Tt w.3 originally pierncdd to have Bikini equipment presazed for shipment to the ZI 2:3 our-loaccd from Enju. Becanse of the darmag- dune to the caa.p farilitles and the hizh race of contamination at that site caused by tha Biktri series of shots, it was necessary to retuci all property to Parry for packing and return to the ZI. Return of equipment and heavy tratlers was scheduled on a priority based on future n2eds for the equipment. 3.17.4 Heclyurrvters Poll-up As of 2400 hours, May 21, 1954 (Eniwetox tirne), Forward Area Headquarters of TG 7.1 closed, After this date all electrically transmitted messages were processed by the AEC Resident Engineer. Mail service continued to be handled by the J-1 Office on Parry Islard until May 31, 1954, when this functicn was also assumed by the AEC Resident Engineer. On May 15, five boxes of classified records of the Headquarters departed the Forwardc Are. for Los Alamos via Fivay.ay 63. On the following day an additional 19 boxes departed on a SM records flight. All records were air-shipped to Kirtland Air Force Base where they were transshivped to Los Alamos by AEC truck. Records were boxed in footlocker-size boxes. The total eight of the 24 boxes was approximately 2400 lb. Classified records belonging to DOM (TU-13) were escorted by their own personnel to appropriate destinations. All H¢N furniture and equipment were left in place, and all AEC and DOD accountahi> equipec.ent was returned to aporopriata supply rooms. 3.18 3.18.1 OPHZRATIONAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS General The support offered to TG 7.1 by other task groups was outstandirg. The flexibility shown by those task groups in meeting the uncertain and continually charngiag conditions of the operation contributed immeasurably to its success. In spite of very ambitious wearons development programs involving two laboratories, the DOD effects programs took approximately 60 per cent of the total support effort. It is suggested that attempts be made to reduce thts proportion in future overseas operations. In order to submit requirements for military support far enough in advance to meet DOD planning criterfa, they are normally turned in from nine months to a year before the operational period. At this time planning has not progressed to the point where it is possible to predict detailed requirements with a great degree of accuracy. Late DOD and other projects, and changes in projects, introduce additional requirements, as do maintenance difficulties at the far end of a long pipe line, large peak requirements, and the possibility of late substantial changes in the operational concept and schedules. It is therefore necessary, in order to be able to com- - mere ow wr plete one of these operations successfully in an acceptable length of time, that support elemcuts have a reascnable reserve of men and equipment above the bare minimum estimated to get the job done. ; Although strenuous efforts were made by the Task Force and Task Group communications personnel, long-range communications were not satisfactory, particularly aboard the USS Estes where Task Force and Air Task Group communications interfered because of limited space and antenna space. Ship-based cperations shouid be avoided, if possible, but if they are necessary, even as a stand-by measure, the Scientific Task Group needs a ship of its own (possibly shared with TG 7.5) for its headquarters. The TU-9 effort in the field is, in the opinton of the Task Group Commander, appreciably larger than necessary to accomplish its mission. A great deal of time was expended by members of the Task Group posing for photography that may not be used in any official report. Great amounts of still photography were taken, very little of which is of any value to the experimenters. It is suggested that the official commitments of TU-9 can be carried out in the future with approximately one-half of the field effort involved in Operation Castle. 57