he sO Intellizense, Seourity end Peblio Information NO. S55 3 eri i * . wnat cea te Ce, te 1s mh are ‘| It is considered that the USSR could interfere with the nmiesion of Joint Task Foree Seven, or the compromiae of its activities could be affected by: Qe Bepsonegee Espionage could be accomplishe by the penetration Of personnel into the Task Foroe or the defection of personnel within the Task Force, In addition to radiological reconnaissaome, espionage oould be accomplished photogrephioally by ship, aircraft, or submarines, with the latter two being the most plousible, Submarine approach within 1,800 yards or less of importent islands of the atoll or overflight by enemy airoraft ore possible. By such means periodic photography and observation could record the progress, process of preparation, and type of construction within the operational area, and important operations probably could be interpreted by an onalysis of these records. be Sabotage. Snbotage could be accomplished by subversive personnel within the Task Foroe or, more remotely, by a raiding perty landed from the sea. Subversive action by these means could inolude the destruction of comnunications and technical installation facilities within the operational area. Oo Overt Action by Vessel or Aircraft. Ovort action by vessel or aire oraft could taxe the form of attack by ncrial bombardment, naval gune fire or amphibious assault, a. Raids, Reids could be conducted by aggressive or surreptitious mothods under the cover of darknoss from combat:nt shipe or sutmarines, The lending ond recovery of raiders by submarine could be accomplished under the conditions of darkness and the confusion resulting from he thelr aotivities. @. Unauthorized Instrumentation. Interference. with the mission could acoomplished by electronic counter-measures by a vessel or aircraft Operating sane distonce from the area. Campromise could be effected by surreptitiously plinting and recovering instrumonts by a landing party. f. Failure ‘of JTF 7 Personne] to Observe SecurityPrecautions, Failure of JiF personnel to observe security precautions could easily oon- promise the mission by their talking or writing indisoriminctely about classified information during the planning ond operational stages. Effeot of Capabilities on JIF 7, The capabilities listed above make is possible for the Soviets to take the following action agninst the operational area: . Q» Submarine reconnaissance. be Air reconnaissance, ' 9. morine. Ground reconnaissance or sabotage by landing parties fran sub- . ¢. Raids from sutmorines or surfece ships. e. Raids by atroraft, Conolusions, Capability o is considered the most likely to ooour under conditions existing today, Capability b is a possibility but is lers likely and capabilities c, d, ond e most likely would bo exercised in the evont of open hostilities between the United States ond the USSR, It is believed that informction os to the operctiona of JIF 7 and the results thereof would be of more practical value to the Soviets then hindering or impeding the operation. RR Rerng 2NIRNR ty ome = ge er CH? enceenemen w e oe Ls .