CHAPTER til, SECTION 6 cant resided in the local area for at least the Jast ten years. The “QE” also was based upon the results of a local and sometimes a national check by agencies. Both types of clearances were strictly temporary, and the prior approval of the Ficid Manager, Eniwetok Field Office. had to be secured before processing could be started. Simultaneously with the request for either the Local “P" or the “QE” Clearance, a formal request was made for the conventional “P" or “Q.” Where the applicant had previously been granted a "Q” Clearance with another activity and his "Q” Clearance had lapsed, a "Q" Reinstatement was requested. At the inception of OPERATION CASTLE, each emplovee was required to have at least a “P" Approval before he was authorized to enter the Pacific Proving Ground. During May, 1933, the Eniwetok Field Office notified Holmes & Narver that, subsequent to 1 January 1954, no indivicual would be allowed to enter the Pacific Proving Ground nor remain at the PPG without a "OQ" Clearance. To plan for compliance with this directive, 1t was decided that requests for “Q” Clearances should be made prior to t September 1953 for emplovees who would be at the Pacihie Proving Ground subsequent to the cutotf date. Accordingly :n only a few instances of emergeney were individuals allowed to proceed to the PPG after 1 September 1953 if they had not been placed in process for a “Q” Clearance prior to that date. AH secumty papers necessary for oblaining clearances Were submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission's Los Angeles Security Branch. Prior to the submission of security papers cach applicant was screened from a professional and character standpoint to determine his eligibility for further processing. This screening was accomplished not only by contacting previous employems and personal references, but also by utilizing two nationai privale investigative avencies. As a result of information received from these sources, approximately 11% of the apphcants were removed from security processing, Information obtained from focal law enfurcement and Federal Agencies in the area was helpful in weeding out those individuals who could not meet established security requirements. Of the 4.293 requests for “P” Approvals. 2.979 were granted; of the 4,2o8 requests for “Q™ Clearances, 1.329 were granted. Of the 450 requests for “Q" Reinstatements, 444 were received: 425 requests for Local “PP” Approvals were requested and received, Vhe average time required for ArtC processing of “P™ Approvals was + 3.03 days; for “Q° Clearances, 101.72 days: for “Q" Reirstatements, 18.82 days: and for Local “P" Approvals, 4.5 cays. A mecting was held 9 Apml 1953. attended by representatives of the HEN Security De.-artment, AEC Security representatives frorr the Santa Fe Operations Office, and from the AEC Los Angeles Security Branch, wherein it was decided that all clearances would be cancelled by the AEC Los Angeles security Branch ninety days after the date of granting unless the individual had been placed on the Holmes & Narver pavroll hy that time. A similar provision pertained to terminating employees; their clearances lapsed unless they were re-hired within ninety davs. In order to attect this procedure a form was prepared for each hired applicant, setting forth the individual’s full name, his AEC number. his next of kin and address of next of kin, and the individual's type of clearance. This form was transmitted to the AEC Los Angeles Security Branch, the ®niwetok Field Olfice Security Representative at the Pacific Proving Ground. and the Eniwetok Field Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico. The form served not only to notify all concerned that H&N was emploving the applicant, but also to notify the Department of state of the overseas travel of an individual. Upon hiring of an individual, either in the Home Office or at Jobsite, his clearance status was made known to his sttperVisor. Entry into the Pacitic Proving Ground was controlled bv the Commander-in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and in order to gain entry, an individual had to be certified as a good security risk. The Port Contro) Director, Long Beach Nava; Station, was the Military representative authorized to sign all overseas identification cards and all travel orders for individuals traveiing to the Pacific Proving Ground. In May 1953, when H&N was advised that any emplovecs who would be at the Pacific Proving Ground subsequent to 1 January 1954 would require a “Q” clearance, the Security Department requested the AEC to commence processing applicants for “Q” clearances. HowCVeP renuests for “a” clearance nracessing an applicants was suspended until “P'’ approvals were received. thus precluding a costly “Q” clearance processing on those individuals who would not be granted a “P" approval. it was decided that all emplovees signing one year cantracts after 1 June 1953 would be placed in process for "Q" clearances. By 15 June 1953, the Jobsite had selected those “P” approved personne! who were desired after the “cut-off” date. and they were placed in process for “Q” clearances. After 15 August 1953, all apphicart) whose services were required after the “cut-off date were olaced in process for a “QP” clearance. The date 1 September 19453 had heen established early in the Operation as the “limiting date.” after which an individual normally could not proceed to the Pacific Proving Ground unless he was in process for a "Q" clearance. Changes in the planning during August 1953 Page 3-33