—_— °= populated areas. Meteorologists predicted downwind trajectories, precipitation and other factors which could affect levels of fallout. The data from the weather stations were currently available almost up to the exact time of the shot. A detonation could be cancelled at any time up to a few seconds before shot time. A more complete description of the meteorological program is given below. To insure safety to aircraft, both from the initial flash of light and any radioactivity in the air mass moving off-site from atmospheric tests, a representative of the Federal Aviation Agency was made an integral part of the Test Organization. He prepared flight advisory plans based on the type of oo @Queurens GARRISON event and on the predicted meterological conditions. GO._OFIELD ck) i rq PLHRANAGAT LAKE rarely necessary to recommend a delay in firing time solely CALIFORNIA because of predicted blast effects since meterological condi- ~LEGEND — Og AIR, SAMPLER AIR SAMPLER WITH CHARCOAL WH) cantRince MILK SAMPLES 4 J WATER SAMPLES oO. 0 The plan delineated flight patterns and areas and recommended alternate routes, if required, by commercial and private aireraft. Frequently the FAA closed specific air lanes and rerouted aircraft for specified periods. Blast effects were minimized by predicting blast wave intensities based on the wind and temperature profile expected at shot time. Since long distance blast pressure propagation is strongly dependent on wind profile structure, calculations were made for many directions and distances from the test site where possible window damage might have occurred. In order to improve blast calculation techniques, a network of especially sensitive microbarographs was operated at as many as 17 off-site locations to record actual shot-produced pressures in Nevada, California and Utah. It was 620 30 40 SCALE OF MILES 50 Figure tions unfavorable for fallout usually were also unfavorable for biast. 9. Full off-site radiological monitoring coverage was and is provided by the U.S. Public Health Service under a Memorandum of Agreement with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. There were and are extensive monitoring programs, including mobile monitoring teams, film badges, air samplers, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING STATIONS AROUND THE NEVADA TEST SITE automatic gamma recorders, collections of milk, vegetation, sentatives from the fields of public health, medicine, meteorology, fallout phenomenology, blast and thermaleffects, etc. As a result of these deliberations more than 200 delaysin firing have been madeat a cost of millions of dollars, to insure safety. The Advisory Panel continues to function for underground tests. The principal cause for the delays was the requirements for proper weather conditions to insure minimum fallout in 34 | _ = soil, etc. A more complete description of these programs is given below. All of the key data obtained from these monitoring programs were and are reported in the open literature such as the Atomic Energy Commission’s Semiannual (now annual) reports to Congress and the U.S. Public Health Service’s monthly publication, Radiological Health Data. An extensive public information program by the U.S. Public Health Service continues around the Nevada Test Site (fig. 10). a5