this ficldj If onthé. otherhandthéUnited‘States«can_determine
that the Scviet announcement was not accurate, we would then be in
a position to deflate Seviet claims to our subsequent advantage.
2s
che Sevict Union‘tests a therincnuclear weapen cor device before
the United States does, does not announce the test, and’ th
' United States has detected its
In this ecntingency the United States must weigh carcfully the
effect of a United States anncuncement both at heme and abroad, On
the one hand, such an annowncement could raise sericus doubts at
home and abroad as to whether the United States is in fact ahead
of the Soviet Union in the entire field of nuclear development.
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how an event of such
importance could deliberately be withheld from the United States
public. The Government cculd with great justification be accused
of withhclding information from the United States public--information which is certainly knuwn te the Seviet Union--which has such a
direct bearing on the naticnal security. Jt would be contrary to
the often repeated policy of this Government that, to the extent
consistent with the national security, the United States publi
must he informed cf mattters that affect their sécurity.
Furthermore, the inited “Stateswill not knew from day to day”
whether the Soviet Union might not maké- an armeuncement concerning
its test. Such an announcement would ferce some statement cut ef
the United States, at which tine it would be revealed that the
United States Government was in possession ef information of: vital
interest to the United States pudlic hut had not chosen to inform
the people,
It is therefore suggested that in this contingen
ney the United
States make a public announcement cuncerning the Seviet test and
that, as in the case cf the first contingency, the United States
public and cur friends and allies abroad he reminded of United _
States progress in this field in order to minimize the impression
that the Soviet Unicn is ahead of the United States,