tdsenhower: gunmen Papers, 1953-61 | fh Pan AYE, Ota ont 8 Pee (ann Whitman file) res, iy Wd bellwhe AitDe Bas a te It vas up to some other Arab state, like Iraq, to take the initiative, which the United States would then back up to the hilt. Experience had taught nus, continued Secretary Dulles, that if the United States takes some such initiative as was being requested, it would find that the Arab states would repudiate our initiative in the name of Arab unity or some other Arab interest. We could not afford to be put into such a situation again as had happened in the past. The dominant theme in the private conversations at Ankara was the union between Syria and Egypt. There had been practically no solid intelligence at Ankara as to how this union had actually . i come about. Intelligence material available in the Near East does ‘not compare in quantity or quality with what is available to us here in Washington, and the U. S. Delegation accordingly felt very isolated and very much in the dark. Nevertheless, there had been "a strong feeling in all the different delegations that the Egyptian-~ Syrian union was a bad development and that it would strengthen Nesser's hand. There was strong pressure on the United States to speak out against the union. Again, said Secretary Dulles, he had taken the position that we wanted first to know where Priendly Arab states stood vis-a-vis the Egyptian-Syrian union. Once they determined their position, the United States would back them up; but we would not take the initiative. Secretary Dulles added that there was a general impres- sion at Ankara that he wanted the National Security Council to be aware of. He thought that we had not developed an adequate military doctrine for the Near East, and particularly for Iran. We must in the future pay more attention to this problem, and we must have available larger forces for the defense of Iran than we now have. We must get rid of the pervasive fear in Iran of a Soviet invasion. This fear amounts almost to an obsession. General Taylor had had some good ideas on this subject. General Cutler pointed out that-in our latest revision of our policy toward Iran, the defense line had been moved further north in Iran than had been the case in previous policies, although we had cut down the force levels in Iran. Secretary Dulles commented that the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact seemed to think that we needed some 16 divisions in Iran, and there were actually only six. The great question was where the rest were to come from. The National Security Council: Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on his recent trip to the Near East, including attendance at the Baghdad Pact meeting. -3- Le wer day Ue adud ben TOP SECRET