oa
Oy
Poveonek fC
nme
et
Th
6, At Meeting 1101 om July 14, 1955, the Commission agreed |
Q
;
\
should be
"clean" weapon
-¢hat the LASL version of the TX-21
:
:
\.testedatOperation REDWING,
|
|
.
DISCUSSION
7,
The test program as tentatively planned and as outlined
in Appendix ml comprises fourteen shots,
Of these, six would be
Fired at Bikini and the other eight would be fired at Eniwetok,
As noted before, it 1s currently recognized that 1t may be
necessary to fire additional shots in order to attain the desired
objectives of the test series.
8, The test program in final form, with full Justification,
should be available in late 1955, at which time it will be
submitted to the Commission,
At that time, Presidential authority
for expenditure of the required special nuclear material will be
requested,
It should be noted that it is possible that further
laboratory development will result in substantial change in the
details of the program as presently conceived,
9, Since the question of contamination from radioactive
fall-out mey be of concern, both at home and abroad, and may
jead to pressure to cancel or discontinue the test series,
it
is extremely important that a comprehensive public information
plan be implemented at the proper time to assist in dispelling
public and governmental fears and to counteract propaganda
designed to capitalize on these fears,
Such a public information
plan will be prepared and presented to the Commission for
approval at the earliest practicable date,
10, In the latter connection, comparisons between Operation
CASTLE and the proposed Operation REDWING are enlightening.
Comparisons can be made from four viewpoints: the danger area
around the Pacific Proving Ground,
the total yield for each
Appendix "a"