~/7 A letter dated 29 Oct. from Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to Chairman Seaborg states rather convincingly the argument against considering the use of the trust territories in the Pacific for atmospheric testing. Among other arguments are the following: Since the Unites States is charged with the administration of the trust territory and it is supervised by the United Nations, we must defend our actions in the trusteeship council and Als in the security council where the general feeling is strongly against nuclear testing and a strong desire to protect the interests of dependent peoples creates an unsympathetic atmosphere for discussion of this question. Furthermore, there is an argument that by conducting tests in the trust territory we avoid exposing our own U. S. inhabitants to the dangers and there has in fact been injury to some of the people of Rongelap in the past. Further, there is a very real potential problem in our relations with the people of these trust territories in future dealings with them and in their future desires to continue cordial and good relations with the U. S. Further, there are legal and political arguments and points to be made by our opponents should the trusteeship issue be raised and carried through in an exhaustive manner, as it certainly would be in this case. There is in fact a serious risk of having the issue brought before the International Court of Justice where the possibility exists that we might be immediately enjoined from such use of the territory. Rusk concludes that in view of these circumstances, he feels that we should avoid using a site in the trust territory for any such atmospheric tests but that the Department of State would be glad to explore any possible alternative sites for the AEC. On 30 Oct. Betts sent a memo to Chairman Seaborg in light of the State Nenartment's feelings about using the EPG and sotting forth the most major steps required for moving forward on preparing for atmospheric testing and the relative chance of the various steps of being observed by and suspect in the public eye. Among other things, he mentions the appointment of a Task Force Commander and notes that an Army Major Gen., I assume Starbird, has already been nominated and also he notes the need for the establishnent of a provisional Task Force and states that such was activated on Oct. 24. From the steps that he sets forth required in the preparation phase and the probability of a number of these steps being observed by the press and the public, it becomes pretty clear that such disclosure probably will become common knowledge and that public queries could be answered to the effect that we have announced that we are making preparations for the possible eventuality of atmospheric testing. Betts summarizes with three recommendations: 1) The AEC and DOD take immediate action to select an overseas test location; 2) that the AEC formally join with the DOD in Task Force activation and planning: and 3) that an early decision be requested from the President due to the lead-time required for many of the necessary implimenting actions and to reduce the inefficiency and lost effort that is potential. Qut of order chronologically is the next item dated 28 Oct. which is a TWX from Hertford, ALO, to Betts on Betts’ 23 Oct. TWX on the details of the plans for possible atmospheric testing. ALO reports for itself and AFSWC and notes that AFSWC now has two B-52 aircraft ready to support the airdrop program as well as equipped bhangmekex with bhangmeter and fireball diag- nostics equipment. Furthermore, AFSWC is equipping two C-130 aircraft for