, The committee has no thought that the U.S. would detonate such adevice but feels that the situation should be explored since it would provide the President with a psychological weapon in the current Soviet terror campaign. Chairman Seaborg states that the AEC concurs in the first two suggestions or conclusions but has reservations about the third one in that the feasibility and advisability of the _\ method is questioned as well as the fact that even if it were feasible the AEC seriously doubts that such an experiment could be accomplished within a few days. They feel it would be technically feasible to detonate a couple of devices in close physical proximity to achieve in that yield in the range of 50 or more megatons but this could not be done in taexxxkkanxaxmakkex a matter of less than a few weeks and that even if it were done such a configuration would not really represent a weapon that would be designed for these yields nor would the technique of obtaining this yield represent the manner in which the laboratories would undertake the design of a very iarge yield deliverable weapon. He further refers to his letter of 18 October concerned with the effects of a £50 and 100 megaton weapon and goes into some detail there on the dimensions and weights of such weapons and the time scales on which the laboratories could possibly bring such a weapon into the stockpile. It is stressed that to do it at either yield, 50 or 100 megatons, and have a device ready in less than a year would be a high priority effort and would seriously interfere with the other work of the laboratories and the rest of the weapons testing program. On 27 October Mr. Howell of Holmes & Narver transmitted to Captain Craig of the DMA Test Branch preliminary drafts on the capabilities of H§N to support test operations at Eniwetok and Johnston Island and he notes that the assumptions have already become somewhat outdated and the current information on the status has not had the benefit of an onsite inspection of current conditions and facilities there. On 28 October Bradbury replied by TWX to Betts TWX of 23 October setting forth the planning for the atmospheric test resumption. No mention is made of the 28 or 43 tests which I assume means they are no longer being considered for a quick air drop program and Bradbury only addresses the 50 and the 59. Bradbury indicates that these devices will be ready at dates somewhat later than those set forth in Betts' TWX. He further discusses a number of other devices which might be feasible for airdrop testing as well as discussing the balloon testing program at NTS and notes that there are a number of devices which, if they could be so tested, would give advantages in accelerating the NTS program as well as allowing diagnostics to be done more accurately and more easily. He lists the device availability dates for these NTS balloon test devices and notes that if it turns out that political and safety pressures will not allow such a balloon test series to be done at the NTS that perhaps these could be airdropped over the Pacific. In the LRL reply to the same TWX, Foster sets forth in tabular form several options, one of which allows for underground testing only, and sets forth a schedule for the revised Nougat and revised Ivanhoe programs and the other major table covers the schedule based on authorization for a combined underground and atmospheric testing program and the dates when the various devices will be ready for this program. The date of Foster's reply is 29 Oct.