; oO in the danger ‘area and stated that a search centered on a 45 sector would be conducted. The search sector was later cancelled because the search at 30° on the previous day had reported no vessels. The CJTF decided that the sector search would be conducted in advance of the faflout cloud "if necessary" (Reference 16, Tab M). of the conditions that might require this search. No indications are gipen Table 36 shows the Known shipping activity near the PPG around shot time. The officer-in-charge, Wake Island Weather Bureau Station, assumed radsafe monitor responsibility for Wake and was requested to make specfal reports to the task force headquarters if intensities reached 0.010, 09050, 0.100, and 0.500 R/hr. tion by TG 7.4. Radiac instruments were supplied to the Wake sfa- In accordance with operational requirements, the task force fleet was positioned in a sector from 90° to approximately 120° ground zero at a minimum distance of 26 nmi (48 km). rom Figure 76 shows e location of the fleet for KOON. At the midnight command briefing, the forecast shot-time winds wer favorable, having considerable southerly flow.in the mid-levels. Howevpr, light to moderate scattered showers were forecast for H-hour and later. The decision to shoot was affirmed, pending the weather/radsafe situatipn The forecast fallout plot by the method of ellipt _ at 0430 on shot day. cal approximations is shown in Figure 77. Based on the recommendations contained in the surface radex area dif rective, CTG 7.3 informed all task groups of the following flagship (eh Estes) movements near shot time: @ The H-hour position would be on a bearing from ground e At H+5 minutes (i.e., after completion of firing requirements), the ship would commence moving south at 15 knots (28 km/hr) @ The H+2 position would be 1349 true, 33 nmi (61 km) zero of 88° true at 25 nmi (46 km) from ground zero, with a possibility of moving from that position at approximately H+3 if required. 272