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PAIS
Papers, 1953-61 |
| {Ann Whitman file)
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When asked for his views by General Cutler, General White
(for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) expressed support for the
views of Secretary Dulles, and reiterated the position of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in opposition to the inclusion of, paragreph 44.
General Cutler argued with Secretary Dulles, pointing out
that the United Kingdom and France seemed quite capable of playing
a unilateral game with the Germans, and he could not understand why
the United States did not seem capable of looking ahead in order to
try to determing what we were going to do when Adenauer disappeared
and we might find our forces asked to leave Germany.
The President pointed out that if the Socialists did come
into power in Germany, we might have to put even more U. 5. forces
in that country. He added with emphasis that he agreed with all
that the Secretary of State had said on the problem of German untfication end neutralization. In point of fact, the President added,
neutralizing Germany would amount to nothing more than communizing
Germany.
Mr. George Allen said he wanted to remind the Council that
the most significant single motivation in German public opinion was
for the unification of that country.
(
If the Soviets play up to this
sentiment and agree to a neutralized Germany, Mr. Allen felt that
the Germans would quickly buy such a proposal and give all the credit
to the Soviet Union for re-uniting their divided country. We would
be faced with a terrible force if Soviet Russia and Germany joined
together.
The Fresident replied to Mr. Allen by expressing firmly
the opinion that if Germany were neutralized it would be a Germany
taken over completely by the Soviets. Mr. Allen expressed egreement with the President's view, and said that he wes not arguing
for the neutralization of Germany, but rather for a re-armed Germany favorably disposed to the United States and to the West.
The President went on to say that in his view the way to
handle the German problem was to build up NATO and Germany within
it. Germany would be attracted to remain in a strong NATO. Furthermore, the building up of NATO would perhaps encourage the satellites to throw off the Russien yoke. In short, the building up
of the Western European community was, in the President's view,
the best possible guarantee of world peace.
After General Cutler had called the Council's attention
to certain salient features of the Financial Appendix, the President turned to Secretary Dulles and asked if he could give a clear
reason as to why the Germans had dragged their feet so in the field
of re-armament. Secretary Dulles replied that he supposed it stemmed
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