CHAPTER I, SECTION 1
ing Ground through the Project Manager at the
site. Sub-units of the organization were maintained at Honolulu, T.H., for recuiting and
control of personnel traffic; at Oakland, California for coordinating transshipment of supplies
and equipment; and at Travis Air Base at Fairfield, California, for laison with personnel of
the Military Air Transport Service in connection
with air transportation of personnel and materials to the Jobsite.
The Contractor maintained a separate and
distinct set of accounting records, which were
kept in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles z£.id directives issued by
the Atomic Energy Commission. Ail purchases
or charges, payrolls, raxes, petty cash, per diem,
transportation and other authorized expenses
were audited and processed for disbursement or
entry and reimbursement and recorded in permanent books of account and record for completion of statements and reports.
Cost estimates were submitted to the
Atomic Emergy Commission for each item of
work proposed. From these estimates, manpower
equirements, engineering, procurement and
construction schedules were formulated. The
Atomic Energy Commission was kept informed
of progress by weekly reports and monthly
historical narratives which covered all features
of the project.
Construction services were rendered to the
various Governmental Agencies and.or Task
Groups, which included three JTF SEVEN
Task Groups and six Task Units together with
19 Scientific Programs and 53 Scientific Projects

applicable thereto. Under tne scope of work of

the Scientific Structures Program, 269 stations
were constructed.
The solutions to problems encountered in
scheduling construction on OPERATIONS
GREENHOUSEand IVY led to establishment |
in the spring of 1953 of an innovation in advance scheduling that proved to be very effective, All expendable construction was advance-

scheduled by item. For example, before design

criteria were firmed up for any Scientific Sta-

tion, a realistic attempt was made to schedule

a date when criteria would be available to tke
Engineering Department; engineering work w 5s
then scheduled; procurement and shipping of
materials was scheduled; and finally, the actual
construction period was shown. Although :n
many instances it became necessary to reschedule individual items because of changes in criteria, unavailability of materials, or a necessery
change in schedules at Jobsite to mect lo al
conditions, this over-all method of advar.ce
scheduling and the progress reporting resultiag
from it proved to be eff: :tive.

Within the Contractor's organization, schedules were most helpful in making it possible

to do effective expediting on materials procured

for Stations which had to be completed early
in the program in order to eliminate interference with scheduled work that could not be
designed until later in the program. This was
also effective in reducing the amount of work

which normally mus‘ be done during the last

few weeks of a construction program dueto late
arrival of materials, and resulted in a minimum
expenditure for premium payments for deliveries of equipment and materials.
During the period from 1 January 1953 to
30 April 1954, Holmes & Narver shipped 603,205
pounds via air freight. The two highest months
were November and December, 1953, when air
shipments reached 98,198 and 89,184 pounds
respectively. Shipments of such large quantitics
of air freight were accomplished through close
cooperation between Holmes & Narver representatives and Air Force Base personnel. However, temporary delays of air shipments from
Travis Air Force Base occurred in a few instances
due to priorities being given to Military materiel and personnel.
The over-all responsibility for radiological
safety, including monitoring and reporting of
exposures, was a Task Force function.
The
Atumic Energy Commission established a permissible exposure rate of an average of 300 milllroentgens (mr) per week with a maximum of
3900 mr allowable during a 13-weck period.
Each person entering a contaminated area was
required to carry a film badge. This badge was
returned to Rad-Safe where it was evaluated
and recorded. Accumulated exposures were renorted to appropriate Task Group leaders in
accordance with established procedure. In aduition, the Rad-Safe group, provided a separate
report of all personnel whose accumulated dosage had reached 2500 mr or over. This report
acted as a warning to supervisory personnel responsibile for detailing men and work in contaminated areas. Due to the extent of the ultimate contamination, a heavy work load was imposed on the Rad-Safe group; as a result, there
were times when the evaluation of film badges

was sot completed until several days after the

exposure. Another problem existed in that the
development of film badges and recording of
exposures was accomplished on a vessel other
than the one on which the Contractor's employecs were housed. There were times when
hoating was so difficult that Rad-Safe inform-

ation was delayed in arriving at the Contract-

or’s offices. As a result, men were detailed to
work in contaminated areas without current
knowledge of their accumulated exposures and
several TG 7.5 personnel received cumulative
dosages in excess of 3900 mr per 13-week period.
None of these overexposures, however, were excessive. Nevertheless overexposure was the cause «

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