ce ey NNDre Operation Plan CTG 7.3 No. 1-53 (3) Overt Action by Vessel or Aircraft. Overt action by v:sscl or aircraft could take the form of attack by bomb, guided missile, gunfire or assiult, (4) Raids. Raids could be conductcd by aggressive or surreptitious methods under the cover of darknoas from ships and submarincs, or possibly, from aircraft. The landing and recovery of raiders by submarine could be accomplished under the conditions of darkneas and the eorfusion resulting from thoir activities. , (5) Photography and Observation. Compromisc coule be accomplished by photozraphic means from surface ship, aircraft or subrarine. Unobserved submarine aprroich within one nile of important islands of the atoll cr overflight by unfricndly aircraft are possible. In addition, a determined surfact ship cormander might attempt to compromise tho operations by overt observation of activities in the arca from immediately outside the three (3) mile linit. By such means, periodic vhotography and observation could record and interpret the progrzss, proccss of preparation, types of construction and the approximate tinc of important opcrations from the activitics within the atoll, (6) Unauthorized Instrumentation. Mcans under this heading for obtaining unauthorized information would include pressure, hat and racintion detection devices as well as radioactive material collection devices. (7) Declaration or Commencencnt of War. In the event of thc commencement of wir, by declaration or otherwise, involving the United States, the nature and cxtent of CASTLE Operations might be radically changed, TIis difficult to predict the exact nature of these changes, but if the Opcration were continucd, partially, wholly or augmented in scope, 2 complete re-evaluation of enemy capabilities and intentions would be necessary. b, USSR Naval Cap2ebilities. (1) Subrmrine Capibilitics. If he decided to utilize his submmrine capability to obtain information concerning, or to interfere witn, CASTIE Operations, the Soviet might employ submarines as follows: (4) To instruncnt the shots by the erploymcnt of pressurc, heat and ratiaticn measuring instruments loextcd on board. The submarine probably would have to ccme to the surface to cmploy th:se instruncnts, although it is not imnossible te mount them en periscopic extensions fron a submergec subrerince in which case the detecticn of the submarinc would D~3