t

Bruce Wachholz,
December

12,

Ph.D.

1979

Page two...

anticipated that a very difficult administrative problem. would develcp during the
Users Conference, since Mr. Otterman had been invited.
I requested that the concerned
DOE representatives have a preliminary meeting at Livermore, prior to the conference

a attempt to resolve these problemsfand not to use the conference itself as a forum
for the discussion of the details of the survey.

Unfortunately, we were unable to

accomplish this.
I can expand on why this was not accomplished, if necessary?” I
think this is the proper time and place to expand on why I was unable to meet with
the DOE representatives prior to the February ship's Users conference.
I checked
into the Livermore Motel at 2:00 P.M.,

awaiting the DOE group.

At 6:30 P.M., I had

dinner and returned to my room.
In the process, I checked at the desk for any
messages -~ they had none.
I then wnt to my room and waited until 11:00 P.M., calling
the desk repeatedly for any messages with no luck.
Finally at 11, I went into the
bar and found Chuck Otterman,

Roger Ray,

Bill Stanley,

Harry Brown,

Bill Robeson

and vic Noshkin having a great party.
Roger Ray was so intfoxicated it was impossible
to converse with him, in fact, he could hardly stand up.
I asked Bill Stanley if
he wanted to convene the meeting -- he thought we ought to skip it!

That is exactly

what happened on my first attempt to follow the line of command and to proceed in an
orderly manner.
The next attempt occurred on March 29, 1979, in Walter Weyzen's office in Germantown.
Copies of my trip report had been sent throughcut the Las Vegas - PASO acministrative chain. Walter recognized the problems were severe and summoned Roger Ray
Your DOE legal counsel
and Bill Stanley to headquarters to discuss the discrepancies.
was there.

We met for three hours.

I am sure Walter remembers the meeting well.

Roger Ray stated that the ship cannon was probably some sort of signalling device.
He said it seriously but none of the participants could believe he meant it.

I

am

enclosing my letter of June 25 to Bill Stanley referring to that meeting (enclosure 2).
As you re-read it, I think you can see that I was still trying to work within the system -~ a copy went to Roger Ray.

You seem to indicate that the problems are "personality conflicts" between Roger
Ray and myself. “Do you know that Dr. K. Knudsen repeatedly complained to Dr. Conard JAB
that Roger Ray interfered in the program and he also insisted that Mr. Ray's position 15
be clarified concerning programmatic interference.
On another occasion, Roger Ray
kept Dr. Bond and Dr. Burr waiting several hours in Majuro in 1977, at the time of
medical negotiations for expanded care.
They cooled their heels while Mr. Ray
negotiated medical policy with the Marshallese government.
TI am enclosing a copy of
Dr. Knudsen's letter of resignation (which he never submitted) so that you can
understand that this problem is not unique with me.
Harry Brown is Mr. Ray's protege;
they act in unison...so I hold Mr. Ray responsible for Mr. Brown's transgressions.
I use the word transgressions in the true sense ("exceeding of due bounds or limits")
These acts were not just "goofs".
They were calculated decisions of a reasonably
intelligent man.
Would you pleas call Walter and ask him his opinion of Mr. Ray?
He told me that Mr. Ray frequently injected himself into areas that were not his concern and that Walter was "sick of ib".
I do not blame him.
I treasure the support
I received from Walter.
Now we get down to.the crux of the matter.

After attempting,

repeatedly,

to.

CF
pet

Cri

orkthrough the system, I consciously took a course of action.
I knew would get
gome results.
Myletters to Cdr. Utara and Gen. Gates were designed to produce
exactlythe results the acheived.
I will be dilighted to discuss this set of actions
with Ms. Clusen or anyone you feel is interested in the evolution of the problems.

Select target paragraph3