g 24 Major Rosen proposes consideration of barges and surface ships to be used as aiming point and diagnostic base for the air drops and questions whether this method: shouldn't be considered as it might possibly be a more desirable and better method of diagnosing the air drop tests than were the airborne diagnostics that were discussed. Although slightly out of chronological order in the file this 27 October TWX from Henderson of Sandia to Betts addresses the questions about delivery of a 30 or 50 megaton device from a B52 aircraft. The response is that it looks like with parachute systems there is a method of air dropping such devices and obtaining safe separation distances for the aircraft and further the possibility of doing an exoatmospheric shot of one of these devices is addressed. It is felt that the Thor could be launched with such a warhead and certain advantages such as the minimization of fallout problems could be thus attained and notes that the desired launch sites would be in the Aleutians, Greenland, or Johnston Island. On 8 November Betts sent a memo to Leudeke documenting the fact that Sandia feels that air drop of a 30 or 50 megaton weapon from a B52 aircraft at a release altitude of 35,000 feet with a height of burst of 15,000 feet is both feasible and can be safely performed. Documentation on 8 November covers the fact that DMA has been requested to outline for a Senator Aiken the reasons for the U. S. resumption of atmospheric testing as well as underground testing and also to prepare a proposed atmospheric test schedule in the event the U.S. resumes atmospheric testing. On 10 November a TWX from Reeves of ALO to Betts documents the fact that neither one of the three laboratories can practically utilize a large amount of cable offered by the United Kingdom at a date a month or so previous to this and therefore have after a great deal of correspondence turned down the United Kingdom's offer. A memorandum for Chairman Seaborg from Betts on 10 November documents the fact that Betts will be briefing the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on 11 November and contains an outline of the briefing which contains the present AEC guidance for preparing atmospheric testing, the steps that the AEC is taking towards implementing the atmospheric program which include a planned meeting of the laboratories, and ALO and the support contractors on the 13th and 14th of November as well as a good deal of detail on 10 or so devices which are tentatively thought of as candidates for testing in the atmosphere plus a summary briefly covering the five tests already completed underground at NTS. In an unclassified letter to Senator Aiken on 13 November, Gen. Betts covers some rationale behind the commission feeling the need for resuming atmospheric testing if the President so directs. In assessing the relative positions of the United States and the Soviet Union since testing was resumed on 1 September the letter states in part "The Soviet Union could have been making relatively large gains in nuclear weapons technology through their current intensive tests in the atmosphere. They have demonstrated that the number of tests that can be concucted in the atmosphere in a comparatively short period of time is much