isenhower: Papers, 1953-61 | (Ann Whitman file) ; av Ls ce Do : . Walled “i Secretary Dulles pointed out that the shakiness in the Baghdad Pact meeting, to which he had initially alluded, came primarily from two sources: Iran and Iraq. In Iran, factors of personality, particularly the personality of the Shah, gave rise to serious complications. The Shah considers himself a military genius, and is insistently demanding a further military build-up in Iran. In arguing for assistance to this end from the United . States, the Shah compares the situation of Iran very unfavorably with that of its stronger military neighbors, Pakistan and Turkey. He sums up a picture of the Russians pouring into the gap (Iran) between the two strong powers of Pakistan and Turkey. Moreover, continued Secretary Dulles, the Shah has not been willing to play the role of constitutional monarch. This refusal makes for severe internal complications in Iran because the rest of the government does not agree with the Shah's estimate of his proper role. Many of the leaders in the Iranian Government are seeking for more economic development and less military buildup, and they want something approaching a balanced budget. However, we have refused U. S. assistance to help Iran's budgetary difficulties, because we feel that the country has enough natural resources and wealth to handle their own budget. Thus there is a confused internal situation. The Shah was actually talking about getting out of the Baghdad Pact if the United States did not join it when Secretary Dulles arrived in the Near Bast, but he had taken a different view by the time the Secretary left. Secretary Dulles in- — dicated that he had invited the Shah to come to Washington to talk over Iran's military problems with the President, who was so obvi- ously qualified to discuss such things. Accordingly, it is quite possible that the Shah will come to this country about next June. Turning to Iraq, Secretary Dulles pointed out that this eountry was in an awkward position because it is the only Arab nation in the Baghdad Pact. There have been heavy pressures on Iraq from the other Arab states, who play up the theme of Arab unity as opposed to the Baghdad Pact, which they regard as a barrier to Arab unity. Secretary Dulles felt that the Baghdad Pact meetings had been particularly useful in one respect--namely, that there had been so many opportunities for restricted private conversations. In one of these, the Iraqi delegates requested the rest of the conferees to give a great lead in a campaign to bring all the Arab nations back into a position of sympathy toward the West. In pursuit of this theme, several delegations pointed out that the only areas | in the Near East which seemed capable of initiating anything were se Egypt and Israel. In reply to these arguments, Secretary Dulles had pointed out to the other delegations how difficult it was for the United States to take such an initiative as had been suggested. . erm mT, | | " WEE cB ieae Cte abd B. d -@ TOP SECRET