, in the light of the U. K. position men- tioned in a above; reporting to the National Secu- - b>. rity Council in time for Council consideration not later than March 1, 1958. NOTE: 4, The action in b above, as approvedby the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, CFEP, for appropriate implementation. U. S. POLICY TOWARD GERMANY (NSC 160/71; Supplement to Nsc 160/1; Annex to NSC 160/1; nsc 5404/1; Nsc 5608/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1664 and 1764; NIE 23-57; NSC 5727; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 20, 1957, and January 2 and 24, 1958) General Cutler briefed the Council on the contents of the new German policy, in very great detail. (A copy of General and another is attached to this memorandum.) At the conclusion Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, | of his briefing, General Cutler called attention to the split views on paragraph 4h, reading as follows: "Uh, /Although it is not now propitious for the United States to advance major alternatives toward achieving German unification, such as neutralization, the United States should give continuing consideration to the development of such alternatives (which may be later required by developments in either West Germany or the USSR or both) with a view to the long-run solu- tion of the unification problem./* "* Supported by Treasury, Budget and ODM." General Cutler discussed at length the controversy in the Planning Board with respect to paragraph 44, and also pointed out the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff against inclusion of this paragraph. He then called on Secretary Dulles. Secretary Dulles began by stating his opinion that with respect to Germany the policies of the United States and of the Soviet Union have something in common--namely, that it was not safe to have a unified Germany in the heart of Europe unless there were some measure of external control which could prevent the Ger- mans from doing a third time what they had done in 1914 end in 1939. Secretary Dulles insisted that the Soviet Union would never accept an independent, neutralized Germany in the heart of Europe. He added that he was convinced of this fact from many private conversations with Soviet leaders, who had made it quite clear that PADS RR POCONO G Es . * TOP SECRET