z ‘ BEADQUARTERS, Joint Tesk Foros SEVEN APU 187 (HOY) o/o Postmaster Sac Franoisco, California 2.0 February 1954 Ann... 0 to CUTF SEVEN Operation Plan No, 3-53 INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY AND PUBLIC INFORAATION ie Intelligenwe ~- General Situatios. The ataosphere of tension existing tween the United States and ite allies and the USSR and ite satel~lites stands little chanoo of diminishing during the next six months. It may increase as the result of possible further Soviet inspired aotions ageinst nations on the geographical fringe of the Soviet Bloc, 2 General Soviet Capabilities, ‘The armed forces of the USSR are maine tained in an advanced state of military readiness, As a result, tho | Soviets oan undert xe military aggression with little or no advanced warnings Be Soviet Capabilities as Applied to JTF 7 Naval Capsbilities. The Soviets have nineteen coean patrol and thirty-seven medium range type submarines in the Pacific Ocean Be area. Because of endurance limitations of the mediun range type, it ds believed that the ooean patrol type would be better for oper= ations in the Eniwetok area. It is estimated that at least four to six ocean patrol submarines could be maintained on station in the Eniwetok area indefinitely, and for short periods this number oould be increased. be. Air Capabilities (1) Aerial photo and radiologioal reconnaissance of the Euiwetok area from Far Eost bases (Sakhalin or the Kuriles) is within Soviet oapabilities,. It is estimated thet the TU-4 has a combat range/radius of 3,100/1,700 nautical miles with a 10,000-pound bonb lead, The Td=4, with the rated bomb load replaced by fuel, could remain in the target area for only a brief period, By utilizing range extension techniques (including removol of defensive armament with attendant increase of fuel capacity, replacement of rated bomb load by fuel, end one acrial refueling), the time over the tarret for a TU-4 air~ oraft could be extended to over four hours, Although there is no evidence that the USSR has actually employed range extension tech~ niques, it is within Soviet technical oapabilities to employ such techniques. The Third Long Range Air Army is presently estimated to have a TO& strength of approximately 190 TU-4's, No TU-4 aireraft are known to be modified for long range reconnaissance. (2) In i95l a single four-engine bomber considerably larger than the TU-4 was observed in flight. This aircraft has been deasig- nested as the Type 51 heavy bomber. It probably has a range/radius of $,700/1,850 nautical miles with conventional reciprocating engines, The Soviets are known to have developed and tested a turboprop engine but the production status is unknown. A successful engine of this type would give the Type-31 o combat range/radius of 4,400/2,500 nautioal miles and considerably in excess of this if the canbat load were replaced with fuel. (3) Although there is no intelligence to indicate that the Type-Sl is in series production or in operational units, information suggests that the Soviets have o few aircraft, larger then the TU-4, which ore estimated to be capable of overflying the operational area. (4) | It is possible that the Soviets might equip one or more of these airoroft for photo and radiological reconnaissance if a sufficiently high priority exists for this requirement, 6 pe peeve ° C-} ' Lee Ang, sre - - . ew — ¢ “0 oe vebeiiape erp: