oa Oy Poveonek fC nme et Th 6, At Meeting 1101 om July 14, 1955, the Commission agreed | Q ; \ should be "clean" weapon -¢hat the LASL version of the TX-21 : : \.testedatOperation REDWING, | | . DISCUSSION 7, The test program as tentatively planned and as outlined in Appendix ml comprises fourteen shots, Of these, six would be Fired at Bikini and the other eight would be fired at Eniwetok, As noted before, it 1s currently recognized that 1t may be necessary to fire additional shots in order to attain the desired objectives of the test series. 8, The test program in final form, with full Justification, should be available in late 1955, at which time it will be submitted to the Commission, At that time, Presidential authority for expenditure of the required special nuclear material will be requested, It should be noted that it is possible that further laboratory development will result in substantial change in the details of the program as presently conceived, 9, Since the question of contamination from radioactive fall-out mey be of concern, both at home and abroad, and may jead to pressure to cancel or discontinue the test series, it is extremely important that a comprehensive public information plan be implemented at the proper time to assist in dispelling public and governmental fears and to counteract propaganda designed to capitalize on these fears, Such a public information plan will be prepared and presented to the Commission for approval at the earliest practicable date, 10, In the latter connection, comparisons between Operation CASTLE and the proposed Operation REDWING are enlightening. Comparisons can be made from four viewpoints: the danger area around the Pacific Proving Ground, the total yield for each Appendix "a"