CHAPTER II], SECTION 5
The H&N Rad-Safe unit was assigned the
over-all responsibility of preventing over-exposures through effective safety measures, inclu-
ding the functions of photodosimetry; monitoring; repair and calibration of instruments; and
control of protective clothing and equipment.
As this was a new field of endeavor for the
Contractor, the Senior Rad-Safe Electronics
Technician, the head of H&N’s Rad-Safe Unit,
was sent to Fort McClellan, Alabama, and then
to Los Alamos for three weeks training. Upon
his return to the Jobsite, a course of indoctri-
nation in Rad-Safe measures was given to carefully selected personnel. This on-the-job training, supervised by the AEC Radiological Safety
Officer, qualified four other technicians who, in
turn. conducted courses in monitoring as well
as radiological safety in general.
An instrument repair shop was provided at
site Elmer. Of the more than 350 instruments
turned over to the H&N Rad-Safe Unit, only
150 were of modern design, and many of these
required modification. All instruments were in-
ventoried, repair parts were ordered, and a pro-
gram of rehabilitation of instruments was undertaken. By 15 April 1956, all instruments for
which H&N was accountable were readied for
REDWING.
In October 1955, at the time of the activation of the Contractor’s Rad-Safe Unit, many
islands in both Eniwetok and Bikini were still
subject to residual radioactivity. All sites were
thoroughly monitored and designated as Radex
areas if necessary. By 15 April 1956, through
natural decay and through decontamination by
earth removalorfill, only sites Charlie and Tare
on Bikini Atoll presented radiation hazards. The
maximum permissable exposure to Gamma radiation had been established by the AEC as
3900 mr every thirteen weeks. All personnel
entering radex areas were required to carry film
badges, and complete records of all individuals
exposed to radiation were maintained. The radiation safety control during the build-up stage
was effective; no one was subject to overexposures during this period.
In anticipation of further contamination
(as a result of REDWING events), a vehicle
and equipment decontamination area at site
Elmer was provided with a steam boiler and
salt and fresh water service. A gun was made
available for use with high pressure steam,
alone or mixed with other solutions. The
pmncipal agents for use in these solutions were
as follows: synsuds for general decontamination;
sodium metasilicate (Metso 99) for heavy duty
on »ainted surfaces; and oxalic acid for use
with steel. Separate areas were provided for
sandblasting and storage of contaminated equipment.
For
Page 3-24
personnel
decontamination,
two
96-man stations were set up,
one each,
at
Elmer and Nan. A barge was also outfitted as
a personnel decontamination station in case
operations were shifted to bases afloat as
was the case in Bikini Atoll during Operation
CASTLE. This barge was equipped with laundry
facilities, clothing change and issue tents, showers, electric power and steam generating facilities, and a supply of fresh water.
As a result of the REDWINGevents, contamination was widespread in both atolls and
tight Rad-Safe control was mandatory. All per-
sonnel were required to wear film badges, which
were exchanged approximately every six weeks.
Special mission badges and dosimeters were
issued to personnel entering radex areas. Upon
completion of each mission, vehicles and personnel were monitored at conveniently located
check points. Contaminated vehicles were sent
to decontamination areas, and personnel show-
ing evidence of radioactivity were required to
proceed to the personnel decontamination station, Mission badges and photodosimeters were
returned to the Rad-Safe Office where the results were entered on the individual’s record. A
list of all personnel with an accumulative exposure of 1000 mr or more was furnished daily
to Jobsite management, and before assigning
personnel to tasks in contaminated areas, this
list was checked in order to eliminate those
men who might be subject to overexposure. Be-
cause of the requirements of recovery and other
essential work in contaminated areas, a number
of personnel received dosages which approached
the maximum permissable. Those scheduled for
retention at the Proving Ground were assigned
employment at the uncontaminated base camps
at Elmer and Fred. However, as a result of
the Tewa event, the last test of Operation RED-
WING, fall-out occurred at these two sites.
and the radioactive level reached approximately
110 mr/hr and remained at this intensity for
several days. Measures were initiated to eva-
cuate personnel with records of high exposure:
to houseboats in Bikini Atoll. The decay o
radioactivity, aided by heavy rain, was faster
than had been anticipated and evacuation measures were abandoned. Approximately 100 Ho
mes & Narver employees received accumulativ
dosages between 3.9 and 8.0 r. In order to retain key personnel at the Proving Ground.
CJTF-SEVEN authorized an increase in t}
maximum permissable dosage to 7r for tl
remainder of the operational period - to 10 August. The Test Director of the AEC lat-authorized the retention of these personnel { °
the post-operational period, provided the avera,z
quarterly dose for the last three quarters of
1956 would be less than 3.9r. These authc ‘-
zations permitted the retention of person
|
whose services were required for urgent recovery and roll-up activities.