In response to a request from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy the AEC General Manager sent a letter on 27 October to the Joint Committee summarizing the results of the underground test program to date which had to that point detonated 4 different events and going into detail on the current planning for future testing both underground and in the atmosphere. The letter contained a schedule for a follow-on program that is an underground test program to follow the Nougat operation which is scheduled only into February and a copy of this schedule is not. contained here but is attached to a letter to the President dated 19 September 61 and filed in the Ivanhoe file. In addition to the schedules and details of the results of the underground program the following section was included in addressing the possibilities of an atmospheric program: "we have made preliminary plans and preparations should circumstances demand and the necessary approval be obtained to perform certain proof tests as well as a portion of the Nougat and follow-on tests in the atmosphere. At the NTS these would be done on balloons and might include certain devices listed here. If we are permitted to do this type of testing at the NTS, a Nougat schedule acceleration of from one to two months might be accomplished with perhaps 4 to 5 months acceleration of the later shots of the follow-on program. Tests of certain others devices which are best performed in their high yield versions could be done by air drops in the Pacific area within a few weeks if the President should decide to test in the atmosphere. Of course a somewhat more advanced and sophisticated testing program involving relatively complex diagnostics would call for an island site, requiring several months time and a considerable expenditure of funds to get underway." Betts sent a TWX on 27 October to ALO and the labs on the subject of underground testing and requested that each of the addressees answer and comment on certain questions concerning the course of action to be taken in the area of underground testing should atmospheric testing authorization be forthcoming. The questions which he requires answers to are whether some tests can be conducted more advantageously underground, what capability for underground testing could be retained in the event we return to atmospheric testing, certain questions about the development of diagnostic techniques and instrumentation for underground testing as well as safety aspects to be studied in this area, comparison of the costs and time and instrumentation limitations in the vertical holes versus the tunnels, and what capability should exist for underground testing if atmospheric testing were stopped but exoatmospheric XeSKiNgXOSXEEAREXXKESKIRE or space testing were authorized. Betts requested these answers by 3 November. On 27 October Chairman Seaborg sent the President a letter listing certain suggestions and recommendations that the AEC General Advisory Committee chaired by a Mr. Pitzer had requested be communicated to the President without delay. The committee advised the commission that they are of the firm opinion that militarilly useful technical information can best be obtained by atmospheric testing. Secondly, it would be technically feasible to conduct a useful atmospheric test before the announced termination of the current Soviet series on 31 October if a decision were made to resume such testing within the next few days. The committee believes that possible political advantages of such a test should ke evaluated promptly. Third, the committee is convinced that the AEC could within a few days of a presidential directive come up with a single weapon having a yield of about 50 or may be up to 100 megatons.