SESSION H 4) [ suppose that within the military tnere must have already been a discussion of a military demand for surface and underground shots, Until Janzle we had not really thought about the consequences of a surface or under, round explosion, It was widely recogaiced that the Jangle explosions would produce more radioactive dust than any of the previous detunations including the Tower Shot during World War UL. However, it was thought to be unnecessary tu Monitor tne radioactive ity beyond 50 miles from the explosion. HASI. arrcayed to inake measurements in the annulus of 50 to 50. miles, despite the fact that people thoug... we would be wasting time. Tu the contrary, we obtained a good deal of useful information and, in fact, we found that even aa far away as Salt Lake City doses were hicher than 1090 mr, This was certainly revealing, considering that the two Jangle devices were very small. Following these tests several groupe took the Jangie data and extraporated tuo the multi-imegaton device which was then being planned for Eniwetok, FREMONT-SMITH. EISENBUD: ‘hat is Janzic? Jangle was rhe Nevada test, This was in November 1951, It was a code name. anda year later they were planning to explode the first large thermonuclear device at Eniwetur, There was an Air Force officer known to most of you whe came up with a rather pessimistic estimate of what the fallout would’ « like, and he, I think, was probably the first to have predicted that Miles away. Our group in New York came up wath some abat the there might b+ hurdreds or maybe thousands of rads huncre « of same coictusicr aithough not quite so persimistic, However, itecertain'y did see. .hat -nuch more extensive monitor ya wie Vacific tie wbak boree would be necessary th a wae then being contemp! 7 ul , saw no need to monitor beyond the ateibo.w boa. tua, where Gtike. the first large thermonucsear .etanation., wogt. to enohace. No tabsout re search program was includec as part of the te-t program put it was lirs.ted to about 50 miles from Ground Zero. Tbe ABC, hewever, did agrey that a monitoring prograra beyc ad Eniwetph proper could be mounted if support could be found outside the task fotee, We ead ceeded in convincing CINC PAC, Commander-in-Chief ofthe locihe, who had responsibility for security of the ratives in the \tarshail Islands, that the fallout should be tracked throughout the shuthwest ww oe Pacific Ocean. , Then we were given the job of doing it, and after the Mike shot, fourd there wos 1.0 fallout. As we recons*ructec it later on, based