CHAPTER tlt, SECTION 6 made this date unrealistic because the personnel requirement was increased from 1,850 to 2,500. The result was that a considerable number of individuals who were not in process for a “Q” clearance by 1 September 1953 were sent to the Jobsite with the understanding on the part of Management that the employee would not be allowed to remain at the Pacific Proving Ground after the “cut-off” date if his clearance had not been received by that date. As the ‘cut-off’ date approached, Lists of uncleared employees were transmitted to the Atomic Energy Commission so that the Civil Service Commission and the FBI which individuals in process should be afforded preferential handling. During the latter part of Decernber 1953, the Eniwetok Field Office extended the “cut-off? date to 24 January 1954; this extension relieved the clearance situation to some extent. As of the “cut-off” date, there were approximately 32 individuals who had not yet received their “Q" clearances. Twenty of these employees were allowed to remain in the forward area due to the fact that their services were urgently required on Eniwetok Island after the “cut-off? date. PHYSICAL SECURITY All physical sccurity measures were implemented as directed by the Commission's General Manager. the Manager, Santa Fe Operations, and the Field Manager, Eniwetok Field Office. The responsibility to protect classified matter extended to every location in which Holmes & Narver had a security interest. At the start of the Operation, the Home Offices were located at 816 and &24-828 South Figueroa Strect, Los Angeles 17, California. On 24 July 1953, the offices at 316 South Figueroa Street were Street. moved to 751 South Figueroa At the outset, one limited area located at 894-898 South Fieveroa Street was devated ex- clusively to the drafting and engineering activities related to the Operation. Access to this area was controlled by an armed, “Q" cleared guard. On 25 January 1954, this limited area was altcred to a controlled area, thus allowing access to “P” approved personnel. With the changing of the area from a limited to a controlled area, all Restricted Data was transferred to the Central Files Section at 751 South Figueroa Street. Specific security areas at the 816 address were the Teletype Sigtot Room, which was established as an exclusive area, and the Central Files Section, which was established as a limited urea. Access to the Sigtot Room was restricted to only those °“Q” cleared emplovees authorized to enter. All individuals entering the area were required to sign a register. After the move to the 751 address. these areas were protected security-wise as they had been while at 816 South Figueroa Street. Page 3-34 Due to the number of employees who were in various stages of security processing, badges were utilized as a media of identification for entry into the various areas. No visitors were allowed access to classified information unless Holmes & Narver had been given full advance details concerning the visit by the AEC. Upon entry to a controlled, limited, or exclusive urea, the visitor was required to sign the visitor’s register, and all visitors were escorted while in the security areas. Visitors who were “Q" cleared were issued one type of visitor badge; non“Q” cleared visitors were issued another type. The Home Otfice was also responsible for the production and preparation of I. D. cards for overseas emplovees. These cards, in addition to the individual's photo and other information, carried tye signature of the Port Control Director. At both Home Office locations, guard service w.s provided on a 24 hour basis. Guards were armed, "Q” cicared, and trained in security procedures and fire detection. Hourly patrols wwere made during non-working hours. All repositories were checked on each patrol, as well as all areas of access to the buildings. In addition, an electronic photo-electric cell was installed to span the entrance to the offices in the 751 South Figueroa Street building. At the Pacific Proving Ground, physical security was maintained hy the Holmes & Narver Guard Force. During non-working hours. hourly patrols were made, repositories checked. and classified areas patrolled to gzuard against un- authorized entry. Guards continued the security checks for the entire Operation except during shot periods when the Military assumed this responsibility. With the great number of personnel involved. maintaining exact personnel clearance information became extremely important. The Security Officer at Jobsite maintained records on each emplosee arriving at the biG. Individuals were issued ba. ies according to the type of their clearnnce, their need for access, and the areas to which they were permitted in order to accomplish their assigned duties. All but a very limited number of emplovees (those assigned to site Fred where a “Q” Clearance was not required) were granted “Q” type clearances. Classified documents arriving at or originated by the Honolulu Office were stored at Hickam Air Force Base. Honolulu. A moderate number of Confidental Defense Information, Non-Restricted Data documents were stored in the approved repository at Holmes & Narver’s Honolulu offices. Midway during the Operation, the President of the United States in his Executive Order 10,501 abolished one of the four security classifications: “Restricted.” This left three classes