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Technical Report

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June 1982


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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

PHOTOGRAPH THIS SHEET

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INVENTORY

JOINT TASK FORCE 7
TASK GROUP 7.3
OPERATION PLAN NO 1-53

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

JOINT TASK FORCE 7

COMMANDER TASK GROUP 7.3

Classification (Cancelled) (Changed to ______)

By Authority of ______ CN ______

By ______ Date ______ 0669

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OPERATION PLAN

NO. 1-53

Statement A
Approved for public release;

UNCLASSIFIED

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9549

Joint Task Force SEVEN
TASK GROUP 7.3
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

FF3/7.3/10:jmt

11 April 1954

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Commander, Task Group 7.3
To: All Holders of ComTaskGroup 7.3 Operation Plan No. 1-53 of 7 December 1953

Subj: Change #4 to CTG 7.3 OpPlan 1-53

Encl: (1) Ten pages containing correction sheets

1. Purpose: The purpose of this Notice is to promulgate Change #4.

2. Action: Make change as indicated.

a. Insert pages 2, 2a, B-III-1, C-4, C-4a, F4a, F-9, F-9a, G-IV-1, G-IV-2, G-V-1 and G-V-2. Destroy superseded pages by burning. No report of destruction required.

b. Make pen and ink corrections on pages 12, C-3, C-5, C-6, G-5, X-1 and X-3.

c. Make cut-out changes on pages 10 and A-6.

3. Cancellation: This Notice is cancelled upon completion of the above changes.

4. Downgrading: This Notice may be downgraded to Unclassified when separated from enclosure.

H. C. BRUTON

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

This document contains 15 pages, copy number 140 of 185 copies, series A
153

Pen and ink corrections

3549

page 12 under "G Radiological Safety" add the following

"Appendix IV Radioactive Fallout Reports
Appendix V Additional RadSafe Measures Directed for Shot Times"

page C-3 subparagraph 2.a.(3)(b). Under "Supporting Unit" add "SHEA". Under "Units to be Supported" delete "GYPSY" and "SIOUX" and on same line as CURTISS add "MENDER" and "SIOUX". On same line with SHEA add "RECLAIMER".

page C-5 subparagraph 2.d.(4). Delete last three sentences commencing with "Naval ....."and substitute the following:

"Ships and units having confinement cases, but not equipped with brigs, shall so inform the SOPA who will make arrangements for the confinement of the personnel involved."

page C-6 subparagraph 2.d.(8). Delete last sentence commencing with "For transportation..." and substitute the following:

"Personnel ordered transferred to the United States for duty or granted emergency leave shall be directed to report to MATS Terminal FRED with three copies of their orders or leave papers certifying that they are authorized to travel to the CONUS. Leave papers of those granted emergency leave shall contain the words 'Emergency leave' therein. Also mark leave papers or orders 'Has no Badge'".

page G-5. Under "Appendices" add the following:

"IV Radioactive Fallout Reports
V Additional RadSafe Measures Directed for Shot Times"

Page X-1 Personnel Clearance Status Report. Under "DATE REQUIRED" change to read: "Monthly on the last day. A report on the fifteenth is required only if changes occur."

Page X-3 Semi-monthly status report. Delete. This report no longer required.

3441

JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
TASK GROUP 7.3
c/o Postmaster, APO 187 (HOW)
San Francisco, California

FF3/7.3/30:ejt
30 January 1954

TASK ROUP 7.3 NOTICE 3121

From: Commander, Task Group 7.3
To: All Holders of ComTaskGroup 7.3 Operation Plan No. 1-53 of 7 Dec 1953

Subj: Change #2; forwarding of

Encl: (1) Change #2, consisting of: Replacement pages, Pen and Ink Changes and Cut Out corrections.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this notice is to promulgate Change #2 to ComTaskGroup 7.3 Operation Plan No. 1-53.

2. DIRECTIVE. THE ATTENTION OF ALL COMMANDERS OF TASK UNITS AND COMMANDING OFFICERS IS PARTICULARLY DIRECTED TO NEW ANNEX J INCLUDED HEREIN, ENTITLED "CONTACT IDENTIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURE".

3. Scope. Corrections shall be made as indicated below:

a. Insert new or replacement pages as follows: J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, J-7, J-8, J-9, J-10, J-11 and J-I-A-1. Destroy superceded pages by burning; no report of destruction is required.

b. Make Pen and Ink corrections on pages 2, C-3, C-I-1, F-2, F-4, F-I-A-1, F-I-A-2, F-I-A-7, F-I-B-1, F-I-B-2, F-I-B-4, F-I-B-5, I-II-A-1, and C-I-2.

c. Make cut out change on page F-8.

4. Cancellation. This notice is cancelled upon completion of the above changes.

5. This notice may be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL when separated from enclosure.

H. C. BRUTON

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OF 16 PAGES, NO. 140
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SECRET

PEN AND INK CHANGES

1. Operation Plan, page 2, para i. under ENIWETOK Harbor Unit, add:

"1 YO, when at ENIWETOK"

2. Annex C, page C-3, para 2.a.(3)(b), line 6, after ESTES, YAG 39, YAG 40, add:

" YOG 61, YO 120 and YOGN 82"

3. Annex C, Appendix I, page C-I-1, para 1.a.(1), last line, add:

" YO 120, YOG 61 and YOGN 82", between "YAG 40" and "to ESTES".

4. Annex F, page F-2, para 4.b.(4) add: "Only the following personnel of TG 7.1 are authorized to originate traffic from TG 7.1 addressed to activities outside the forward area: Dr. W. E. OGLE; Mr. DUNCAN CURRY, JR; Mr. ARMAND KELLY; Mr. DUANE SEWELL; Mr. WALTER GIBBIN; COL H. K. GILBERT, USA; CAPT NEIL KINGSLEY, USN; upon presentation of proper identification.

5. Annex F, page F-4, para 6.b. delete all after "Authentication" line #1. Substitute "CTG 7.3 will distribute AFSAL 5369 to all units, which will be used for authentication between JTF units."

6. Annex F, page F-4, para 7.b. delete addees after "INFO" on sample heading, substitute "CJTF SEVEN ENIWETOK; CTG 7.1; CTG 7.2; CTG 7.5; CTU 7.3.1, CTU 7.3.2; CTU 7.3.3; CTU 7.3.7; CTU 7.3.8; and own TU Commander."

7. Annex F, Appendix I, TAB A, page F-I-A-1, Channel 1a, 1b delete second sentence. Substitute "Ships having one or two operators copy TG Common at appropriate periods as set forth in Art 331, USF 70(B), keeping CTG 7.3 informed."

Third sentence delete "BAIROKO" substitute "CURTISS".

8. Annex F, Appendix I, TAB A, page F-I-A-2, Channel 5 substitute "CURTISS" for "BAIROKO" where appearing. Sentence 5 delete and substitute "CURTISS will mail via guard mail each Thursday, copies of B3.1 FOX log sheets and general messages for all ships for whom she is guard." Last sentence, delete "F3" substitute "B3.1"

Channel 6 substitute "CURTISS" for "BAIROKO" where appearing. Sentence 2, add "CURTISS will distribute broadcast log sheets to all ships for whom she is guard simultaneous with Channel 4 logs."

Channel 14 delete and substitute "Circuit will be activated only upon direction of CTG 7.3."

9. Annex F, Appendix I, TAB A, page F-I-A-6 Channel 28c add "Channel 28c will be used for IFF checkout between aircraft in the ENIWETOK area and AOC ENIWETOK."

Channel 32 second sentence delete "Flag Plot" substitute "Operations Office (IVY Wiring Room)".

Channel 33 add "This circuit will be utilized as an alternate channel in the event of failure or overload of circuit J-202."

[redacted]

CHANGE #2

PEN AND INK CHANGES (CONTINUED)

10. Annex F, Appendix I, TAB A, page F-I-A-7 Channel 35 delete Channel 35d and 35e.

Add "Channel 42 In event of failure of the TC 7.4 Homing Beacon on ENYU CURTISS activate a homer using 100-500 watts, identifier 'AV'".

11. Annex F, Appendix I, TAB B, page F-I-B-1 Column M delete "LST 551, LST 762". Substitute "LST's).

Column O add "DM-30", "ARS-42".

Column P add "YOG-61"; delete "G" opposite channels 2 and 3.

Channel 6 Column H add "Cy".

Channel 7a Column F delete "G"; Column P add "G".

12. Annex F, Appendix I, TAB B, page F-I-B-2 Channel 15 delete "CAP" substitute "F4-U".

Channel 20c Column P delete "L"; Column A delete "154.57" substitute "152.99".

13. Annex F, Appendix I, TAB B, page F-I-B-4 Channel 36 Column A delete "156.7" substitute "153.11".

14. Annex F, Appendix I, TAB B, page F-I-B-5 add "Channel 42 BIKINI (NAN) STANDBY HOMING BEACON" Column A insert "400"; Column H insert "T".

15. Annex I, Appendix II, TAB A, page I-II-A-1 delete the words "SHACKLE FIRST TWO GROUPS USING CURRENT PAC SIX SHACKLE CODE".

16. Annex C, Appendix I, page C-I-2 para 1.c.(5) delete the sentence "These reports shall be made using current PAC 6 shackle code" and add "This report shall be made by deferred message."

[redacted]

JOINT TASK FORCE 7
TASK GROUP 7.3
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-53

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CHANGES TO OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-53

Enter Number and Date of Corrections as Indicated

CHANGE NO.	DATED	EFFECTIVE	DATE MADE	SIGNATURE
1.	31 Dec 53	now	6 Jan 54	[illegible]
2.	3 Jan 54	immediately	[illegible]	[illegible]
3.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Chart Reference: Grids of ENIWETOK and BIKINI, HO 6032; HO 6033; HO 2009 FC; HO 2010 FC; and HO 2011 FC

Task Organization:

a.	TU 7.3.0	Special Devices Unit	CAPT R.E.C. JONES
	(1) TE 7.3.0.0	Special Devices Element USS CURTISS (AV-4)	CAPT R.E.C. JONES
	(2) TE 7.3.0.1	Escort Element	As assigned
b.	TU 7.3.1	Surface Security Unit Cort DesDiv 12 USS EPPERSON (DDE-719)(F) USS PHILIP (DDE-498) USS NICHOLAS (DDE-449) USS HENSHAW (DDE-499)	CAPT J. E. SMITH CDR N. B. DAVIS CDR G. W. ALBIN CDR J. C. ELIOT CDR L. H. ALFORD
	(1) TE 7.3.1.0	USS PC 1546 ENIWETOK Surface Security Element	LT B.B. GARLINGHOUSE As Assigned.
c.	TU 7.3.2	Carrier Unit	CAPT E. O'BEIRNE
	(1) TE 7.3.2.0	Carrier Element USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) 10 USN & Air Force helicopters as assigned	CAPT E. O'BEIRNE
	(2) TE 7.3.2.1	BIKINI Fighter Element 3 F4U-5N	Senior Naval Aviator assigned
	(3) TE 7.3.2.2	ENIWETOK Fighter Element 3 F4U-5N	Senior Naval Aviator assigned
d.	TU 7.3.3	Patrol Plane Unit VP - 29 12 P2V-6 1 P2V-5 1 P4Y-2 2 PBM-5A	CDR W. ARNOLD
e.	TU 7.3.4	Joint Task Force Flagship Unit USS ESTES (AGC-12)	CAPT J. W. WATERHOUSE

[redacted]

f. TU 7.3.5	Utility Unit USS RENDER (ARSD 2) USS COCOPA (ATF 101) USS MOLALA (ATF 106) USS APACHE (ATF 67) USS SIOUX (ATF 75) USS TAWAKONI (ATF 114)	LCDR L. JONES LCDR L. JONES LT W. O. WILSON LT D. F. REED LT T. A. CASEY LT T. B. HURTT LT R. A. MOWRER
g. TU 7.3.6	MW Ship Countermeasures Test Unit	CAPT G. G. MOLUMPHY
(1) TE 7.3.6.0	Drone Ship Element YAG 39 YAG 40	CAPT G. G. MOLUMPHY LCDR H. W. ANCELL, Jr. LCDR J. S. MALAYTER
(2) TE 7.3.6.1	Towing and Decontamination Element ATFs as assigned	As assigned
h. TU 7.3.7	BIKINI Harbor Unit	CAPT E. O'BEIRNE
(1) TE 7.3.7.0	Landing Ship Dock Element USS BELLE GROVE (LSD 2)	CDR C. O. LOWE
(2) TE 7.3.7.1	Boat Pool Element 5 LCU 15 LCM 2 LCPR 1 26' MNB 1 AVP 1 YCV 1 YFN 1 YC	LT B. R. WATKINS
i. TE 7.3.7.2	Mine Project Element USS SHEA (DM 30)	CDR J. W. REED
(1) TE 7.3.7.3	Mine Laying and Recovery Element USS RECLAIMER (ARS 42) EODU ONE (Team 1)	LCDR H. K. SMITH LCDR H. K. SMITH LT W. R. BROOKS
(2) TE 7.3.7.4	Mine Ready and Analysis Element USS LST 1157 Mine Project SIX	LCDR R. S. SCOTT, Jr. LCDR R. S. SCOTT, Jr.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

j.	TU 7.3.8	ENIWETOK Harbor Unit 3 LCM YOG YOGN 1 AVR 1 LCPR 1 YO, when at ENIWETOK Ships in upkeep ENIWETOK	
k.	TU 7.3.9	Transport Unit	CDR C. O. LOWE
	(1) TE 7.3.9.0	Special Devices Transport Element USS BELLE GROVE (LSD 2)	CDR C. O. LOWE CDR C. O. LOWE

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

(2) TE 7.3.9.1	Special Devices Transport Element USS LST 762	LT J.O. BACHERT
(3) TE 7.3.9.2	Escort Element	As assigned
(4) TE 7.3.9.3	Escort Element	As assigned
(5) TE 7.3.9.4	Material Transport Element USS LST 551	LT R.G. KANZEBACH
(6) TE 7.3.9.5	Material Transport Unit	As assigned
(7) TE 7.3.9.6	Personnel Transport Element USNS Fred C. AINSWORTH (T-AP-181)	C. W. HUTCHESON, MASTER LCDR H.B.KRUETZFELDT CO, Military Dept.

1. General. This plan is based on CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53 of 10 November 1953, copies of which are being distributed to all ships and units of TG 7.3 with this plan.

a. By direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Force 132 (JTF 132) was activated on 9 July 1951 for the purpose of conducting Operation IVY at ENIWETOK Atoll during 1952. Operation IVY was completed on 21 November 1952. On 21 May 1953, the JCS designated the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to continue as Executive Agent for a subsequent overseas Atomic Test (Operation CASTLE) and broadened the mission of CJTF 132 to include the execution of CASTLE. On 1 February 1953, Joint Task Force 132 was redesignated Joint Task Force SEVEN (JTF SEVEN). By direction of the JCS, CJTF SEVEN will conduct tests of experimental devices at the Atomic Proving Grounds at ENIWETOK and BIKINI in the winter and spring of 1954. Seven (7) shots are presently planned. Further details in Annex A.

b. Joint Task Force SEVEN is commanded by Major General P. W. CLARKSON, U.S. Army, with the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army as Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJTF SEVEN reports to CINCPAC for movement control, logistics support and for purposes of general security with respect to Joint Task Force SEVEN and the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area.

c. Joint Task Force SEVEN is organized into five task groups:

Task Group 7.1 (Scientific)	Dr. William E. CGLE, LASL
Task Group 7.2 (Army)	COL Edward H. LAHTI, USA
Task Group 7.3 (Navy)	RADM H. C. BRUTON, USN

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Task Group 7.4 (Air Force) BRIG GEN H. M. ESTES, USAF
Task Group 7.5 (AEC Base Facilities) Mr. James E. REEVES, AEC

d. ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area is that area encompassing ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls and bounded by the meridians 160° 35' E and 166° 16' E and by the parallels 10° 15' N and 12° 45' N, an area of 150 by 340 miles. For other area definition, see paragraph 1 CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53.

e. Intelligence, Security and Public Information - Annex D.

2. Mission. The mission of Task Group 7.3, broadly stated, is to provide the necessary afloat support, including an evacuation capability, for the Joint Task Force Commander and other task groups of Joint Task Force SEVEN, and to provide for the security of the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area.

3. Tasks Assigned Task Group 7.3:

a. Provide for the security of the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area by:

(1) Maintaining the status of the "Closed Area".

(2) Detecting, warning and escorting unauthorized vessels and aircraft out of the Danger Area.

b. Provide suitable water transportation, air and surface escort and shipboard assembly facilities for the weapons and devices to meet the requirements of the Commander, TG 7.1.

c. Provide shipboard command and control facilities for CJTF SEVEN, with command and administrative space for CTG 7.1, CTG 7.4, and CTG 7.5 afloat.

d. Assume operational control of inter-island helicopter airlift system at BIKINI and provide ship to shore and inter-island surface and helicopter transportation, primarily at BIKINI, to include flights for damage survey and recovery of scientific data.

e. Provide shipboard facilities to house designated elements of the joint task force while afloat, including pre-shot evacuations as directed by CJTF SEVEN.

f. Support TG 7.1 directly with ships, aircraft and small craft required in experiments and projects and as otherwise directed by CJTF SEVEN.

[redacted]

g. Provide personnel, as required, for participation in the defense of ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls. All military personnel based on ENIWETOK Island will, to the extent practicable, be trained in and available for ground defense.

h. Exercise maximum economy in the conduct of all operations. Attention is directed to letter, subject: "Conservation of Funds, Time and Resources", published by CJTF SEVEN on 8 May 1953.

4. Tasks of subordinate units:

a. Commander Special Devices Unit shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Receive, transport and safeguard special devices as directed.

(2) Provide shipboard facilities for assembly of devices and space for CTG 7.1 administration and laboratories.

(3) Act as flagship of CTG 7.3 enroute to the forward area.

(4) Provide transportation to the forward area for approximately 100 officer and 50 troop class personnel of JTF SEVEN.

(5) Assist Joint Task Force Weather Control by taking Rawind data.

b. Commander Surface Security Unit shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Provide surface escorts and plane guards as directed.

(2) Conduct anti-submarine, air and surface search of designated areas, as directed. (See Annex B).

(3) Detect, warn and escort out of the Danger Area any unauthorized craft.

(4) Take such action as may be directed or authorized in the event a ship (including submarines), craft or aircraft takes offensive action, as later defined, against ENIWETOK or BIKINI Atolls or against a unit of the Joint Task Force. (See Annexes H and J).

(5) Station at least one DDE as TE 7.3.1.0 at ENIWETOK Atoll (See Annexes H and I) to provide surface patrol, ASW, air search and fighter director services.

(6) Provide air search, fighter director and communications services for CTE 7.3.2.2, as required.

(7) Perform rescue missions as directed. (See Annex E).

(8) Provide a capability for rapid surface movement of ground defense forces between ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls in the event of emergency.

(9) Provide control homing ship for TG 7.4 aircraft at shot times if required.

c. Commander Carrier Unit shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Transport from the west coast to the forward area the following:

Material:

15 F84G Sampler Aircraft (TG 7.4)
3 to 6 A-20 Aircraft (TG 7.4)
10 HRS Aircraft (TG 7.3)
6 F4U-5N Aircraft (TG 7.3)
2 LCPL type Barge and Gig with dollies (CTG 7.3)
3 Trailers 27' long 11' high 8' wide, weight 18,000 lbs (TG 7.1)
600 cubic feet, 10 tons water spray equipment (TG 7.3)
2 675 cubic feet reefers
2 8GPH distilling units
Assorted recreation equipment
Radiac Instruments (TG 7.1)
Personnel:

22 Officers, 70 enlisted men (TG 7.4)
3 Officers or officer class, 2 enlisted men (TG 7.3)
32 Officers and 142 enlisted (Naval Air Units)

(2) Operate a ship-to-shore and inter-island helicopter lift system at BIKINI Atoll to support pre-shot operations, post-shot surveys and scientific data recovery. (See Annex N).

(3) Assist TG 7.4 with inter-island airlift operations at ENIWETOK as directed by CTG 7.3 by assigning helicopters to CTG 7.4 operational control.

(4) Provide decontamination facilities aboard CVE for own aircraft and assigned Air Force helicopters.

(5) Control and provide manpower for rough decontamination of aircraft ashore at BIKINI Atoll.

(6) Assist CTG 7.4 in search and rescue operations. (See Annex E).

(7) Provide space and command facilities for CTG 7.3 in the forward area.

(8) Base 3 F4U-5N each at ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls, respectively. Operate 3 BIKINI F4U-5N from CVE during BIKINI shot evacuation periods, as directed.

(9) Control and operate F4U-5N aircraft, as directed.

(10) Take such action as may be directed or authorized, in the event a ship (including submarines), craft or aircraft, takes offensive action, as later defined, against ENIWETOK or BIKINI Atolls or against a unit of the Joint Task Force. (See Annex J).

(11) Maintain all F4U-5N aircraft and assigned USMC helicopters.

(12) Maintain a plot of all ships and aircraft transiting the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area.

(13) Provide space and power for radio-chemical laboratory and operations office for radiological safety unit, TU 7 of TG 7.1, and for three (3) trailers, each 28' x 8' x 11'.

(14) Assist Joint Task Force Weather Central by taking Rawind data.

d. Commander Patrol Plane Unit shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Provide for the security of the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area by air patrol of that area as directed. (See Annex I).

(2) Provide air escort for Special Devices Unit or Special Devices Transport Unit as directed.

(3) When directed before each shot, patrol out to 800 miles to detect and warn any surface shipping from the significant sector.

(4) Take such action as may be directed or authorized in the event a ship (including submarines), craft or aircraft takes offensive action, as later defined, against ENIWETOK or BIKINI Atolls or against a unit of the Joint Task Force. (See Annex J).

(5) Provide logistic support for the Navy aircraft participating in scientific programs.

(6) Assist in post-shot location of collector buoys for fall-out measurements.

(7) When directed make two specially configured HRS-5A available to CTG 7.4 for inter-atoll airlift.

e. Commander Joint Task Force Flagship Unit shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Provide shipboard command, control and communications facilities for CJTF SEVEN and staff.

(2) Provide facilities and personnel for the Joint Task Force Weather Central.

(3) Provide command, control and communications facilities for CTG 7.4.

(4) Provide assistance to TG 7.1 with certain scientific projects, including the major portion of personnel required for decontamination of drone ships.

f. Commander Utility Unit shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Provide general tug services as directed.

(2) Assist TG 7.5 in mooring shot barges and in preventing loss of barge-loaded devices in heavy weather or other emergency.

(3) Assist TG 7.1 in carrying out scientific projects, including the positioning and recovery of test equipment and free floating buoys.

(4) Assist Commander TU 7.3.6 with remote control, towing, ship evacuation and decontamination facilities.

(5) Plant mooring buoys for TG 7.3 boat pool craft.

(6) Assign ATF's to other task units as directed.

g. Commander AW Ship Countermeasures Test Unit shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Prepare and train drone ships and control units for tests.

(2) Direct the movement of drone vessels and assigned ATF's and aircraft.

(3) Direct, and provide for the radiological safety of, working parties from other units of TG 7.3 assigned for decontamination duties aboard drones.

h. Commander BIKINI Harbor Unit shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Control Harbor Operations at BIKINI.

(2) Assist in cargo handling operations at BIKINI, as requested.

(3) Operate and maintain TG 7.3 Boat Pool at BIKINI taking cognizance of the Task Force Commander's concept of coordinated Boat Pool Operations. (See Annex O).

(4) Provide SAR surface craft facilities at BIKINI.

(5) Provide POL replenishment services for Task Force Units at BIKINI.

(6) When Belle Grove is present at BIKINI, delegate foregoing tasks to CTE 7.3.7.0 as desired.

i. Commander ENIWETOK Harbor Unit shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Control Harbor Operations at ENIWETOK.

(2) Assist in cargo handling operations at ENIWETOK, as requested.

(3) At ENIWETOK, operate and maintain assigned units of TG 7.3 Boat Pool, taking cognizance of the Task Force Commander's concept of coordinated Boat Pool Operations. (See Annex O).

(4) Provide SAR surface craft facilities at ENIWETOK.

(5) Provide POL replenishment services for task force units at ENIWETOK.

(6) Detect surreptitious entrance of unauthorized ships or boats into ENIWETOK Lagoon by maintaining continuous hydrophone surveillance of harbor entrances.

(7) Coordinate information from visual and radar searches of units present to permit early identification of hydrophone contacts and inform appropriate units.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

j. Commander Transport Unit shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Transport the special devices and the necessary barges and associated personnel between and within ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls, as directed.

(2) Provide shipboard facilities for pre-shot evacuation of Task Force personnel for BIKINI Atoll.

(3) Provide afloat barracks accommodations and administrative space in Personnel Transport Element for TG 7.5 during BIKINI operations. (See Appendix II to Annex C).

(4) Provide surface transportation for personnel and materials between BIKINI and ENIWETOK Atolls, and other designated points.

See back of page for change!

x. (1) This operation plan is effective for planning purposes on receipt and is effective for all units upon reporting to CTG 7.3 for operational control. Commanding Officers of all ships and units are required to be thoroughly familiar with CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53 to insure intelligent performance of assigned tasks. A separate CTG 7.3 Operation order will be promulgated for each shot.

(2) All units, except VP-29, shall be prepared to provide working parties to assist Commander AW Ship Countermeasures Test Unit.

(3) Commander Carrier Unit and Commander Joint Task Force Flagship Unit will provide and maintain recreation facilities for TG 7.3 personnel at their respective bases.

(4) All units having organized landing forces be prepared to land such to assist in ground defense of ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls, if so directed.

(5) All units shall provide for the radiological safety of all embarked Task Force personnel.

(6) All units shall be prepared to provide emergency post-shot evacuation of all personnel from both atolls for a period of less than 48 hours. A detailed plan to cover this contingency will be promulgated before the shot period.

[redacted]

k. Commander Mine Project Element shall perform the following tasks:

(1) Recommend movements and control operations of the ships and craft of CTE 7.3.7.2 which includes TE 7.3.7.3 and TE 7.3.7.4.

(2) Transport test inert mines to forward area.

(3) Determine plans of participation of Project 3.4 in barge shots.

(4) Plant mines prior to barge shots.

(5) Recover, examine and record data on mines.

(6) Provide for radiological safety of TE 7.3.7.2, TE 7.3.7.3 and TE 7.3.7.4.

[redacted]

(7) All units shall obtain and furnish weather information, as requested by Task Force Weather Central.

(8) All units will exercise maximum economy, consistent with effective performance, in the conduct of all operations.

(9) Units base at BIKINI, ENIWETOK, or KWAJALEIN Atolls, as directed.

5.K. Logistics in accordance with Annex C.

6.B. a. Commander Task Group 7.3 at Naval Gun Factory, Washington, D. C. until embarked in USS CURTISS for passage to forward area, and upon arrival, in USS BAIROKO or on Parry Island as announced.

b. Use time zone minus twelve (MIKE) while in forward area.

c. Captain J. W. Waterhouse in USS ESTES (AGC-12) second in command.

d. Communications in accordance with Annex F.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Annexes:

A. Concept of Operation
- Appendix I — Map of ENIWETOK Atoll (Showing Code Names of Islands)
- Appendix II — Map of BIKINI Atoll (Showing Code Names of Islands)

B Organization and Command Relationships
- Appendix I — Organization for Operation CASTLE (Prior to On-Site Phase)
- Appendix II — Organization, Staff, Commander Task Group 7.3
- Appendix III — Organization, Task Group 7.3

C Logistics
- Appendix I — Resupply and Replenishment
- Appendix II — Shot Period and Emergency Evacuation and Reentry
- Appendix III — Official Observers Plan
- Appendix IV — Division of Funding

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

D Intelligence, Security and Public Information

E Search and Rescue Plan

F Communications
- Appendix I Radio Circuit Plan
  - TAB A Radio Circuit Description
  - TAB B Radio Frequency Plan
  - TAB C Aircraft Radio Frequency Plan
- Appendix II Radio Circuit Diagrams
  - TAB A Principle Task Force HF Circuits
  - TAB B Joint Task Force SEVEN Teletype Network
  - TAB C Security Patrol Communications

G Radiological Safety
- Appendix I Radiological Safety Regulations
- Appendix II Hazards Resulting from Atomic Bomb Explosions
- Appendix III Decontamination Procedures

H Surface Security Unit Employment Plan
- Appendix I BIKINI Patrol Sectors
- Appendix II ENIWETOK Patrol Sectors

I Aerial Search and Fighter Defense Plan
- Appendix I Basic ASW Patrol Plans
- Appendix II Patrol Plane in Flight Report
  - TAB A Patrol Planes Weather Reporting Code
  - TAB B Visibility Table

J Contact Identification and Development Procedure
- Appendix I ~~Tasks of UDU Installation, ENIWETOK Atoll~~ Hydrophone Contact Development Procedure

K Typhoon and Tidal Wave Plan

L Hostile Alert Plan

M Shot Phase Evacuation and Reentry Plan

N Airlift Plan

O Boat Plan

P Weather Plan

Q Photography Plan

X Summary of Reports

[redacted]

Appendix IV Radioactive Fallout Reports
Appendix V Additional RadSafe Measures Directed for Shot Times.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

DISTRIBUTION:

Addresses	No. of Copies	Copy Nos.
CJTF SEVEN	15	1-15
CTG 7.1	5	16-20
CTG 7.2	5	21-25
CTG 7.4	5	26-30
CTG 7.5	2	31-32
CNO	3	33-35
CinCPac	2	36-37
CinCPacFlt	5	38-42
ComServPac	2	43-44
ComWesSeaFron	2	45-46
CO, NavStaKwaj	2	47-48
ComAirPac	2	49-50
ComPhibPac	2	51-52
ComCruDesPac	2	53-54
ComHawSeaFron	2	55-56
ComMSTS, PAC	3 (2 for USNS AINSWORTH)	57-59
USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)	7	60-66
USS [illegible]	5	67-71
Patrol Squadron 29 (VP-29)	3	72-74
USS [illegible] ([illegible] 12)	5	75-79
USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2)	5	80-84
USS LST 7[illegible]	2	85-86
USS LST [illegible]	2	87-88
COMCORTDESDIV TWELVE	2	89-90
USS EPPERSON (DDE-719)	3	91-93
USS NICHOLAS (DDE-449)	3	94-96
USS RENSHAW (DDE-499)	3	97-99
USS PHILIP (DDE-498)	3	100-102
USS PC 1546	2	103-104
USS GYPSY (ARSD-1)	2	105-106
USS MOLALA (ATF-106)	2	107-108
USS APACHE (ATF-67)	2	109-110
USS SIOUX (ATF-75)	2	111-112
USS TAWAKONI (ATF-114)	2	113-114
USS COCOPA (ATF-101)	2	115-116
[illegible] G 39	1	117
[illegible] 40	1	118
[illegible] Task Group 7.3 Boat Pool	2	119-120
[illegible] Task Group 7.3 Underwater Detection Unit	1	121

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Proj Officer, Proj 6.4, BuShips Code 568	1	122
Composite Squadron THREE (VC-3)	2	123-124
Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 362 (HMR-362)	1	125
Staff, CTG 7.3:		
N-1	3	126-128
N-2	1	129
N-3	4	130-133
N-4	2	134-135
N-5	2	136-137

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
Lieutenant Commander
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Annex A

Commander's Concept of Operations

1. General. Operation CASTLE will be a series of atomic tests conducted early in 1954 at ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls, MARSHALL Islands. As it affects the Naval Task Group, the operation will have three general phases:

a. Deployment to forward area.

b. Preparation in forward area.

c. Shot Activities, including Evacuation.

2. Mission of Task Group 7.3.

a. To furnish the necessary afloat support, including an evacuation capability, for the Joint Task Force Commander and the other task groups (especially the Scientific Task Group) of the Joint Task Force, in the conduct of tests of experimental weapons and devices and the conduct of technical and measurement programs, and

b. To provide for the security of the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area by maintaining the status of the "Closed Area", and by detecting, warning and escorting unauthorized vessels and aircraft out of the Danger Area.

3. Deployment Phase. It is expected that TG 7.3 ships and units will depart from home ports or operating areas, arrive in the forward area, and carry out certain tasks enroute as indicated:

SHIP	DEPART		ARRIVE		
	PLACE	DATE	PLACE	DATE	REMARKS
USS CURTISS	SAN DIEGO	1-2-54	NSC OAKLAND	1-4-54	For loading TG 7.1 Material
	NSC OAKLAND	1-8-54	PORT CHICAGO	1-8-54	For Loading Special Components
	PORT CHICAGO	1-10-54	ENIWETOK	1-24-54	For Off Loading
	ENIWETOK	1-26-54	BIKINI	1-27-54	Operations
CortDesDiv12	PEARL HARBOR	1-17-54	ENIWETOK	1-24-54	Rendevous with and Screen CURTISS
USS PC 1546	PEARL HARBOR	1-5-54	ENIWETOK	1-15-54	Operations

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

SHIP	DEPART		ARRIVE		REMARKS
	PLACE	DATE	PLACE	DATE	
USS BAIROKO	SAN DIEGO	1-9-54	KWAJALEIN	1-21-54	Off load AUW Unit and Weapons at Kwajalein.
	KWAJALEIN	1-21-54	ENIWETOK	1-22-54	Fly off 6 HRS to BIKINI while enroute.
	ENIWETOK	1-23-54	BIKINI	1-24-54	Operations
VP-29	WHIDBEY IS.	1-4-54	KWAJALEIN	1-11-54	Operations
USS ESTES	SAN DIEGO	1-18-54	PEARL HARBOR	1-24-54	48 Hr. Stop-Over
	PEARL HARBOR	1-26-54	ENIWETOK	2-3-54	Operations
BELLE GROVE	SAN DIEGO	1-2-54	PEARL HARBOR	1-10-54	48 Hr. Stop-Over
	PEARL HARBOR	1-12-54	BIKINI	1-20-54	Stops only long enough to off load Boat Pool 3rd Echelon
	BIKINI	1-20-54	ENIWETOK	1-21-54	Load Boat Pool 1st & 2nd Echelons
	ENIWETOK	1-21-54	BIKINI	1-22-54	Operations
USS GYPSY	PEARL HARBOR	1-27-54	BIKINI	2-8-54	Operations
USS MOLALA	SAN PEDRO	1-2-54	PEARL HARBOR	1-11-54	Test with YaGs enroute. Rest. Avail. at Pearl.
	PEARL HARBOR	1-20-54	BIKINI	2-6-54	Operations
USS APACHE	SUBIC BAY	1-4-54	BIKINI	1-29-54	It is anticipated
USS SIOUX	PEARL HARBOR	1-17-54	BIKINI	1-26-54	that YCV 9, YFN 934
USS COCOPA	PEARL HARBOR	1-30-54	BIKINI	2-8-54	and YC will be de-
TAWAKONI	PEARL HARBOR	1-2-54	BIKINI	1-16-54	livered to BIKINI by AFFs arriving from Pearl Harbor
YAG 39 & 40	SAN PEDRO	1-2-54	PEARL HARBOR	1-11-54	See Molala Remarks
	PEARL HARBOR	1-20-54	BIKINI	2-6-54	See Molala Remarks
USS LST 762					Already in Fwd Area
USS LST 551	PEARL HARBOR	12-13-53	MAJURO	12-23-53	Off loads Material for Weather Stations
	MAJURO	12-26-53	KUSAIE	12-28-53	" " " "
	KUSAIE	12-31-53	PONAPE	1-1-54	" " " "
	PONAPE	1-3-54	ENIWETOK	1-5-54	Loading for Rongerik
	ENIWETOK	1-9-54	RONGERIK	1-10-54	Off load Weather Station Material
	RONGERIK	1-14-54	BIKINI	1-15-54	Commences inter-atoll surface lift
AINSWORTH	SAN PEDRO	2-13-54	BIKINI	2-26-54	

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

SHIP	DEPART		ARRIVE		REMARKS
	PLACE	DATE	PLACE	DATE	
BOAT POOL					
1st Echelon	SAN DIEGO	10-17-53	ENIWETOK	11-2-53	4 LCM in USS COLONIA
2nd Echelon	SAN DIEGO	10-4-53	ENIWETOK	12-2-53	2 LCU, 12 LCM via FT. MARION & GUNSTON HALL
3rd Echelon	SAN DIEGO	1-2-54	BIKINI	1-20-54	In BELLE GROVE

Ships and units are expected to be sailed to the forward area by type commanders or other commanders having operational control, and to report to CTG 7.3 for operational control as directed, generally upon crossing the boundary of the Danger Area.

4. Preparation Phase

a. The Preparation Phase in the forward area commences on 16 January with the arrival of the first ATF with the YCV and YFN, and is characterized by operations to prepare, transport and instrument the special device for the first shot, and to rehearse the tasks which must be performed immediately before, during and after this shot. Certain specific operations not involving all units nor contained in other annexes, will be performed during this period and are listed with a designation of the performing unit in anticipated chronological order.

	Operation	TU
(1)	Mooring of YCV near shot site prior 17 Jan.	ATF of 7.3.5
(2)	Mooring of YFN near LSD buoy at BIKINI prior 17 Jan.	ATF of 7.3.5
(3)	Planting of twenty buoys for LCM moorings prior 20 Jan.	Unit of 7.3.5
(4)	Commence helicopter inter-island transportation system at BIKINI 20 Jan.	7.3.2
(5)	Commence boat pool inter-island transportation system at BIKINI 22 Jan.	7.3.7
(6)	Position and assist in instrumentation of lagoon fall-out refts of Projects 2.5a	7.3.5& 7.3.7

[redacted]

	Operation	TU
(7)	Lay marker buoys and conduct LCU survey of certain areas	7.3.7
(8)	Render direct support to Project 1.6 with modified LCM	7.3.7
(9)	Transport loaded dummy device barge from PARRY Island to shot site	LSD of 7.3.9
(10)	Transport loaded dummy device barge from shot site to PARRY Island.	LSD of 7.3.9
(11)	Commence laying moorings for Project 1.4, 8 Feb.	7.3.5& 7.3.7
(12)	Conduct rehearsal of cloud sampling aircraft operations while underway	7.3.4
(13)	Conduct rehearsal of drone ship operations with control from aircraft.	7.3.6
(14)	Commence instrumentation of Project 1.4.	7.3.5
(15)	Conduct airborne tests of Project 1.4 telemetering.	7.3.3
(16)	Transport shot barge loaded with special device to shot site.	LSD of 7.3.9
(17)	Commence evacuation of trailers from shot site.	7.3.7

5. Shot Activities, including Evacuation

a. The Shot and Evacuation Phase will commence about six (6) days prior to the first scheduled shot and will continue until about three (3) days after the final shot. Pre-shot evacuation of all or nearly all personnel, and movement of varying quantities of equipment, will be required for each shot at BIKINI Atoll. No general personnel evacuation nor extensive movement of equipment is planned prior to the scheduled shot at ENIWETOK Atoll. An emergency post-shot evacuation of personnel from the non-shot Atoll may be required.

b. All ships, except those required at the non-involved Atoll, will go to sea prior to each shot and will remain at sea until after the shot is detonated and radiological conditions permit safe reentry. Boats and craft will be loaded on the LSD, or go to sea, or be beached or anchored in safe localities in the lagoon in deep water for each shot at the affected Atoll.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

While at sea, ships and craft will be positioned and maneuvered to avoid dangerous blast, shot, heat and wave effects as well as radiological contamination. TG 7.3 aircraft will be on board the CVE or on the ground at a non-affected Atoll at shot time for each BIKINI shot, except in an emergency when they will be positioned at safe distances from the detonations.

c. The present shot schedule is repeated for convenience:

SHOT	CODE NAME	DATE	LOCATION
#1	BRAVO	B-Day 3-1-54	On reef ½ mile WSW of Namu Island
#2	UNION	U-Day 3-11-54	On barge approximately 1.5 miles from Yurochi and 3 miles from AOMOEN.
#3	YANKEE	Y-Day 3-22-54	On barge in Union crater.
#4	ECHO	E-Day 3-29-54	Eberiru Island, ENIWETOK
#5	NECTAR	N-Day 4-5-54	On barge in approximately same location as Yankee.
#6	ROMEO	R-Day 4-15-54	On barge in approximately same location as Nectar.
#7	KOON	K-Day 4-22-54	Eninman Island, BIKINI

d. As soon as practicable after each shot, recovery of data recording equipment and samples will commence by means of helicopter and boat pool craft. Ships of the task group will return to the Atoll when it is radiologically safe to do so, and recovery of data will continue. The preparations for subsequent shots will be resumed and concurrently, the evacuation of men and equipment from the next campsite and area to be affected will begin.

6. Factors Significant to On-Site Operations.

a. All ships and craft of Task Group 7.3 will be based at BIKINI Atoll, except ESTES, YaGs 39 and 40, one (1) DDE on a rotational basis, and certain harbor craft, which will be based at ENIWETOK Atoll. CURTISS may be required to base at ENIWETOK for a few days prior to Shot No. 4, but will return to BIKINI following the detonation.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

b. TG 7.3 aircraft will be based as follows:

(1) Helicopters - on board CVE or at ENINMAN Island airstrip.

(2) F4U-5N - three (3) at ENIWETOK Island; three (3) at ENINMAN airstrip or on board CVE.

(3) VP-29 - at KWAJALEIN. Some aircraft will stage through ENIWETOK Island.

(4) P4Y-2 and P2V-5 project aircraft - ENIWETOK Island airstrip.

(5) Two (2) specially configured PBM-5As - ENIWETOK Island airstrip.

c. CTG 7.3 and staff will be located on PARRY Island until about one (1) week prior to Shot No. 1; thereafter, they will be located on board the CVE unless otherwise announced. During the period he is afloat, CTG 7.3 will maintain one or more staff officers on PARRY Island or on board ESTES to maintain liaison with CJTF SEVEN and other Task Group Commanders. During the period he is ashore on PARRY Island, CTG 7.3 and members of his staff will make frequent visits to BIKINI Atoll and to ships present.

d. BELLE GROVE will be required to make periodic trips to ENIWETOK to transport device loaded barges to BIKINI, and to participate in rehearsals of this task. During the periods BELLE GROVE is absent, the Navy Boat Pool will be supported by BAIROKO.

e. Devices prepared on PARRY Island for detonation at BIKINI Atoll will be assembled and transported to the BIKINI shot site aboard the LSD and/or an LST so as to arrive approximately five (5) days prior to scheduled shot time.

f. The TG 7.3 Boat Pool will commence support operations at BIKINI at 0800M 22 January 1954.

g. TG 7.3 helicopter support operations at BIKINI will commence at 0800M 20 January 1954.

h. The success of the entire operation is dependent on reliable, rapid communications. All required communications facilities for CASTLE are expected to be thoroughly tested, given operational runs, and re-tested to the maximum practicable extent before ships and units report to CTG 7.3 for operational control.

[redacted]

i. Task Element 7.3.7.2 is a self-supporting (for operations) group conducting a BuOrd test to determine the effect of nuclear weapons on a sea mine field. Except for the detonators there will be no other explosives in the mines to be used.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

7. Coordinated Inter-Island and Inter-Atoll Airlift Operations

Coordinated Boat Pool Operations.

All ships and units are expected to cooperate fully in submitting requirements well in advance, and in combining and adjusting trips as practicable to assist the responsible commander in coordinating aircraft and boat lift operations. (See Annexes O and N).

8. Security of the operational atolls and of units of the task force in the operational area will be maintained by detecting intruders by surface, air and anti-submarine searches, as outlined in Annexes H and I, and by preventing observation and interference and countering hostile action, as outlined in Annexes J and K.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Appendicies

I Eniwetok Atoll with Code Names of Islands
II Bikini Atoll with Code Names of Islands

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

[redacted]

COMMANDER, Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
1 November 1953, 1600 R

Appendix 1 to Annex A
Concept of Operation, CTG 7.3 Operation Order 1-53

ENIWETOK ATOLL WITH CODE NAMES OF ISLANDS



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Washington 25, D. C.
1 November 1953, 1600 R

Appendix 1 to Annex A
Concept of Operation, CTG 7.3 Operation Order 1-53

ENIWETOK ATOLL WITH CODE NAMES OF ISLANDS



RESTRICTED

COMMANDER, Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
1 November 1953, 1600 R

Appendix II to Annex A
Concept of Operation, CTG 7.3 Operation Order 1-53

BIKINI ATOLL WITH CODE NAMES OF ISLANDS



BIKINI ATOLL WITH CODE NAMES OF ISLANDS



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RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

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Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Annex B

Organization and Command Relationships

The organization and command relationships of Joint Task Force SEVEN and Task Group 7.3 are depicted on the charts attached as appendices listed below.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Appendices
I Organization for Operation CASTLE
II Organization, Staff, Commander Task Group 7.3
III Organization, Task Group 7.3

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Appendix I to Annex B

Organization for Operation CASTLE

(Prior to On-Site Phase)

LEGEND

_____ Operational control (for planning and coordination, except TG 7.2)

..... Liaison

-.-.-. AEC Policy

NOTE 1: BY DECISION OF THE JCS ON 13 APRIL 1951, THE COMMANDER OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE WILL [illegible] THE APPROPRIATE COMMANDER UNDER THE JSC (CINCPAC) FOR MOVEMENT CONTROL, LOGISTIC SUP[illegible] FOR THE PURPOSE OF GENERAL SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO THE TASK FORCE AND ENIWETOK ATOL[illegible] BROADENED TO INCLUDE BIKINI ATOLL). IN THE ABSENCE OF THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER FROM ENIWETOK AREA, THE SENIOR TASK FORCE OFFICER PRESENT WILL, AS AFCOM, REPORT TO CINCP[illegible] THESE PURPOSES.

NOTE 2: BY DECISION OF THE JCS ON 23 APRIL 1953, THE CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPO[illegible] (AFSWP) WILL EXERCISE, WITHIN ANY TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION, TECHNICAL DIRECTION OF TH[illegible] EFFECTS TESTS OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO THE ARMED FORCES AT ATOMIC TESTS CONDUCTED OUTSI[illegible] CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES. PRIOR TO THE ON-SITE PHASE OF AN OVERSEAS TEST OPERATION FORCE COMMANDER WILL CONSULT THE CHIEF OF AFSWP ON MODIFICATIONS OR DELETIONS TO THE[illegible] OF DEFENSE WEAPONS EFFECTS TEST PROGRAMS.



B-I-1

LEGEND

_____ Operational control (for planning and coordination, except TG 7.2)

..... Liaison

-.-.-. AEC Policy

NOTE 1: BY DECISION OF THE JCS ON 13 APRIL 1951, THE COMMANDER OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE WILL REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATE COMMANDER UNDER THE JSC (CINCPAC) FOR MOVEMENT CONTROL, LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF GENERAL SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO THE TASK FORCE AND ENIWETOK ATOLL (LATER BROADENED TO INCLUDE BIKINI ATOLL). IN THE ABSENCE OF THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER FROM THE ENIWETOK AREA, THE SENIOR TASK FORCE OFFICER PRESENT WILL, AS ATCOM, REPORT TO CINCPAC FOR THESE PURPOSES.

NOTE 2: BY DECISION OF THE JCS ON 23 APRIL 1953, THE CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT (AFSWP) WILL EXERCISE, WITHIN ANY TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION, TECHNICAL DIRECTION OF THE WEAPONS EFFECTS TESTS OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO THE ARMED FORCES AT ATOMIC TESTS CONDUCTED OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES. PRIOR TO THE ON-SITE PHASE OF AN OVERSEAS TEST OPERATION, THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER WILL CONSULT THE CHIEF OF AFSWP ON MODIFICATIONS OR DELETIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WEAPONS EFFECTS TEST PROGRAMS.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

Operation Plan
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Washington 25, D. C.
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APPENDIX II TO ANNEX B

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART COMMANDER TASK GROUP 7.3 STAFF

PRIMARY DUTIES




00 COMMANDER
001 FLAG LIEUTENANT AND AIDE
01 CHIEF OF STAFF AND AIDE
N-1
ATIVE DIV
ECRETARY
NNEL OFFICER
N-2
SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
20 SECURITY AND INTELL DIV
N-3
PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIV
30 PLANS AND OPERATIONS OFFICER
N-4
LOGISTICS DIVISION
40 LOGISTICS OFFICER
45 SUPPLY OFFICER
N-5
COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION
50 COMMUNICATION OFFICER
51 ASSISTANT COMMUNICATION OFFICER
52 ASSISTANT COMMUNICATION OFFICER
53 ASSISTANT COMMUNICATION OFF (REGISTERED PUBS CUSTODIAN
31 ASSISTANT PLANS AND OPERATIONS OFFICER (AIR)
32 ASSISTANT PLANS AND OPERATIONS OFFICER (ATOMIC DEFENSE OFFICER)
33 MEDICAL OFFICER
32.1 ASSISTANT PLANS AND OPERATIONS OFF (ASST ATOMIC DEFENSE OFFICER)
INDICATES NORMAL CHAIN OF COMMAND
INDICATES ADVISORY RESPONSIBILITY

B-II-1

[redacted]

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Appendix III to Annex B

Organization of Task Group 7.3

Joint Task Force SEVEN
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

n Plan
No. 1-53

Appendix III to Annex B

Organization of Task Group 7.3

Joint Task Force SEVEN
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Washington 25, D.C.
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COMMANDER
TASK GROUP 7.3
RADM H. C. BRUTON

Devices Unit
E. C. JONES

.0
Devices

ISS (AV 4)
.C. JONES

.1
lement
ned

TU 7.3.1
Surface Security Unit
CortDesDiv 12
CAPT J. E. SMITH
EPPERSON (DDE 7.9) (F)
NICHOLAS (DDE 449)
RENSHAW (DDE 499)
PHILIP (DDE 498)
USS PC 1546

TE 7.3.1.0
ENIWETOK Surface
Security Element
As assigned

TU 7.3.2
Carrier Unit
CAPT E. O'BEIRNE

TE 7.3.2.0
Carrier Element
USS BAIROKO (CVE 115)
CAPT E. O'BEIRNE
10 HRS & Air Force
Helicopters Assigned

TE 7.3.2.1
BIKINI Fighter Element
3 F4U-5N

TE 7.3.2.2
ENIWETOK Fighter Ele.
3 F4U-5N

TU 7.3.3
Patrol Plane Unit
VP - 29
CDR W. ARNOLD
12 P2V-6
1 P2V-5
1 P4Y-2
2 PBM-5A

TU 7.3.4
Joint Task Force
Flagship Unit
USS ESTES (AGC 12)
CAPT J.W.WATERHOUSE

TU 7.3.5
Utility Unit
LCDR L. JONES
REINDER (ARSD 2)
COCOPA (ATF 101)
MOLALA (ATF 106)
APACHE (ATF 67)
SIOUX (ATF 75)
TAWAKONI (ATF 114)

ounter-
Test Unit
MOLUMPHY

0
Element
MOLUMPHY
LG 40

Decon.

ssigned

TU 7.3.7
BIKINI Harbor Unit
CAPT E. O'BEIRNE

TE 7.3.7.0
Landing Ship Dock Ele.
BELLE GROVE (LSD 2)
CDR C. O. LOWE

TE 7.3.7.1
Boat Pool Element
LT B. R. WATKINS
15 LCM 5 LCU 2 LCVP
1 LCPL 1 28' MkB 1 YC
1 AVR 1 YCV 1 YFU

TE 7.3.7.2
Mine Project Ele.
USS SHEA (DM 30)
CDR J. W. REED

TE 7.3.7.3
Mine Laying and
Recovery Element
RECLAIMER (ARS 42)
LCDR H. K. SMITH

TE 7.3.7.4
Mine Ready and
Analysis Element
USS LST 1157

TU 7.3.8
ENIWETOK Harbor Unit
CAPT J.W.WATERHOUSE
YCG, YCGH, 1 AVR, Yo

TE 7.3.8.0
UDU Element
LT B. [illegible]USSETTO
1 LCM

TU 7.3.9
Transport Unit
CDR C. O. LOWE

TE 7.3.9.0
Special Devices
Transport Element
CDR C. O. LOWE

TE 7.3.9.1
Special Devices
Transport Element
As assigned

TE 7.3.9.2
Escort Element
As assigned

TE 7.3.9.3
Escort Element
As assigned

TE 7.3.9.4
Material Trans. Ele.
As assigned

TE 7.3.9.5
Material Trans. Ele.
As assigned

TE 7.3.9.6
Mtrl. Trans. Ele.
USNS W.C. AINSWORTH

B-III-1

[redacted]

Joint Task Force SEVEN
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Annex C

Logistics and Administration

1. Basic Information

a. Commander in Chief Pacific is charged with the logistic support of Joint Task Force SEVEN. CinCPacFlt is the Naval Commander in the Pacific and ComServPac is the principal logistics agent for CinCPacFlt. In addition, ComAirPac is responsible for aeronautical material for Naval Air Units and ComWestSeaFron coordinates the logistic support provided by West Coast activities.

b. This Annex is based upon the following:

PacFlt Regulations, 1952
CinCPacFlt OpOrder 201-52
ComAirPac OpOrder 2-52
CJTF SEVEN OpOrder 3-53
ComServPac OpOrder 1-52

c. The logistic concept of CTG 7.3 requires that all ships and units be self supporting to the greatest extent practicable. It is anticipated, however, that the limited capabilities of smaller ships and units of TG 7.3 will make individual self-support unfeasible. Therefore, large ships shall be prepared to provide fuel, ammunition, provisions, disbursing service, general stores material and potable water to other units as assigned in para. 2.a.(3)(b) this Annex.

2. Logistic Elements

a. Supply

(1) Supply levels for all units assigned shall be maintained as close to the following levels as possible:

(a) Provisions and Water

Fresh provisions - to capacity. Capacity shall be interpreted as the maximum quantity which can be reasonably carried without exceeding the limits established by BuShips Control of Loading letter applicable to the ship concerned. Where storage is limited to less than that specified, ships shall load to capacity.

Dry Provisions - to capacity.

Water - to capacity.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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BAIROKO (CVE-115) provide 25 cu. ft. of space in chilled compartment for RADIAC batteries.

(b) Ammunition

All ships shall carry the allowance of ammunition designated by the Bureau of Ordnance and the type commander. Aircraft carry amount and type of ammunition designated by the type commander, and as further directed by CTG 7.3.

(c) Fuels, Lubricants

Fuels and Lubricants - to capacity prior to departure from Continental United States and Pearl Harbor. For resupply - See Appendix I.

(d) Medical Stores

To sustain 120 days operations.

(e) General Stores, Ship's Store Stock, and Small Stores

To sustain 120 days operations.

(f) Aviation Stores

To sustain 120 days operations.

(g) Spares

Authorized allowance.

(h) Miscellaneous

The following buildings on ENIWETOK have been assigned the Navy Task Group: Buildings 152, 153, 154, 155, 156 and 173 (Boat Pool spares and supplies); P14, P15, P16 and P17 (naval aviation activities).

(2) The Patrol Plane Squadron to be based on KWAJALEIN shall be fully equipped for their mission prior to departure for the forward area.

(3) Method of Supply (Including units shore based at ENIWETOK)

(a) Fleet units will be supported directly from supply units afloat except when operating in the vicinity of Hawaiian or West Coast bases.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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(b) The CURTISS, ESTES, BELLE GROVE, BAIROKO, and assigned DDE's shall provide support, including disbursing and minor repairs, to other naval units, as follows:

Supporting Unit	Units to be Supported
CURTISS, Mender, Sioux, Shea, Reclaimer	COCOPA, KOLALA YAG 61, YO 120, YOGN 82
ESTES	YAG 39, YAG 40
BELLE GROVE	~~GYPSY~~, ~~SIOUX~~, Navy Boat Pool
BAIROKO	APACHE, TAWAKONI, PC, and assigned air units

(c) Requirements, other than for refrigerated provisions, which can not be met by a supporting unit shall be forwarded by the supporting unit to PRCO, NSC, Oakland, California. The resupply and replenishment of refrigerated provisions shall be in accordance with Appendix I this Annex.

(d) Emergency requirements may be submitted by supporting units to NSC, Pearl Harbor.

(e) Aircraft units based on KWAJALEIN will be supported by ComNavSta, KWAJALEIN.

(4) Cost Accounting Procedure - See TG 7.3 Instruction 7310.1 forwarded separately.

b. Maintenance, Repairs and Salvage

(1) Repairs

(a) Small boat repairs beyond capacity of ship's force shall be accomplished by BELLE GROVE, CURTISS, and BAIROKO.

(b) RADIAC repairs beyond the capacity of ship's force shall be accomplished by TG 7.3 RADIAC repair facility in BAIROKO.

(c) Routine upkeep periods will be assigned by the Task Group Commander.

(d) Facilities for other repairs beyond the capacity of ship's force are available at Pearl Harbor.

(e) Repairs and maintenance of aircraft shall be in accordance with Chapter IX, Pacific Fleet Regulations.

[redacted]

c. Medical

(1) Medical Facilities

(a) Medical facilities afloat are those organic to assigned ships. Ships shall be prepared to provide treatment and hospitalization for other elements of Task Force.

(b) Medical facilities ashore are provided at ENIWETOK by CTG 7.2, and at KWAJALEIN by C. O., NavSta, KWAJ.

(c) In case medical emergencies occur where proper medical facilities are not available, such cases should be transferred to the nearest adequate medical facility by the most expeditious means possible.

(2) Evacuation of Patients

(a) Although medical facilities afloat and at ENIWETOK and KWAJALEIN are sufficient to take care of the normal needs of CTG 7.3, in case of a major catastrophe, serious epidemic, or other occasion where evacuation is indicated, air evacuation will be coordinated by CJTF SEVEN from ENIWETOK to KWAJALEIN and onward to OAHU for hospitalization at Tripler Army Hospital. The facilities of fleet aircraft and MATS will be made available for air evacuation lift.

(b) Personnel, who in the opinion of appropriate medical authorities cannot be returned to duty within fifteen (15) days, normally shall be transferred to the Army Hospital, ENIWETOK, where they will be held and treated until air evacuation has been arranged by CTG 7.2. Military and civil service personnel will be evacuated to the Tripler Army Hospital, OAHU, T. H. All others will be evacuated to civilian hospitals on OAHU, T. H.

(3) Preventive Measures

(a) All units assigned to TG 7.3 shall institute a continuing program to control outbreak of disease, to improve sanitation, and to control insects and rodents in accordance with Chapter 22, BuMed Manual.

(4) Burials

(a) BuMed Manual, Chapter 17, contains current directives relative to burials and the transportation of remains where death occurs outside the Continental United States.

[redacted]

(b) In addition, the following procedures shall be carried out when death occurs in the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Area:

1. The body shall be kept in a refrigerated space until transfer can be effected. It shall be placed in a supine position with arms and legs parallel to the body.

2. A Territory of Hawaii Death Certificate shall be completed by a medical officer prior to transfer, if possible.

3. A dispatch shall be sent to the Mortuary Officer, ENIWETOK giving time of arrival, whether or not an autopsy is desired and whether or not records are in order.

4. The body together with records, clothing, and death certificate, shall be sent to Mortuary Officer, ENIWETOK. A human remains pouch is convenient for storage and transfer of the dead and may be obtained, along with the death certificate blank, from either the Medical Officer on USS BAIROKO, or from the Army Hospital, ENIWETOK.

(5) Miscellaneous

(a) BuPers Manual, Chapter 9, Section 8 contains current directives regarding casualty reports. Casualties and deaths resulting from aircraft accidents shall be reported in accordance with CNO ACO 63-50 and Chapter X, AirPac Instructions.

d. Personnel

(1) Personnel shall be handled in accordance with regulations and instructions of the Department of the Navy, CinCPacFlt and ComServPac.

(2) Rotation - It is not contemplated that any rotation of Naval Personnel will take place during this operation.

(3) Replacement - Replacements for Naval officer personnel will be furnished by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Replacements for naval enlisted personnel will be furnished by ComServPac.

(4) Courts Martial and Prisoners - Court Martial matters shall be handled through type command organizations. ~~Naval prisoners may be evacuated to Naval Station, KWAJALEIN. Such evacuation may be accomplished as soon as trial is completed and prior to review, if deemed necessary. For transportation apply to Commander Task Group 7.3.~~

(5) Civil and Criminal Law Enforcement - The Department of the Interior is charged with the Civil and Criminal law enforcement in Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands. Two employees of the firm of Holmes and Narver have been deputized as Deputy Marshals of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The High Commissioner, Office of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Honolulu, T.H., will administer civil and criminal law enforcement on the Atoll, and the Atoll Commander will render such assistance as may be required.

(6) Medals and Awards - Recommendations for medals and awards shall be forwarded to the Task Group Commander in accordance with Headquarters, JTF SEVEN SOP 30-1, forwarded separately.

(7) Mail

(a) Mail for units afloat, with the exception of the Boat Pool at BIKINI, the staff of the Commander Task Group 7.3 and the Underwater Detection Unit Team, will be addressed to the unit concerned c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.

[redacted]

Ships and units having confinement cases, but not equipped with brigs, shall so inform the SOPA who will make arrangements for the confinement of the personnel involved.

[redacted]

(b) Mail for the Boat Pool at BIKINI should be addressed to the Boat Pool, c/o USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2), Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.

(c) Mail for Staff, Commander Task Group 7.3 and Underwater Detection Unit Team should be addressed to APO 187 (HCW), c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

(8) Leave

(a) During the operational phase, only emergency leave shall be granted. For ~~transportation from ENIWETOK to CONUS by air, contact CTG 7.2 by dispatch with information copy to this command~~. see back of page for changes.

(9) Pay

(a) Units of TG 7.3 that have a disbursing officer attached shall arrange their own schedules of pay for naval personnel.

(b) Units without a disbursing officer, not based at KWAJALEIN, shall be paid by the disbursing officer as indicated in paragraph 2.a.(3)(b), this Annex. Units based at KWAJALEIN will be paid by the Disbursing Officer, NavSta KWAJ. Units without a disbursing officer and separated from their normal supporting unit will be paid by the nearest available disbursing offic

(c) Personnel are advised that normal living expenses will be low in the forward area. It is recommended that all personnel take advantage of the Navy allotment system to ensure that sufficient funds are being sent to families each month for the duration of the operation.

e. Transportation

(1) Transportation by air or surface to or from the forward area will be coordinated by CJTF SEVEN.

(2) Transportation bookings from ENIWETOK to KWAJALEIN, PEARL and the United States, by air or surface, will be made by Commander Task Group 7.2.

(3) Transportation from KWAJALEIN, by air or surface, will be under the coordination control of CO, NAV STA KWAJ.

(4) CTG 7.3 will provide ship-to-shore and intra-island air transportation by helicopters at BIKINI. CTG 7.4 will provide intra-island air transportation at ENIWETOK.

[redacted]

Personnel ordered transferred to the United States for duty or granted emergency leave shall be directed to re ort to MTS Terminal [illegible] with three copies of their orders or leave papers certifying that they are authorized to travel to the CONUS. Leave papers of those granted emergency leave shall contain the words 'Emergency Leave' therein.
Also mark leave papers or orders, 'Has no Dated.

[redacted]

(5) CTG 7.4 will coordinate inter-atoll air transportation.

(6) CTG 7.3 will coordinate inter-atoll surface transportation.

(7) Port Operations (Forward Area)

(a) Primary responsibility for providing small boat service from PARRY ISLAND to the northward at ENIWETOK has been assigned to CTG 7.5.

(b) CTG 7.2 is responsible for the operations of port of embarkation/debarkation for ENIWETOK ATOLL.

(c) The Navy Boat Pool, operated by the Commander, Service and Harbor Control Element, BIKINI, shall assist in providing water transportation for Task Groups 7.1, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 at BIKINI ATOLL.

(d) Automotive transportation on ENIWETOK ISLAND will be provided by CTG 7.2.

(e) Lighterage and tug service within the ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLL will be provided by CTG 7.2 or CTG 7.3 in coordination with the civilian contractor.

(f) All transportation on KWAJALEIN ISLAND will be controlled by CO, NAVSTAKWAJ.

(8) For Marking and Shipment of Supplies, see JTF SEVEN SOP 75-1 forwarded separately.

(9) For evacuation of personnel and equipment, see Appendix II this Annex.

f. Miscellaneous Logistic Services

(1) Morale

(a) Recreation facilities on ENIWETOK ISLAND are provided by CTG 7.2.

(b) Recreation facilities on KWAJALEIN are provided by CO, NAVSTAKWAJ.

(c) Recreation for personnel of the Navy Task Group at ENIWETOK ATOLL shall be coordinated by Commanding Officer, USS ESTES (AGC-12).

[redacted]

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(d) Recreation facilities on BIKINI ISLAND shall be coordinated by Commanding Officer, USS BAIROKO (CVE-115).

(e) Motion pictures aboard ships of Task Group 7.3 shall be supplied from a sub-exchange established on board BAIROKO. Films shall be drawn from appropriate activities by each ship prior to departure for the forward area. Film replacement, repair, and resupply will be from the exchange at NAVSTAKWAJ.

(f) All units shall encourage personnel to make use of the recreational facilities, post and navy exchanges, movies, hobby shops and educational media provided aboard ships and ashore in the ENIWETOK, BIKINI, and KWAJALEIN areas.

(2) The division of funding responsibilities within the DOD shall be according to the concepts in the "Memorandum of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, dated 9 March 1953", attached as Appendix IV this Annex.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Appendices:
I Resupply and Replenishment
II Evacuation and Reentry of Personnel and Equipment
III Official Observers Plan (to be issued at a later date)
IV Division of Funding

AUTHENTICATED:
H. C. Dragge

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

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CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
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7 December 1953, 1200R

Appendix I to Annex C

Resupply and Replenishment

1. Resupply and replenishment of vessels based on or operating at ENIWETOK and BIKINI shall be accomplished in accordance with the following procedures:

a. Fresh and Frozen Provisions

(1) CURTISS, ESTES, BELLE GROVE, BAIROKO, T-AP, DDE's and LST's shall submit their requirements for fresh and frozen provisions to ComWestSeaFron not less than four (4) weeks prior to the scheduled departure of the ComServPac AF from San Francisco. All other naval units of TG 7.3 shall submit requests for fresh and frozen provisions as follows: GYPSY and SIOUX to BELLE GROVE; COCOPA and MOLALA to CURTISS; APACHE, TAWAKONI and PC to BAIROKO; YAG 39 and YAG 40 to ESTES. [illegible]

(2) Refrigerated provisions requested from ComWestSeaFron will be shipped as consigned cargo. CTG 7.3 will coordinate delivery of cargo consigned to Naval units.

(3) Projected AF schedules for the period October 1953 to April 1954 are as follows:

SHIP	ETD SAN FRAN	ETD PEARL HARBOR	ETA KWAJALEIN	ETA ENIWETOK
MERAPI (AF-38)	10-23-53	11-2-53	11-11-53	11-15-53
KARIN (AF-33)	1-16-54	1-26-54	2-4-54	2-8-54
MERAPI (AF-38)	2-12-54	2-22-54	3-3-54	3-7-54
KARIN (AF-33)	3-12-54	3-22-54	3-31-54	4-3-54

(4) Additional schedules will be published as necessary.

b. Dry Provisions, Clothing and Small Stores, Ship's Store Stock, General Stores Material, and Spare Parts

(1) Requirements for dry provisions, clothing and small stores, ship's store stock, general stores material, and spare parts shall be submitted to Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California.

(2) Emergency requirements for dry provisions, general stores material, clothing and small stores, ship's store stock, not obtainable from other ships and units in the forward area, may be submitted to NSC, Pearl Harbor.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

(3) Emergency requirements for aviation stores may be submitted to NAS, Barbers Point, T.H.

c. Fuel

(1) Afloat POL Storage at ENIWETOK

Products	Ship or Craft	Capacity
DIESEL)) - MOGAS)	YOG 61	Approx. 6,800 bbls.
GR 115 AVGAS)) - JP-4 AV fuel)	YOGN 82	Approx. 50,000 bbls.
NSFO	YO 120	Approx. 6,500 bbls.

(2) Ashore POL storage in ENIWETOK/BIKINI Area

Products	Location	Capacity
GR 115 AVGAS	ENIWETOK IS.	4,000 bbls.
GR 115 AVGAS	ENINMAN IS.	1,000 bbls.
MOGAS	ENIWETOK IS.	2,000 bbls.
MOGAS	PARRY IS.	2,000 bbls.
MOGAS	ENINMAN IS.	1,000 bbls.
DIESEL	ENIWETOK IS.	7,000 bbls.
DIESEL	PARRY IS.	4,000 bbls.
DIESEL	BIKINI	3,000 bbls.

(3) ComServPac will resupply afloat and ashore storages at ENIWETOK and BIKINI from stock maintained at PEARL HARBOR or KWAJALEIN.

(4) ServPac AO and AOG will visit area monthly.

(5) Commander Surface Security Unit report to CTG 7.3 daily, percentage fuel on hand for each DDE and PC. Other Unit Commanders make this report to CTG 7.3 weekly for each ship of their unit. ~~"Those reports shall be made using Current Pac 6 Source Code."~~ This report shall be made by Defense message.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(6) ESTES and CURTISS be prepared to fuel DDE's on short notice. ESTES and CURTISS shall be replenished as necessary between monthly AO refuelings by YO 120, which shall obtain additional fuel from BAIROKO if required.

d. Water

(1) Ships are required to be self sustaining. Emergency requests from service craft and landing craft shall be forwarded to USS BELLE GROVE, information to CTG 7.3.

e. Cargo

(1) ServPac AF, AK, AO, and AOG engaged in MIDPAC base resupply are available for cargo lifts if requirements exceed the lift capabilities of MSTS.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED

A. C. DRIGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

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Joint Task Force SEVEN
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Appendix II to Annex C

Evacuation and Reentry of Personnel and Equipment

1. General

a. Present plans for evacuation are as follows:

(1) BRAVO, YANKEE, and KOON - BIKINI ATOLL will be evacuated except for a small firing party on ENYU. For KOON, material and equipment not required in recovery operations will be evacuated to ENIWETOK. Data and equipment recovery operations will be conducted from afloat or from ENYU.

(2) UNION, NECTAR and ROMEO - Will be handled as in (1) above unless results of BRAVO and YANKEE make it feasible to leave a skeleton crew for operating the utilities of the base camp on ENINMAN, in addition to the firing party on ENYU. The number of personnel on ENYU and ENINMAN will be within the capability of helicopter lift.

(3) ECHO - ENIWETOK ATOLL will be evacuated except for PARRY and ENIWETOK ISLANDS.

(4) An emergency capability for post-shot, personnel evacuation of BIKINI and ENIWETOK ATOLLS shall exist. An emergency post-shot evacuation will be executed only if radiological conditions indicate it is necessary and will be capable of accomplishment on four (4) hours notice. Such evacuation will not involve movement of material.

2. Shot Phase Evacuations

a. Personnel expected to be evacuated by ships of Task Group 7.3 during evacuations for tests are as follows:

	CURTISS		BAIROKO		ESTES		AP	
	OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM
HC, JTF 7	-	-	-	-	35	35	Will be promulgated	
TG 7.1	98	13	33	17	35	45	at a later date.	
TG 7.2	-	-	-	-	2	6		
TG 7.4	-	-	7	21	5	3		
TG 7.5	1	-	-	-	15	15		
TOTALS:	99	13	40	38	92	104		

b. Personnel of the Task Group 7.3 Boat Pool in the BIKINI area during shot phase evacuations shall be evacuated by the BELLE GROVE, or shall proceed to sea in LCU's.

[redacted]

3. Emergency post shot evacuation of ENIWETOK, BIKINI and possibly other Atolls will be executed only if radiological conditions indicate it is necessary, and will be capable of accomplishment on four (4) hours notice. Such evacuation will not involve movement of material. All ships shall provide cargo nets for rapid loading of personnel, if such proves necessary.

b. The estimated emergency evacuation capabilities of units of Task Group 7.3 are as follows:

UNIT	NO. OF MEN	NO. OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN	TOTAL
ESTES	600	300	900
BAIROKO	900	100	1000
CURTISS	750	150	900
BELLE GROVE	200	50	250
EPPERSON	100	50	150
PHILIP	100	50	150
NICHOLAS	100	50	150
RENSHAW	100	50	150
GYPSY	5	-	5
COCOPA	10	-	10
MOLALA	10	-	10
APACHE	10	-	10
SIOUX	10	-	10
LST 762	500	50	550
TAWAKONI	10	-	10
LST 551	500	50	550
AP	5000	300	5300
TOTAL:	8905	1200	10105

c. Detailed plans for evacuation or safeguarding of boats and barges during shots will be promulgated at a later date.

4. Sortie and Assembly Plan - To be issued at a later date.

5. Detailed Schedule of Evacuation Events - To be issued at a later date.

6. Evacuation of Material - It is not contemplated that material other than certain landing craft and barges will be evacuated to sea during shot phases.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

7. Responsibility for Evacuation - It is the responsibility of Commanding Officers of units of this Task Group to ensure that all officers and men under their respective commands attached to Task Group 7.3 are evacuated from the islands of BIKINI and ENIWETOK during shots at those Atolls. As soon as it has been ascertained that all officers and men of Task Group 7.3 attached to the unit are on board and accounted for, each commanding officer shall, prior to leaving the harbor, report this fact to Commander Task Group 7.3.

8. Reentry Plan - Will be promulgated at a later date.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

...t Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Appendix III to Annex C

Official Observers Plan

To be issued at a later date.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Appendix IV to Annex C

Division of Funding Between the Services and the Task Force

1. The following are "Normal Service Operating Expenses" and will be financed by the services:

a. Pay and allowances of all service personnel.

b. All costs of subsistence of service personnel.

c. Cost of special clothing normally furnished service personnel when employed in severe climates.

d. Cost of travel and transportation of personnel to first Task Force duty station upon initial assignment and travel and transportation from last Task Force station to next regular duty assignment. All costs of travel and transportation of the member, his family, and household goods incidental to a permanent change of station when assigned to or relieved from assignment to the Task Force.

e. Medical and dental services for military personnel.

f. Ships, aircraft, boats and other standard equipment and supplies necessary for the operation, including maintenance, parts, POL and consumable supplies required in support of the Department of Defense participation.

g. Packing, handling and transportation to Task Force of equipment and supplies furnished by the services for the support of the Task Force.

2. The following are "Extra Expenses" and are to be financed out of funds made available direct to the Task Force Commander, provided facilities, equipment or modification are not to be continued in use by the service after completion of the Task Force requirement:

a. Costs of modification to and subsequent restoration of equipment, aircraft, or ships requested by the Task Force Commander.

b. Costs of activation and subsequent inactivation of ships, aircraft and small craft requested by the Task Force Commander.

c. Costs of construction and rehabilitation of existing structures and facilities at the test site required by the operations of a Task Force Commander in connection with approved Department of Defense test programs.

d. Cost of transportation of personnel attached to the Task Force and traveling under orders of the Task Force Commander, including costs of temporary duty travel as well as any permanent changes of station travel other than those covered in 1.d. above while assigned to the Task Force.

e. Administrative expenses incurred by Task Force Headquarters.

f. Cost of equipment required for the operation of the Task Force which is not standard to any of the military services.

g. Costs of packing, handling and shipment of special equipment required by Task Force (as distinguished from such cost relating to service support).

h. Costs of material or services required by the Task Force Commander from activities operated under working capital funds, regardless of the department which is executive agent for the activity.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED

A. C. DRIDGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Annex D

Intelligence, Security, and Public Information

Part I - Intelligence Summary

1. General.

a. This Annex supplements Annex C to CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53, the provisions of which are applicable to all ships and units of this command.

2. Area of Operations.

a. ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls are part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, placed under the United States as the administering authority by the Security Council of the United Nations. They are, therefore, subject to the full powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction of the United States. The trusteeship agreement for the Trust Territory permits the United States to close any of the areas for security reasons.

b. On 2 December 1947, by notification to the United Nations, the United States closed the area of the entire ENIWETOK Atoll and the territorial waters adjacent thereto. On 13 December 1948, the State Department concurred in the establishment for an indefinite period of a Danger Zone around ENIWETOK Atoll.

c. On 1 April 1953, BIKINI Atoll and the adjacent waters thereto, was also closed by notification to the United Nations. On 2 April 1953 the United States expanded the ENIWETOK Danger Area to include BIKINI Atoll. Danger Area notices were published in air and marine navigational notices and in the press. The State Department notified all foreign governments concerning this expansion.

d. The Danger Area for the operation is shown on the following diagram:

[redacted]



3. Summary of Enemy Capabilities.

a. It is considered that interference with the Joint Task Force SEVEN mission or compromise of its activities could be effected by:

(1) Espionage. Espionage, or "spying", for the purpose of CASTLE, would involve the unauthorized collection of classified or RESTRICTED DATA information for a foreign government. It includes the collection (by observation, theft, sketching, photography, etc.) of the information as well as its delivery, together with assisting, harboring or concealing persons involved. Espionage could be accomplished by the penetration of foreign agents into the Joint Task Force, or by the defection of personnel of the Joint Task Force.

(2) Sabotage. Sabotage (destructive, delaying or impending acts) could be accomplished by the penetration of subversive personnel into the Task Force, the defection of personnel of the Task Force, or more remotely, by a raiding party landed from the sea or from aircraft. Subversive action by these means could run along the lines of the destruction of communications and technical installation facilities within the atoll.

(3) Overt Action by Vessel or Aircraft. Overt action by vessel or aircraft could take the form of attack by bomb, guided missile, gunfire or assault.

(4) Raids. Raids could be conducted by aggressive or surreptitious methods under the cover of darkness from ships and submarines, or possibly, from aircraft. The landing and recovery of raiders by submarine could be accomplished under the conditions of darkness and the confusion resulting from their activities.

(5) Photography and Observation. Compromise could be accomplished by photographic means from surface ship, aircraft or submarine. Unobserved submarine approach within one mile of important islands of the atoll or overflight by unfriendly aircraft are possible. In addition, a determined surface ship commander might attempt to compromise the operations by overt observation of activities in the area from immediately outside the three (3) mile limit. By such means, periodic photography and observation could record and interpret the progress, process of preparation, types of construction and the approximate time of important operations from the activities within the atoll.

(6) Unauthorized Instrumentation. Means under this heading for obtaining unauthorized information would include pressure, heat and radiation detection devices as well as radioactive material collection devices.

(7) Declaration or Commencement of War. In the event of the commencement of war, by declaration or otherwise, involving the United States, the nature and extent of CASTLE Operations might be radically changed. It is difficult to predict the exact nature of these changes, but if the Operation were continued, partially, wholly or augmented in scope, a complete re-evaluation of enemy capabilities and intentions would be necessary.

b. USSR Naval Capabilities.

(1) Submarine Capabilities. If he decided to utilize his submarine capability to obtain information concerning, or to interfere with, CASTLE Operations, the Soviet might employ submarines as follows:

(A) To instrument the shots by the employment of pressure, heat and radiation measuring instruments located on board. The submarine probably would have to come to the surface to employ these instruments, although it is not impossible to mount them on periscopic extensions from a submerged submarine in which case the detection of the submarine would

be much more difficult. Useful information by this means could be obtained at considerable distances from the Atoll.

(B) To observe and photograph the installations and detonations. The limitations of submarine periscope observation and photography are such that a submarine would have to approach within three (3) miles, and preferably one (1) mile, to obtain useful information of shot sites. Even then, it is highly doubtful if any detailed information could be obtained, but only information indicating the general progress of work, including instrumentation. Radar observation or radar photographs could supplement the information obtained by other means. Useful visual, radar or photographic information of the detonations could, of course, be obtained from much greater distances.

(C) Direct attack by gunfire could harass the operation but would probably result in little damage to installations or injury to personnel. On the other hand, such attacks would result in the detection and probable eventual destruction of the submarine. While no information is available indicating that the USSR have modified submarines for guided missile launching, there is no reason to believe that they could not do so if they so desired, in view of the relatively simple modifications required and the widely publicized U.S. accomplishments in this field. A properly directed, submarine-launched guided missile, fitted with an atomic warhead, could inflict great damage to installations and injury to personnel and thus seriously interfere with the Operation. USSR submarines also have the capability of attacking ships of the Joint Task Force with torpedoes. The presence of an escort could indicate that the ship or ships escorted are considered valuable. It is considered that direct attack probably would precede or accompany the opening of hostilities by the USSR, although the USSR might possibly take the risk of attempting to launch an undetected submarine-launched guided missile in the hope that the resulting atomic explosion might be considered (by the U.S.) as the accidental or premature explosion of one of the test devices or a component thereof.

(D) Raids and Sabotage. As discussed above.

(E) Lagoon penetration could be attempted by a submarine assigned any of the foregoing missions. However, lagoon penetration is not necessary for the accomplishment of any of them and involves definite additional risks of detection and destruction.

(2) Other USSR Naval Capabilities. USSR surface ships also have capabilities for unauthorized instrumentation, observation, photography, landing of raiders and saboteurs and direct attack, but except as noted below, it is most unlikely their employment would be attempted, short of actual

hostilities, in view of their inability to approach the Operational Atolls undetected. There is a possibility that the USSR might attempt the employment of small surface craft, such as fishing boats, for instrumentation and observation. There is a more remote possibility that the Soviet might attempt the landing of raiders or saboteurs from a small, fast surface craft launched from a larger surface vessel. As in the case of submarines, attempted lagoon penetration is possible but unlikely.

c. USSR Air Capabilities. No information in addition to that set forth in Annex C to CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53.

d. Conclusions. Of the foregoing capabilities, the following are those which it is considered the USSR is most likely to attempt, under present world conditions:

(1) Espionage.

(2) Unauthorized instrumentation by submarine, surface vessel or aircraft.

(3) Observation or photography by submarine or aircraft.

(4) Sabotage.

If it decided to initiate war with the U.S., the Soviet might well attempt overt action (direct attack) by ships or aircraft, or raids, immediately preceding or in conjunction with the opening of hostilities.



Soviet Military Capabilities of
Interference with Joint Task Force SEVEN

1. Reconnaissance by air or sea.
2. Raids by air or sea.
3. Direct attack by air or sea.

Means available to the Soviets

1. Fifty eight (58) oceangoing submarines.
2. TU-4 aircraft (radius of action - 2,400 nautical miles operating from CHINA and SIBERIA.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Intelligence, Security, and Public Information

Part II - Security

1. Security Policy. Security of classified information is the normal responsibility of any commander but this responsibility must be re-evaluated in Operation CASTLE where the operation is dealing with nuclear energy, a development which played an important part in terminating World War II and which constitutes such importance that it has been regulated, controlled and protected by Federal Law. The security policy of Task Group 7.3 is set forth in Task Group 7.3 INSTRUCTIONS (5500 series). These policies are published to facilitate implementation of necessary security measures as directed by Joint Task Force SEVEN for Operation CASTLE, and such instructions that have or may be issued by CINCPAC in relation to ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls.

2. Security Training and Indoctrination. Requirements on these subjects, affecting every member of the Task Group, have been outlined in detail in Task Group 7.3 INSTRUCTION 005510.7. The Task Group Commander cannot emphasize too strongly the importance and necessity of fulfilling the requirements set forth.

3. Travel Security Control. CINCPAC Serial 020, dated 1 April 1952, as modified by ALPACFLT 60 of 29 June 1953, outlines the requirements for entrance to ENIWETOK - BIKINI Operational Area. Commander, Task Group 7.3 may authorize re-entry without recourse to CINCPAC.

4. Contraband. The provisions of paragraph 11, Annex C of CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53 and paragraph 4 of enclosure 1 to Task Group 7.3 INSTRUCTION 005510.7 apply.

5. Badge Identification System. The provisions of Task Group 7.3 INSTRUCTION 5511.1A and enclosure 1 thereto apply.

6. Photography. Task Group 7.3 INSTRUCTION 05510.8 setting forth the policy for the control, responsibility and accountability of Task Group 7.3 photographic material will be forwarded in the very near future to all ships and units for information and compliance.

7. Reporting Essential Elements of Information.

a. A report will be made to the Task Group Commander immediately when:

(1) Character and loyalty of any JTF SEVEN personnel is doubtful,

(2) Possible espionage is indicated,

[redacted]

(3) Any possibility of sabotage exists,

(4) Any suspicious or unidentified aircraft, surface or submarine vessels are observed in the area,

(5) Any questionable acts or incidents are observed which tend to create suspicion, or

(6) In any case when items of contraband are confiscated.

Intelligence, Security, and Public Information

Part III - Public Information

1. Public Information. The provisions of paragraph 19 Annex C of CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53 and Task Group 7.3 INSTRUCTION 005510.7 apply.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200Z

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Annex E

Search and Rescue Plan

Reference: (a) Search and Rescue Joint Standard Operating Procedure; Pacific.
(b) JANAP 300, The Air Sea Rescue Manual.
(c) NWP 37, Search and Rescue

1. General. This Annex is supplementary to Annex O of CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53, the provisions of which are applicable to all units of this command.

2. Responsibilities.

a. Responsibilities of commanders for search and rescue (SAR) operations within their respective commands are set forth in reference (a). Specifically, as relates to the area of primary concern to Commander, Task Group 7.3, responsibility for search and rescue is assigned by CinCPacFlt to ComHAWSeaFron.

b. Reference (a) further provides that:

"For tactical aircraft, operating on unit, combat or training missions, the primary responsibility for SAR rests with the commander exercising operational control of the aircraft regardless of the area of operation. This responsibility may be delegated to subordinate commanders. Commanders holding SAR responsibility as defined above shall insure that their operating forces are familiar with the rescue facilities and procedures of the SAR area in which they are operating and shall request assistance as necessary from the appropriate area SAR commander. Once the area SAR commander has been requested to provide assistance he assumes SAR control".

This paragraph quoted is applicable to Operation CASTLE and places certain responsibilities on CJTF SEVEN.

c. Commander Task Group 7.4 has been assigned primary search and rescue responsibility for all JTF SEVEN air and surface units in the ENIWETOK/ BIKINI area during Operation CASTLE.

d. Commander Task Group 7.3 has been directed to provide assistance to CTG 7.4 and the Area SAR Commander as necessary.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

3. Tasks for Subordinate Units.

a. All TG 7.3 units shall:

(1) Familiarize themselves and comply with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c).

(2) Conduct SAR training and have available suitable SAR equipment.

(3) Be prepared to provide assistance to CTG 7.4 and the Area SAR Commander and to take independent action, as necessary.

b. CTU 7.3.4 shall provide a qualified officer for liaison with CTG 7.4 when that Commander is carrying out his SAR functions aboard the ESTES (AGC-12).

c. CTU 7.3.2 shall provide a qualified officer for liaison with CTG 7.4 when that Commander is carrying out his SAR functions at ENIWETOK.

4. Independent Action. DESIGNATED PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITIES IN NO WAY AFFECT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ANY COMMANDER TO ENGAGE IN OPERATIONS UPON HIS OWN INITIATIVE AS THE CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE. INDEPENDENT ACTION MUST BE IMMEDIATELY REPORTED TO, AND COORDINATED WITH, THE APPROPRIATE SAR COMMANDER.

5. Command and Communication.

a. Joint Task Force SEVEN SAR activities will be commanded by CTG 7.4 until such time as control is assumed by the Area SAR Commander.

b. Location of Command Headquarters.

CJTF SEVEN	PARRY ISLAND, M.I. (When ashore) USS ESTES (AGC-12) (When afloat)
CTG 7.3	PARRY ISLAND (When ashore) USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) (When afloat)
CTG 7.4	ENIWETOK ISLAND (When Ashore) USS ESTES (AGC-12) (When afloat)
CINCPACFLT (SAR Commander, Pacific Command)	PEARL HARBOR, T.H.
COMHAWSEAFRON (Area SAR Commander)	PEARL HARBOR, T.H.
CO, NAVSTA KWAJALEIN (SAR Coordination Center)	KWAJALEIN, M.I.

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Communications. As specified in reference (a) and Annex F.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral,
Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D.C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

ANNEX F

COMMUNICATIONS

1. General. This annex supplements Annex L of CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53, USF 70(B) and JANAP 195(C). This Communication Plan is effective upon receipt for training and planning purposes and is fully effective upon reporting to CTG 7.3 for operational control.

2. 200. BASIC COMMUNICATION PLAN

a. USF 70(B) is the Basic Communication Plan and JANAP 195(C) is the basic Frequency Plan for the U. S. Naval Service. Numbered articles in this plan constitute modification or amplification to similarly numbered articles of USF 70(B). Chapters and articles of USF 70(B) not modified or amplified herein are to be considered effective and are to form an integral part of these instructions.

b. Communication Rehearsals. Communication rehearsals will be conducted in preparation for shots. All circuits will be activated simultaneously to detect interference and to test satisfactory operation. CJTF SEVEN and CTG 7.3 will issue rehearsal instructions.

c. Communication Readiness. Since the success of the entire operation depends upon reliable rapid communications, it is most important that all ships and units achieve and maintain the highest possible state of communications readiness, both in materiel and operation. Maximum practicable training of personnel, especially in the use of CASTLE equipment, should be accomplished prior to reporting.

d. Communication Operation Instructions (COI's). Numbered Communication Operation Instructions (COI's) are published by CJTF SEVEN as necessary, and will be distributed to TG 7.3 units by CTG 7.3. COI's will take precedence over any conflicting instructions contained herein.

e. Promulgation of this Plan. Sufficient copies of this communication plan will be made available to each unit to permit placing one or more copies in each communication space where adequate security is available. Supervisory personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the plan. Comments and recommendations for improvement of the plan are invited.

3. 210. Class "E" Messages. The Class "E" message privelege is extended to Army, Air Force, and AEC civilian personnel embarked.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

4. SPECIAL MEASURES FOR CLEARING TRAFFIC IN THE FORWARD AREA

a. All messages for transmission to addressees outside the Eniwetok-Bikini Danger Area will be routed through the Joint Relay Center, Eniwetok, except:

(1) Routine administrative messages not concerned with Operation CASTLE which may be sent via Navy Ship/Shore circuits by the U.S.S. BAIROKO.

(2) VF-29 Detachment, Kwajalein traffic.

(3) Emergency type traffic which cannot be delivered to the Joint Relay Center because of circuit failure.

(4) Intra-task group operational traffic.

(5) Other traffic as directed by CJTF SEVEN or CTG 7.3.

b. Message Preparation and Release

(1) All persons releasing messages shall be thoroughly familiar with CJTF SEVEN and CTG 7.3 Security and Classification directives.

(2) Messages pertaining to Operation CASTLE addressed to activities outside the Forward Area should be released by Commanding Officers only, except in an emergency

(3) The number of officers authorized to release messages should be reduced to a practical minimum.

(4) Commanding Officers are responsible for the proper classification of all messages transmitted from facilities on board, except where the shipboard terminal is manned by personnel of other Task Groups or where traffic is originated and released by staffs embarked. Except as specified above, all passengers shall be required to obtain message release from the Commanding Officer or his authorized representatives.

(5) Communication personnel shall familiarize themselves with JANAP and ACP publications containing Joint Communication Procedures, and shall be alert to insure that drafters use only abbreviations authorized by JANAP 132 when originating inter-task group and joint traffic.

5. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT AND CRYSTAL PROCUREMENT

a. Communication Equipment

(1) Units carry sufficient spare parts to maintain communication

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Only the following personnel of TG 7.1 are authorized to originate traffic from TG 7.1 [redacted] addressed to activities outside the forward area: Dr. K.E. Ogle, Mr Duncan Curry, Jr; Mr. Armand Kelly; Mr. Duane Sewell; Mr. Walter Gibbin; Col. H.M. Gilbert; USAF; CDT Neil Kingsley, USN; upon presentation of proper identification.

[redacted]

and electronics equipment for a period of about five months after departure for the CASTLE operating area.

(2) Large units assist smaller units, as requested, in furnishing spare parts and technical assistance.

(3) Units notify CTG 7.3 of electronic equipment failure which might prevent a unit from successfully carrying out its operational mission.

(4) VRC-10 radios will be installed in designated ships by TG 7.3 Boat Pool, assisted by ship's force, in accordance with this plan and as directed by CTG 7.3. Where not specifically designated, Commanding Officers should designate installation locations. Repair and replacement facilities will be located in U.S.S. BELLE GROVE. When the BELLE GROVE is absent from Bikini, spare radios and repair service will be located in YFN 934. Units at Eniwetok utilize services of TG 7.2 repair facilities, Eniwetok Island, during absence of TG 7.3 VRC-10 repair personnel.

(5) Strict accountability of VRC-10 equipment will be maintained, and all components of all sets issued must be returned to the TG 7.3 Boat Pool prior to departure from the CASTLE operating area. OIC 7.3 Boat Pool will initiate a receipt system for issuing equipment.

(6) Designated ships will assist the contractor Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc. in installing Motorola sets in spaces on board selected by TG 7.1 personnel and approved by the Commanding Officer or CTG 7.3. EG&G will furnish replacement sets on request.

b. Crystal Procurement

(1) Task Group 7.3 units are responsible for procuring the crystals necessary to meet the requirements outlined in Appendix I to this Annex. One spare set of crystals shall be procured for each applicable frequency. CTG 7.3 will provide funds on request where expenditures are in excess of $100 and crystals are not provided for in the unit's allowance. Units will notify CTG 7.3 twenty days in advance of scheduled departure for the operating area if crystals on assigned frequencies are not on hand.

(2) Task Group 7.2 will operate a crystal grinding facility for all elements of the Task Force in the forward area. Requests from TG 7.3 units shall be submitted via CTG 7.3.

c. Communication Equipment for Small Boats. All small boats required to operate in remote areas of Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls shall be provided with means of emergency communication. Boats in this category which are not

radio equipped will be provided with Very pistols or signal rockets. TG 7.3 Boat Pool boats will carry emergency signal equipment in addition to radios.

6. 400. AUTHENTICATION

a. General. All units of Task Group 7.3 shall be prepared to authenticate upon request, or when directed by CTG 7.3 or other competent authority.

b. Joint Task Force SEVEN Authentication. ~~CTG 7.3 will distribute to all units, prior to 1 January 1954, authentication tables extracted from AFSAG 1247 which are directed for use in Joint Communications within JTF SEVEN.~~ CTG 7.3 will distribute AFSAL 5364, to all units which will be used for authentication between JTF units.

c. Intra-Task Group 7.3 Authentication. Authentication of intra-task group traffic utilizing the above tables is authorized and will normally be used in lieu of intra-Navy authentication systems, which will remain effective for use with units outside of JTF SEVEN. Extract tables will become effective 15 January 1954 and will be employed and superceded in accordance with instructions contained therein.

7. 500. MOVEMENT REPORTS

a. Movements to and from the Eniwetok-Bikini Danger Area. All movements of units into and out of the Eniwetok-Bikini Danger Area will be previously made known to and approved by CTG 7.3 and shall be reported in accordance with Chapter 5, USF 70(B). Movement reports shall be classified "CONFIDENTIAL" during periods when units are under CTG 7.3 operational control.

b. Movements within the Eniwetok-Bikini Danger Area. Movement of units within the Eniwetok-Bikini Danger Area shall not be reported to the Movement Control System. In lieu of movement reports as required in para a. above, units moving within the Eniwetok-Bikini Danger Area shall file a "CONFIDENTIAL" movement message addressed as follows:

From: Unit
To: CTG 7.3
Info: ~~CJTF SEVEN, CTG 7.2, SOPA, etc. as appropriate and other JTF SEVEN activities concerned with the movement.~~
[redacted] CJTF Seven & Subordinate CTG 7.1, CTG 7.2, CTG 7.5, CTG 7.3.1, CTG 7.3.2, CTG 7.3.3, CTG 7.3.4, CTG 7.3.5, and such other Commands as

c. Local movement reports on movements confined to the Eniwetok-Bikini area may be sent plain language, provided designated classified code words are substituted for these locations and no other information of a classified nature is included. Movements of ships carrying nuclear materials or device components shall be classified Secret or as directed. Address arrival reports only to CTG 7.3, info to other interested commands at discretion. (This paragraph promulgated by CTG 7.3 312245Z of March).

d. Texts of plain language movement reports shall not contain all elements of information needed for evaluation that assigned code words indicate Bikini and Eniwetok. Names of passages shall not be used.

Examples of properly prepared texts:

(1) ETD JOY RIDE 060630M X SOA 11 X 16 PAX X 32 BAGS MAIL AND 50 LOTONS FOR THUMBTACK

(2) DEPARTED FOR SUNBURN X SOA 15 PNT 5 (DTG of message to be time of departing)

(3) ETA GAYDOG 091120 MIKE 4 PAX X NO MAIL X SOA 8 (DTG to be 2 or more hours before or after actual departure).

(4) ARRIVED. To be sent on arriving if voyage has been previously ordered by message. (DTG of message to be same as arrival time, If CTG 7.3 is present send arrival report by visual. Usually no other units require this information.

8. 900. SECURITY

a. 910. Radio Silence. No requirement for radio silence is imposed on radio circuits except as may be specifically ordered by CTG 7.3 or higher authority. It is expected that radio silence on almost all circuits will be ordered from several minutes prior to a shot until about one minute after the shot.

b. 975.3. Monitoring of Radio Traffic.

(1) The Army Security Agency (ASA) will provide a communication security unit, under the operational control of CJTF SEVEN, for monitoring radio circuits in the Forward Area.

(2) All low, medium, and high frequency radio circuits are subject to instant interception from fixed land stations or possibly from ships, aircraft, or submarines. Under favorable conditions, VHF and UHF transmissions are also susceptible to monitoring by unfriendly forces.

c. Transmission Security

(1) Basic Principles. The basic principles of transmission security are outlined in ACP 122(B). In view of the heavy requirements anticipated on all circuits, circuit discipline must be vigorously enforced. In addition, the following principles of security shall apply in the forward area:

(a) No radio circuit (including VHF and UHF) or telephone circuit having a radio link is approved for transmission of classified information in the clear.

(b) All TOP SECRET and RESTRICTED DATA messages will be enciphered off-line prior to transmission over SIGTOT circuits.

(c) Code names will not be assigned to individuals. The use of personal names on voice radio circuits is authorized.

(d) Radioteletype, CW, and visual message facilities will be used in lieu of voice radio whenever practicable.

(e) Personnel operating voice circuits shall be thoroughly familiar with ACP 125. Where time permits, and especially on HF circuits, voice transmissions should be written out and approved by originators prior to transmission in order to avoid the inadvertent disclosure of classified matter.

(f) The new (ICAO) phonetic alphabet (ALPHA, BRAVO, COCA, etc.) is not authorized for naval use. All units shall use the naval phonetic alphabet (ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE, etc.) during CASTLE.

(2) Approved Circuits

(a) The landline and submarine cable systems at Eniwetok and Bikini (including telephone and teletype) are approved for the transmission in the clear of classified information up to and including SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION.

(b) TOP SECRET and AEC RESTRICTED DATA will not be transmitted in the clear by electrical means at any time.

(c) Extreme care must be exercised to insure that classified information is not transmitted in the clear over any type "radio" circuit. This includes back-up radio telephone and radio teletype circuits. When a portion of a telephone circuit consists of a radio link, the operator shall inform parties that, "THIS IS A RADIO CIRCUIT--CONFINE CONVERSATION TO UNCLASSIFIED MATTERS."

(3) Visual Traffic

(a) Comply with paragraph 2108 and section 2400 of AFSAG 1248. When a classified message is sent in the clear by visual means, the first word of the text shall be the message classification and the heading shall contain the operating signal "ZNJ" meaning- "This message contains classified information. Do not transmit over non-approved circuits." Hand flags or directional light using minimum brilliance consistent with satisfactory communications should be employed to send classified traffic.

(b) The TG 7.3 Admin Net (Channel 2) may be used to alert signal bridges.

(c) Vessels having three or more signalmen attached shall maintain a continuous signal watch.

(d) Use of Longglass and Ship's Optical Equipment. Commanding Officers shall take positive action to insure that the use of the ship's longglass, binoculars, and other optical equipment is restricted to personnel officially engaged in communication and navigation duties. Annex "D" of this Operation Plan (Security Annex) directs that individuals whose duties require the use of such equipment be specifically authorized by name in written orders. Officers of the Deck and

bridge personnel must be thoroughly familiar with all pertinent security directives and must be alert to prevent any unauthorized use of ship's optical equipment.

9. 1034. INTERFERENCE REPORTS. In accordance with Part II, Para 9, JANAP 195(C) and Chapter 13, USF 70(B), serious circuit interference shall be reported to CTG 7.3 and CJTF SEVEN (J-5 Division) by the most expeditious means.

10. TELEPHONE AND SUBMARINE CABLE SYSTEMS ENIWETOK-BIKINI AREA

a. Use of Cable Facilities at Mooring Buoys. Submarine cable facilities are provided at mooring buoys in the Eniwetok-Bikini area as follows:

ENIRIKEN ISLAND	PARRY ISLAND	ENIWETOK ISLAND
1. CVE Mooring Buoy	1. POL Buoy	1. Berth N-2
2. LSD Mooring Buoy	2. Berth -1	2. Berth L-2
3. AGC Mooring Buoy		3. Berth L-4
4. AVR Mooring Buoy		4. AVR Mooring Buoy

Ships with facilities available will establish telephone connections with switchboards at Bikini, Eniwetok, or Parry Island as appropriate. Where teletype facilities exist, ships shall establish landline teletype circuits to the Joint Relay Center, Eniwetok, or the Communication Station, Bikini, as appropriate, for transmission of ship/shore traffic.

b. Eniwetok and Bikini telephone directories will be furnished to each ship by CTG 7.3.

c. Ships scheduled to moor to telephone buoys or having AN/TRC-3 installed (CURTISS, ESTES, BAMOKO & PELLE GROVE) furnish CTG 7.3 with directory of key personnel for inclusion in the JTF SEVEN telephone directories. This information should be forwarded to CTG 7.3 as soon practicable after receipt of this order.

11. 2500. MAIL

a. 2510. U. S. MAIL. All U. S. Mail arrives and departs Eniwetok daily via air. Eastbound mail is sorted for air or surface transportation at Pearl Harbor, according to its class.

b. U.S. Mail Handling in the Forward Area. Post Offices in the forward area are located as follows:

ENIWETOK - APO 187 - Receives and dispatches mail from and to the ENIWETOK-BIKINI Area.

PARRY ISLAND, ENIWETOK - APO 187 (H) - Receives and dispatches mail between units located on PARRY Island and APO 187.

HOLMES AND NAVVER Mail Distribution Center, BIKINI - Receives and distributes non-registered mail between personnel based ashore (except Navy) at BIKINI Atoll and APO 187 (H) and APO 187.

CTG 7.3 will keep APO 187 notified of correct mail routing to TG 7.3 ships and units in the area. Mail for units at BIKINI will be placed aboard Flight 1, departing ENIWETOK at 0820M and arriving BIKINI at 0955M, except Sundays, by APO 187. Any backlog not placed on Flight 1 will be placed on Flights 2, 3 and 4 departing the same day. SOPA BIKINI (normally BIRCKC) will meet flights carrying Navy mail and arrange for pick-up of outgoing mail and distribution of incoming mail. CTG 7.3 will designate a ship at ENIWETOK (normally ESTES) to coordinate mail pick up and delivery between ships at ENIWETOK and APO 187.

c. 2513. Officer Messenger Mail

(1) Officer messenger mail arriving at ENIWETOK is picked up by the TG 7.2 AG Publications Section. This section will contact the CTG 7.3 Staff Communications or CTG 7.3 Liaison Officer, PARRY Island, who will arrange for delivery to naval ships and units. Officer messenger mail within the ENIWETOK-BIKINI Area will be handled by SOPA ENIWETOK or SOPA BIKINI who will normally send via TG 7.3 officers enroute to delivery point.

d. 2514. Guard Mail

(1) Guard Mail Centers afloat will be maintained by SOPA Eniwetok and SOPA Bikini. Ships present will pick up and deliver guard mail at these centers.

(2) SOPA will make Guard Mail trips to JTF SEVEN HQ Guard Mail Centers on Parry and Eninman Islands.

(3) Guard Mail schedules will be as follows:

Each ship will make guard mail trips to SOPA at 1030 and at 1500 daily except Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays when only the morning trip will be made.

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12. 3600. REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS, CRYPTOBOARDS AND GENERAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

a. General. The majority of CASTLE traffic, other than routine administrative, logistic, and personal Class "E" messages will be classified. Units of TG 7.3 shall insure that sufficient cryptoboard personnel are trained prior to reporting to CTG 7.3 for operational control.

b. 3603. Cryptographic

(1) TG 7.3 units hold cryptographic allowances in accordance with AFSAG 1250, with the following exceptions:

(a) PC 1546, COCOPA, MOLALA, APACHE, SIOUX, TAWAKONI and MENDER hold class 3 Pacific (afloat) allowances

(b) LST's 551, 762, and 1157 of TG 7.3 hold a modified class 3 Pacific (afloat) allowance, including a regular class 2 allowance and the following class 3 publications:

AFSAG 1202C	AFSAR 3907	AFSAR 4085
AFSAK 2439	AFSAR 3907-1	CSP 2899
AFSAK 2591	AFSAR 3908	CSP 2900

(c) CTG 7.3 and the USS ESTES (AGC-12) hold class 5 Pacific (afloat) allowance.

(d) The USNS AINSWORTH (TAP-181) holds a modified Class 3 Pacific (Afloat) allowance, consisting of the following publications:

AFSAK 2110	AFSAK 2438	CSP 2899
AFSAK 2116	AFSAK 2439	CSP 2900
AFSAK 2122	AFSAK 2591	
AFSAK 2138	AFSAG 1202(C)	

(e) YAG 39 and YAG 40 are assigned Class 2 Pacific (afloat) allowance; however publications are not retained on board during operations at Eniwetok or Bikini. UHPJA is cryptoguard for YAG's when present at Eniwetok and for routine administrative traffic. MOLALA is cryptoguard for YAG's when YAG's are underway or at Bikini.

(f) Naval Station, Kwajalein is cryptoguard for VP-29 (CTE 7.3.3); CTG 7.4 ComCenter is cryptoguard for CTE 7.3.2.2.

(g) UHPJA is cryptoguard for CTG 7.3 LNO Eniwetok.

c. 3604. Mail Issues by RPIO's. When necessary to request publications by message, ships of TG 7.3 shall address such request to NavComSta Pearl Harbor, (RPIO). Delivery will be made by Officer Messenger Mail to the OMMC Parry Island, or OMM Sub-Center at Eninman Island as appropriate. All TG 7.3 holders shall furnish a copy of Sections III and V of RPS 10(A) to NavComSta Pearl Harbor (RPIO prior to arrival at Eniwetok.

d. 3664. Authorization of Cryptoboard Members. The procedure for authorizing cryptoboard members is set forth in TG 7.3 Instruction 5521.1 dated 28 Aug., 1953. In addition to the clearance required therein, cryptoboard members should be designated in writing to handle crypto material in accordance with Art. 3664, USF 70(B).

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Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

TAB B to Appendix I to Annex F

Radio Frequency Plan

TG 7.3 CHANNEL NUMBERS	KEY: Cy- Copy; G- Guard as required by circuit description; L- Listen as required by circuit description; T- Transmit as required by circuit description; *- Indicates net control CIRCUIT NAME	[illegible]	[illegible] EMI CLASS	[illegible] DESIGNATOR	CTG 7.3 PARRY ISLAND	CTG 7.3 AFLOAT BAIROKO	CJTF SEVEN AFLOAT ESTES
	COLUMN	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1a	TASK GROUP COMMON DAY	6420	0.1A1	C3.7(h)	J-300	G*	G*	G
1b	NIGHT	2656	0.1A1	C3.3(d)	J-300	G*	G*	G
2	TASK GROUP ADMINISTRATIVE NET	283.4 mcs	6A3	T63	J-307	G*	G*	G
3a	TACTICAL/MANEUVERING/ PRIMARY	325.0 mcs	6A3	C4.1(e)	J-309	G	G	G
	WARNING NET SECONDARY	274.5 mcs	6A3	C4.1(b)	J-309	G	G	G
4	COMBAT INFORMATION NET	333.0 mcs	6A3	T66	J-308		G	G
5	PEARL PRIMARY FLEET MANUAL OR BROADCAST TELETYPE	SEE JANAP 195(c)	0.1A1 1.08F1	B3		Cy	Cy	Cy
6	PEARL PRIMARY MANUAL OR GENERAL BROADCAST TELETYPE	SEE JANAP 195(C)	0.1A1 1.08F1	B16			Cy	Cy
7a	ENIWETOK HARBOR VOICE	2716	6A3	A2(b)	J-206		G	G
7b	COMMON CW	2836	0.1A1	A2(a)	J-206			G
8	PRIMARY SHIP/SHORE	4255 SERIES	0.1A1	A1	J-301		G	G
9	KWAJALEIN SHIP/SHORE	SEE JANAP 195(C)	0.1A1	P33	J-302		G	G
10	CTG 7.3 - CJTF SEVEN	318.6 mcs	6A3	T-2	J-318		G	G

[redacted]

H	CONTROL
I	BELLE GROVE
J	AINSWORTH (TAP-181)
K	COMCORTDESDIV 12 CORTDESDIV 12
L	PC-1546
M	LST 551 LST 762
N	ATF's
O	ARSD
P	YO-120
Q	TG 7.3 BOAT POOL
R	AVR's
S	YAG-39 YAG-40
T	AIRCRAFT ON SEARCH PATROL
U	AIRCRAFT ON CAP
A	TG 7.3 HELICOPTERS
W	P2V-5
X	P4Y-2
Y	CONTROL DDE- SPECIAL CIRCUITS
Z	ENIWETOK READY DUTY DDE- SPECIAL CIRCUI

e. Cryptographic Repair Facilities. The minor cryptographic repair facility aboard the USS ESTES is available to TG 7.3 units as required. This facility will furnish replacements for CSP 2900 in accordance with Art. 416, RFS 4(D) as directed by CTG 7.3. CTG 7.2 Eniwetok Island operates a minor crypto repair facility which may be utilized in emergencies by TG 7.3 units.

13. 3570. PRESS BROADCASTS. SOPA Eniwetok and SOPA Bikini should prepare sufficient copies of the daily press schedule for dissemination to JTF SEVEN activities via morning guard mail trip or for pickup as requested.

14. AFRS ENIWETOK. WXIE operates on a frequency of 1385 kcs.

15. SUMMARY OF CTG 7.3 STAFF COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (effective 14 Jan. in the Eniwetok-Bikini area).

a. Initial briefing of communication officers and key personnel upon arrival of TG 7.3 units in the Eniwetok-Bikini area.

b. Crystal procurement.

c. Evaluation of circuit interference.

d. Assignment of new frequencies when necessary to eliminate serious circuit interference.

e. Assistance in procurement of spare parts in emergency situations.

f. Revision of circuit loads and guard requirements of individual Task Group units when such revisions are indicated by limitation of equipment or available personnel.

g. Liaison between TG 7.3 units and other commands and activities on matters concerning communications.

h. Procurement of additional special communications equipment required for CASTIE.

16. CIRCUIT ACTIVATION. CTG 7.3 Admin, Parry Island, will activate channels 1 and 2 at 142000Z January and channels 12 and 13 at 220000Z January. TG 7.3 VRC-10 channels will be activated in accordance with Appendix 1 to this Annex, as soon after 22 January as equipment is installed. TG 7.3 units activate remainder of channels in Appendix 1 to this Annex, without further orders and as specified in the circuit description, upon reporting to CTG 7.3 Admin or CTG 7.3 for operational control.

17. CASTLE Roll-up Plan. Prior to completion of CASTLE, a communication roll-up plan will be promulgated, instructing units as to disposition of communication equipment especially procured for CASTLE or IVY.

18. CASTLE COMMUNICATION REPORT. Prior to departure from the forward area, all Task Group ships and units shall submit a summary report of communication activity during Operation CASTLE. Compilation of accurate statistics and evaluation of circuit and equipment capabilities on the operational level will enable CTG 7.3 to make specific recommendations for future planning purposes. These reports should contain the following information:

a. Weekly Traffic Volume Statistics. These figures should reflect the total number of incoming and outgoing messages (exclusive of tactical and voice radio transmission to which no DTG was assigned) received via radio, mail or visual means and processed through the communications office. Figures should be tabulated and should cover the period the unit is under the operational control of CTG 7.3.

WEEK ENDING						
INCOMING	1/1	1/7	1/14	1/21	1/28	etc
Plain						
Confidential						
Secret						
Top Secret						
OUTGOING						
Plain						
Confidential						
Secret						
Top Secret						

b. Indicate approximate percentage by precedence of messages handled in the following categories: Incoming plain; incoming classified; outgoing plain; outgoing classified. Figures may be based upon tabulation of seven or more average days.

c. Approximate percentages of increase or decrease in classified and plain language messages represented by CASTLE traffic compared to normal operating periods.

d. Summary of interference noted and technical difficulties encountered.

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e. Comments on special equipments. Units using special equipments installed for CASTLE operations, ie, SIGTOT-SAMPSON, AN/TRC-3, SIGTOT, etc. should make detailed evaluation of these equipments including traffic volume statistics, maintainance problems encountered and recommendations for future employment.

f. Comments and recommendations concerning adequacy of communications and electronics personnel and special training received.

g. Overall evaluation of CASTLE communications, including comments on planning, adequacy of circuits and recommendations for future planning.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Authenticated:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

Appendices:

I Radio Circuit Plan
Tab A Radio Circuit Description
Tab B Radio Frequency Plan
Tab C Aircraft Radio Frequency Plan

II Radio Circuit Diagrams
Tab A Principle Task Force HF Circuits
Tab B Joint Task Force SEVEN Teletype Network
Tab C Security Patrol Communications

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Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D.C.
7 December 1953, 1200Z

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Appendix I to Annex F

Radio Circuit Plan

1. Appendix I consists of the following:

   a. Tab A Radio Circuit Description
   b. Tab B Radio Frequency Plan
   c. Tab C Aircraft Radio Frequency Plan

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Authenticated:

A. C. DRAGGE
ICDR
Flag Secretary

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Jo Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

TAB A to Appendix I to Annex F

Radio Circuit Description

Radio circuit channel numbers below correspond to channel numbers shown in TAB B to Appendix I and circuit description and instructions apply.

- -

CIRCUIT DESCRIPTION AND INSTRUCTIONS

- -

1a The Task Group CW common shall be guarded continuously by all Task
1b Group 7.3 ships having three or more radiomen on board; from time of arrival in the Eniwetok-Bikini operating area until departure. ~~Ships having less than three radiomen on board arrange schedule with CTG 7.3 under [illegible] operational control.~~ CTG 7.3 will exercise net control [illegible] will utilize net to pass specifically addressed How Fox traffic to ships requesting guardship arrangements and to pass selected general messages, including area weather. Net frequency will be shifted on signal at about 1900M and 0500M if necessary. Ships having one or two operators copy TG common at appropriate periods as set forth in art 331, USF 70(B) keeping CTG 7.3 informed

- -

2 The Task Group UHF Administrative net shall be guarded continuously when two or more TG 7.3 units designated to guard are within UHF transmission range of each other. SOPA Eniwetok and SOPA Bikini will exercise net control. Circuit shall terminate in Radio Central where feasible.

- -

3a The Tactical/Maneuvering/Warning UHF circuit shall be guarded when
3b two or more TG 7.3 ships are underway in the same operating area. During planned sorties circuit shall be guarded continuously commencing one half hour before first ship is scheduled to get underway. AINSWORTH guard channel 3 vice channel 2 when required.

- -

4 The Combat Information Net shall be guarded in CIC equipped vessels when two or more ships are controlling aircraft in the same area or maneuvering as a unit under an OTC. Ships designated to guard channel 24 should utilize that channel to pass CIC information when unable to contact ships on channel 4.

[redacted]

[redacted]

5 Pearl Primary Fleet Broadcast shall be copied continuously by all ships having sufficient personnel. Guarding other TG 7.3 circuits takes precedence over copying How Fox. Ships unable to maintain a continuous watch on either the manual or the teletype component of How Fox shall make guardship arrangements with ~~BAIROKO~~ Curtiss or ship in vicinity. BAIROKO only is authorized to pass How Fox traffic and General Messages Curtiss via Task Group Common circuit. ~~BAIROKO will provide copies of How Fox traffic logs and general messages either by guard mail or for pick-up as requested.~~ Ship movement reports should indicate continuous coverage of Circuit B3 from time of arrival in the Eniwetok-Bikini area until departure. Curtiss will mail via guard mail each Thursday copies of B3 + B5 log sheets and [illegible] general messages for all ships whom she is guard.

6 Curtiss ~~BAIROKO~~ will relay weather, Hydro and Notices to Mariners pertinent to the Eniwetok-Bikini area via the Task Group Common (CW). ~~BAIROKO~~ Curtiss will maintain copies of messages received on this circuit for pick-up or guard mail delivery as requested. Curtiss will distribute log sheets to all ships for whom she is guard [illegible]

7
~~7a~~
7b ESTES will maintain circuit with Eniwetok Army Communication Station using either voice or CW component and relay traffic addressed to TG 7.3 units via CW Common or other available means. Other ships of TG 7.3 may use this circuit as necessary.

8 Ships under the operational control of CTG 7.3 are not authorized to use Primary Ship/Shore circuit A1 except as follows:

a. When not within range of TG 7.3 communication circuits.

b. BAIROKO to pass traffic of a non-operational nature where other elements of JTF SEVEN are not addressed or directly affected and to pass traffic originated by CTG 7.3 designated for delivery via this circuit. BAIROKO be prepared to send FLASH and EMERGENCY precedence traffic originated by CTG 7.3

c. ESTES guard circuit during periods CJTF SEVEN is embarked. Pass traffic originated by CJTF SEVEN specifically designated for delivery via this circuit.

9 CTG 7.3-Kwajalein circuit will not be activated if other ship/shore circuits prove adequate or unless required by CJTF SEVEN.

[redacted]

10 Command voice channel between CJTF SEVEN in ESTES JOC and CTG 7.3 in BAIROKO Flag Plot. This circuit to be manned continuously during periods CJTF SEVEN is embarked in the ESTES.

---

11 DDE's activate as directed by ComCortDesDiv 12, who shall notify CTG 7.3 when either circuit 11a or 11b is activated in order that security monitoring of the circuit can be initiated.

12a P2V-6 aircraft on patrol and ships on security patrol or in a
12b standby status maintain continuous guard, preferably in CIC or adjacent
12c space. BAIROKO and Radio KWAJALEIN maintain continuous guard. Only
12d operational traffic pertaining to CASTLE security mission should be passed via this circuit.

13a Stations designated guard when P2V-6 aircraft are on patrol. Tugs
13b assigned to assist Project 2.5A utilize channel 13b as primary to provide a voice channel to P2V-6 aircraft as required by Project Officer Project 2.5A.

Circuit will be activated only upon direction of CTG 7.3

14 This circuit will be activated upon receipt of contact report and during final search preceding shots and will be manned in addition to channels 12 and 13. When channel 14 is activated, P2V-6 aircraft maintain split-phone watch on channels 12 and 14 and shift transmitter as required.

15a DDE's guard when CAP aircraft are within VHF range and are
15b engaged in investigating unauthorized entry contact.

16a Helicopters engaged in special missions such as RADSAFE survey
16b flights should be shifted to channel 16c to avoid interference with
16c Bikini or Eniwetok intra-atoll helicopter airlift circuits.

17a Aircraft control frequencies; BAIROKO to Navy project aircraft.
17b

18a Channel 18b is TG 7.5 Boat Pool Primary. Boats guard frequency
18b of dispatcher exercising control. Boats notify appropriate dispatcher
18c when shifting frequencies for control purposes. Channel 18c may be
18d used for special missions to avoid interference with Boat Pool circuits.
18e Ships indicated guard boat frequencies as operations require.
18f



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19a Refer CINCPAC serial 405 dated 18 December, 1952 for SAR
19b Communications Pacific. AVR's at Eniwetok and Bikini maintain con-
19c tinuous telephone or VHF circuit with Control Towers. All stations
19d activate channels 19e-19g as directed by CTG 7.3, CTG 7.4 or other
19e command assisting in an SAR incident. AOC Eniwetok will guard 8314 kcs
19f voice and be prepared to activate channels 19e-19g. Original emerg-
19g ency transmission should be made on the assigned air-ground frequency or frequency of last communication contact; if no acknowledgement is received, use any of the SAR channels, or any other frequency as necessary to establish communications. Ships assigned to guard 8364 kcs CW shift to 8364 kcs voice when in receipt of steady CW note on this frequency. ESTES guard channels 19b-19d as requested by TG 7.4.

20a All TG 7.3 ships and aircraft within VHF voice range of time
20b broadcast announcer should make every effort to insure receiption of
20c time broadcast and retransmission over ships public announcing systems. Circuit tests will be announced. Procedure, including Radsafe instructions and information, will be distributed. Motorola and VHF broadcast will originate in firing bunker on Enyu for Bikini shots and in control room, Parry Island, for Eniwetok shot. TG 7.3 will make rebroadcast from BAIROKO on UHF for ships not equipped with Motorola or VHF. LSD is responsible for rebroadcast, as necessary to TG 7.3 Boat Pool. BAIROKO CIC will insure TG 7.3 UHF equipped aircraft on missions shift to UHF time broadcast. Shot times will not be broadcast on any frequency below 126.18 mcs.

21a Channel 21 consists of AN/FGC5 electronic multiplex circuit
21b carrying the administrative SIGTOT-SAMSON duplex circuit between the
21c ESTES and TG 7.2 Joint Communication Center, Eniwetok and the duplex
21d weather RATT between the ESTES and the TG 7.4 Weather Central, Eniwe-
21e tok. In the event of channel failure:
21f

(a) The duplex weather RATT will be reestablished on Channel 22.

(b) The SIGTOT-SAMSON circuit will be reestablished utilizing channel 21 frequencies but eliminating use of AN/FGC-5.

Channel 21 will be manned continuously during the operational phase of CASTLE. ESTES employ AN/URT-3 transmitter with a standby transmitter ready for operating. ESTES coordinate preparation of detailed channel operating instructions with appropriate TG 7.2 and TG 7.4 communications personnel, Eniwetok.

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22a In the event of failure of Channel 21 shift operation of
22b duplex weather RATT to channel 22. If TG 7.4 concurs maintain
22c Channel 22 in a standby status during periods from two days prior
22d to until one day after each shot.
22e
22f

- -

23a Eniwetok-Ponape-Kusaie-Majuro-Rongerik simplex CW weather net.
23b ESTES guard as directed by JTF SEVEN Weather Central in ESTES. ESTES
23c will normally man this channel on failure of channel 21.
23d

- -

24a Simplex voice air operations net. CTG 7.4 exercises net control.
24b This channel will be manned continuously in the CIC's of ships indi-
24c cated and by the AOC, Eniwetok. This channel provides a means to
scramble F4U aircraft at Eniwetok, coordinate aircraft movement in-
formation between the various control centers and for exchange of
air-sea rescue information.

- -

25a Simplex voice air operations circuit between the ESTES CIC and
25b the AOC, Eniwetok. This channel will be activated during rehearsal
25c and shot periods as requested by TG 7.4. ESTES arrange with TG 7.4
for daily circuit test during periods channel is not activated. BAI-
ROKO, Control DDE and Eniwetok Ready Duty DDE should listen on this
channel to obtain information on movements of TG 7.4 controlled
aircraft.

- -

26a Net control in ESTES CIC. To be utilized when TG 7.4 controlled
26b aircraft are outside of VHF range. Aircraft control DDE guard as
requested by TG 7.4 air controller embarked.

- -

27a Net control in ESTES CIC. To be utilized when TG 7.4 controlled
27b aircraft are outside of VHF range.
27c
27d

- -

28a All Air Force aircraft assigned to TG 7.4, except helicopters, will
28b have channels A thru H on VHF radios. ESTES will be required to
28c activate channels 28a and 28e-28h for simultaneous use in CIC for
28d TG 7.4 air control. Channel 28 j will be required in CIC to provide
Channel J will be used for [illegible] between aircraft in the Eniwetok area and AOC Eniwetok!

[redacted]

[redacted]

28e a voice circuit to the JOC Eniwetok via a C-47 relay aircraft, in
28f event of failure of channels 24 and 25. ESTES will activate chan-
28g nels 28b, 28c, 28d and 28i as requested by TG 7.4 Air Controller.
28h Control DDE guard channels 28d and 28f as requested by TG 7.4 Air
28i Controller. Eniwetok Ready Duty DDE utilize channel 28b to communi-
28j cate with Eniwetok Control Tower when necessary to scramble F4U
28k fighter aircraft.

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29 CJTF SEVEN Radsafe circuit between Radsafe Operations Offices in BAIROKO and ESTES. Navy will install VRC-10 radios and CJTF SEVEN Radsafe personnel will operate the circuit.

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30 TG 7.1 Administrative Motorola Net at Bikini and Eniwetok. Ships assist EG&G in making installation in spaces suitable to TG 7.1 and commanding officers. Circuit will be operated by TG 7.1 personnel except that ships may utilize on a not-to-interfere or operational necessity basis.

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31 ESTES, CURTISS and BAIROKO establish AN/TRC landline and radio telephone circuits in accordance with COI 20-1 circuits J-213, J-214, J-215, J-217, J-218, J-219, J-220, J-320 and J-321. Ships establish AN/TRC circuits providing best utilization of equipment depending upon ships' location and operational requirements, or as CTG 7.3 may direct.

32a The ESTES-Enyu Ciphony circuit is for use between the Firing
32b Party located in the bunker on Enyu and CJTF SEVEN embarked in ESTES. ESTES personnel will install and maintain ESTES terminal, including remote control units in ESTES JOC and ~~Flag Plot~~. Scientific personnel will operate the circuit. TG 7.2 will install and maintain bunker terminal. Operations Office (TG 7.3 Firing Force)

33a The BAIROKO-TG 7.2 (Joint Communication Center, Eniwetok Island)
33b SIGTOT channel will be operated continuously during CASTLE opera-
33c tional phase. This circuit will be the primary means of passing
33d traffic between TG 7.3 and the shore communication system. In event
33e of failure of SIGTOT equipment, establish RTT duplex on same fre-
33f quencies.

This circuit will be utilized on an alternate channel in the event of a failure or overload of circuit J-202.

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34 A recreation area will be established on Bikini Island. A VRC-10 radio will be installed at the recreation area for use with ship delegated to control area and with other VRC-10 equipped stations desiring to contact the area. Recreation area will guard continuously during periods parties are ashore in the area. Boats proceeding to the recreation area should contact the area prior to arrival and departure.

35a ESTES copy as requested by TG 7.4 Weather Central.
35b
35c
~~35d~~
~~35e~~

---

36 This net shall be manned and operated as directed by the Project Officer, Project 6.4.

---

37 Control DDE will be furnished a keyer and necessary instructions by ComCortDesDiv 12 to activate, using a TBL transmitter, an MCW homing signal, identifier "YER".

38a This channel provides a rapid means of communication between
38b UDU Harbor Control Stations. CTU 7.3.8 should use this channel for radio communications with these stations.

39a ESTES copy as requested by JTF SEVEN Weather Central in ESTES
39b or TG 7.4 Weather Central, Eniwetok.
39c
39d
39e

40a ESTES guard as requested by TG 7.4 or JTF SEVEN Weather Central
40b in ESTES.
40c

---

41 This channel will be activated as requested by Project Officer, Project 3.2

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F-I-A-7

42. In event of failure of the TG 7.4 homing beacon on ENYU CURTISS activate a homer using 100-500 watts, identifier AV.

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Operation Plan
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NOTES:

1. ComCortDesDiv 12 direct U.S.S. PC-1546 to guard additional circuits as may be required in the performance of the security mission.

2. Control DDE and Eniwetok Ready Duty DDE activate channels listed under columns "Y" and "Z", respectively, in addition to channels listed under column "K" for CortDesDiv 12 DDE's.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

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A. C. DRAGGE, LCDR
Flag Secretary

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D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
J-317 J-317	UDU STATIONS ON PARRY ISLAND AND ENIWETOK ISLAND GUARD												
J-403 J-403 J-403 J-403 J-403			Cy										
J-411 J-411 J-411			G										
	GUARDED BY LCU 1348 AND AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO PROJECT 3.2 PHOTO-TRIANGULA												

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M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
K ISLAND GUARD													
) TO PROJECT 3.2 PHOTO-TRIANGULATION													

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Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. I-53

	COLUMN		A	B	C	D	E
28a	TASK GROUP 7.4	CHANNEL A	143.00 mcs	6A3		J-416	
28b	VHF CHANNELS	CHANNEL B	126.18 mcs	6A3		J-416	
28c		CHANNEL C	137.88 mcs	6A3		J-416	
28d		CHANNEL D	121.5 mcs	6A3		J-416	
28E		CHANNEL E	128.70 mcs	6A3		J-416	
28f		CHANNEL F	139.86 mcs	6A3		J-416	
28g		CHANNEL G	146.16 mcs	6A3		J-416	
28h		CHANNEL H	134.1 mcs	6A3		J-416	
28i		SPARE	151.20 mcs	6A3		J-416	
28j		C-47 RELAY (CIC ONLY)	119.34 mcs	6A3		J-416	
29	BAIROKO-ESTES RADSAFE		53.5 mcs	36F3		J-313	
30	TG 7.1 ADMIN NET MOTOROLA		152.99 mcs	36F3		J-105	
31	AN/TRC NETS		REFER COI 20-1	36F3			
32a	ESTES-ENYU CIPHONY	ESTES SEND	72.2 mcs	100F3		J-220	
32b		ENYU SEND	93.0 mcs	100F3		J-220	
33a	BAIROKO-TG 7.2	BAIROKO SEND	2850	2.85F1		J-203	
33b	SIGTOT	BAIROKO SEND	4077.5	2.85F1		J-203	
33c		BAIROKO SEND	9420	2.85F1		J-203	
33d		TG 7.2 SEND	2342	2.85F1		J-203	
33e		TG 7.2 SEND	4500	2.85F1		J-203	
33f		TG 7.2 SEND	1855	2.85F1		J-203	
34	RECREATION AREA, BIKINI ISLAND		43.6	36F3			
35a	TOKYO FACSIMILE		7938	4F4	B5.3	J-404	
35b			15798	4F4	B5.3	J-404	
35c			20885	4F4	B5.3	J-404	
35d			13450	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	
35e			15755	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	
36	PROJECT 6.4 MOTOROLA NET		156.7 cs	36F3			
37	CONTROL DDE HOMING BEACON		232	2.04A2		J-319	

[redacted]

)	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
+16			G											
416			G											
416			G											
416			G											
416			G											
416			G											
416			G											
416			G											
416			G											
313		G	G											
105		G	G	G	G	G								
		G	G	G										
220			G											
220														
203														
203														
203		G												
203														
203														
203														
		G												
404														
404														
404			Cy											
[illegible]														
[illegible]														
		G	G							G				
										ATF106				
319														

M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
													G
												G	
												G	
	G					G				G			
	ATF106											T	

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Operation Plan
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	COLUMN		A	B	C	D
21a	ESTES-ENIWETOK MULTI-	ESTES XMIT	2478	2.85F1		J-401
21b	PLEX RATT (AN/FGC-5)	ESTES XMIT	4630	2.85F1		J-401
21c	CHANNEL 1-ORDER WIRE	ESTES XMIT	6507.5	2.85F1		J-401
21d	CHANNEL 2-SIGTOT	ENIWETOK XMIT	2068	2.85F1		J-401
21e	SAMSON	ENIWETOK XMIT	4752.5	2.85F1		J-401
21f	CHANNEL 3-WEATHER RATT	ENIWETOK XMIT	6920	2.85F1		J-401
	CHANNEL 4-SPARE					
22a	ENIWETOK-ESTES	ESTES XMIT	2796	1.08F1		J-204
22b	WEATHER RATT	ESTES XMIT	4837.5	1.08F1		J-204
22c	BACKUP FOR CHANNEL 21	ESTES XMIT	6795	1.08F1		J-204
22d		TG 7.4 XMIT	3220	1.08F1		J-204
22e		TG 7.4 XMIT	5205	1.08F1		J-204
22f		TG 7.4 XMIT	7550	1.08F1		J-204
23a	JTF SEVEN WEATHER SIMPLEX		3427.5	0.1A1		J-406
23b			6495	0.1A1		J-406
23c			9180	0.1A1		J-406
23d			12070	0.1A1		J-406
24a	ENIWETOK AOC-ESTES CIC SIMPLEX		2212.5	6A3		J-407
24b			6010	6A3		J-407
24c			9377.5	6A3		J-407
25a	ENIWETOK AOC-ESTES CIC SIMPLEX		2100	6A3		J-408
25b			4917.5	6A3		J-408
25c			9310	6A3		J-408
26a	ESTES CIC-OPERATIONAL		3295	6A3		J-410
26b	AIRCRAFT, SIMPLEX VOICE		5460	6A3		J-410
26c			7580	6A3		J-410
26d			10122.5	6A3		J-410
27a	ESTES CIC-OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT		3060	6A3		J-409
27b			6745.5	6A3		J-409
27c			7835	6A3		J-409
27d			13162.5	6A3		J-409

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1

M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
												G	G
												L	
												O	

)	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
501 501 501 501 501 501			G											
504 504 504 504 504 504			G											
506 506 506 506			G											
507 507 507		G	G											
508 508 508		L	G											
510 510 510 510			G											
509 509 509 509			G											

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Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
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TAB C to Appendix I to Annex F

VHF and UHF Radio Frequency Channel Plan

1. NAVY AIRCRAFT CHANNELIZATION

a. FAU-5N

PURPOSE	CHANNEL	FREQUENCY(MCS)
SAR & VHF/DF SECONDARY	1	135.9
NAVY AIRCRAFT COMMON	2	142.74
PROJECT AIRCRAFT CONTROL	3	142.56
TOWER CONTROL	4	126.18
JOINT/NAVY/AIR FORCE TACTICAL	5	137.88
	6	
CAP/FAD PRIMARY	7	142.02
CAP/FAD SECONDARY	8	132.30
ENTIETOK GCA	9	136.8
SAR & VHF/DF PRIMARY	10	121.5

b. P2M

PURPOSE	CHANNEL	FREQUENCY(MCS)
SAR & VHF/DF SECONDARY	1	135.9
NAVY AIRCRAFT COMMON	2	142.74
PROJECT AIRCRAFT CONTROL	3	142.56
TOWER CONTROL	4	126.18
JOINT NAVY/AIR FORCE TACTICAL	5	137.88
(FOR USE WHEN UNDER CTG 7.4 OPCONTROL	6	(AF ASSIGN)
CAP/FAD PRIMARY	7	142.02
ENTIETOK GCA	8	134.1
ENTIETOK GCA	9	136.8
SAR & VHF/DF PRIMARY	10	121.5

c. P2V-5

PURPOSE	CHANNEL	FREQUENCY(MCS)
SAR & VHF/DF SECONDARY	1	135.9
NAVY AIRCRAFT COMMON	2	142.74
P4Y-2 SHIP/PLANE CONTROL	3	142.56
TOWER CONTROL	4	126.18
JOINT NAVY/AIR FORCE TACTICAL	5	137.88
P2V-5 SHIP/PLANE CONTROL	6	140.58
CAP/FAD PRIMARY	7	142.02
NAVY ATS SPECIAL MISSIONS	8	132.48
ENTIETOK GCA	9	136.3
SAR & VHF/DF PRIMARY	10	121.5

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d. P4Y-2

PURPOSE	CHANNEL	FREQUENCY(MCS)
SAR & VHF/DF SECONDARY	1	135.9
NAVY AIRCRAFT COMMON	2	142.74
P4Y-2 SHIP/PLANE CONTROL	3	142.56
TOWER CONTROL	4	126.18
JOINT/NAVY/AIR FORCE TACTICAL	5	137.88
	6	
CAP/EAD PRIMARY	7	142.02
NAVY WES SPECIAL MISSIONS	8	132.48
ENIWETOK GCA	9	136.8
SAR & VHF/DF PRIMARY	10	121.5

e. NAVY WES

PURPOSE	CHANNEL	FREQUENCY(MCS)
TOWER CONTROL/BIKINI AIRLIFT	A	126.18
ENIWETOK AIRLIFT	B	136.44
SPECIAL MISSIONS	C	132.48
SAR	D	121.5

f. P2V-6 UHF CHANNELIZATION

PURPOSE	CHANNEL	FREQUENCY(MCS)
TOWER CONTROL (MILITARY PRIMARY)	1	233.80
TOWER CONTROL (ENIWETOK PRIMARY)	2	236.60
TOWER CONTROL (CIVIL-ALL MILITARY A/C	3	257.80
CAA AIRWAYS (RANGE STATIONS)	4	255.40
AIR/SURFACE PATROL & CONTACT COORDINATION	5	317.00
SHOT TIME BROADCAST	6	289.80
UHF/DF	13	305.40
GCA SEARCH (ENIWETOK)	14	335.80
GCA FINAL (ENIWETOK)	15	289.40
GCA	16	339.40
GCA	17	258.60
GCA	18	270.60
PROJECT 2.5A TUGS/AIRCRAFT	19	~~263.40~~ 279.4
MILITARY EMERGENCY	20	243.00

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Operation Plan
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2. AIRFORCE AIRCRAFT CHANELIZATION

a. All Air Force Aircraft Less L13's and Helicopters

CHANNEL	FREQUENCY(MCS)
A	143.10
B	126.18
C	137.38
D	121.50
E	129.70
F	139.86
G	146.16
H	134.10

b. L13's and Helicopters

CHANNEL	FREQUENCY(MCS)
A	126.18
B	136.44
C	132.48
D	121.5

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Commander

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Operation Plan
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Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D.C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Appendix II to Annex F

Radio Circuit Diagrams

1. Appendix II consists of the following:

   a. Tab A Principle Task Force HF Circuits.
   b. Tab B Joint Task Force SEVEN Teletype Network.
   c. Tab C Security Patrol Communications.

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7 December 1953, 0800R

TAB A to Appendix II to Annex F

PRINCIPLE TASK FORCE HF RADIO CIRCUITS





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Rear Admiral
Comander

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Joint Task Force SEVEN
TASK GROUP 7.3
Washington 25, D.C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

TAB B to Appendix II to Annex F

JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN TELETYPE NETWORK





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Rear Admiral
Commander

H. C. BRIGGE, LCDR USN
Flag Secretary

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Operation Plan
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Joint Task Force SEVEN
TASK GROUP 7.3
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T/B C to Appendix II to Annex F

SECURITY PATROL COMMUNICATIONS





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Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

H. C. DRIGGE, LCDR
Flag Secretary

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Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Annex G

Radiological Safety

1. General

a. This annex supplements Annex N of CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53, the provisions of which are applicable to all units of this command.

b. Radiological safety of all task force military and civilian personnel is a command responsibility and radiological safety activities will be performed through normal command channels.

c. (1) Radiological Defense (RadDefense) operations, or Radiological Safety (RadSafe) operations, short term RadOps, are general terms. They are used to denote the means by which a unit can control and confine the damage and radiological effects of an atomic explosion, or of radioactive material spread by other means, thereby preventing and avoiding health hazards to personnel. They are interpreted to include such measures as training, organization, distribution of radiological personnel, development of techniques and procedures for use of detecting equipment, protection or removal of exposed personnel, and decontamination of personnel, structures and equipment.

(2) Following each detonation there will be areas of surface radiological contamination and areas of air radiological contamination. These areas are designated as Radiological Exclusion Areas (Radex). Prior to shot times, the forecast air and surface Radex will be disseminated by CJTF SEVEN in the target area. These Radexes will represent a forecast from HOW Hour (H-Hour) until dissemination of a later surface and air Radex at about H plus 4 hours. The later Radexes will be based upon the master radiological "situation map" maintained in the RadSafe Office of CJTF SEVEN. Since the air Radex after shot time will be based on monitored air tracking by aircraft over significant large ocean areas, information promulgated from the forecast air Radex may have to be extended beyond the originally anticipated 4-hour period. The surface Radex will be determined by actual survey with Radiation Detection, Indication and Computation (Radiac) equipment after shot time. The most rapid method of accomplishing surface survey in the early stages will be by helicopter flight in and around the surfaces of contaminated areas. From the radiation intensities measured at a known altitude, it is possible to obtain an estimate of the radiation dosage rates which would be encountered on the surface of the ground or water. Actual water samples from the lagoon will also be utilized. Ground survey will follow these guides to determine definitely the contaminated regions and objects.

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Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

2. Mission. The purpose of Radiological Safety (RadSafe) is to provide:

a. Protection of personnel.
b. Effective training of personnel.
c. Evaluation of effectiveness of training and equipment.

3. Phases. To carry out its radiological mission, the Radiological Operations (RadOps) of Task Group 7.3 during Operation CASTLE are divided into three phases.

a. Pre-shot Phase.
b. Shot Phase.
c. Roll-up Phase.

4. Pre-Shot Phase General Requirements

a. The Pre-shot Phase shall be utilized by all subordinate commands in:

(1) Developing operational efficiency to carry out all phases of RadOps through training.

(2) Filling of operational equipment allowances.

(3) Maintenance and calibration of Radiac equipment.

b. Developing Operational Efficiency. Commanding Officers of surface and air elements shall arrange for the training of key enlisted personnel who will be concerned with RadOps in Operation CASTLE at the Radiological Defense Schools, Fleet Training Centers, San Diego, California and Pearl Harbor, T.H., and/or the training of designated officers at the Damage Control Training Center, Treasure Island, San Francisco, California. In the forward area, lectures will be conducted by certain qualified personnel of Task Group 7.3 staff for key ship, boat pool, and air personnel of Task Group 7.3. "On the job training" cannot be over stressed; commanding officers of task units shall hold frequent drills to develop operational efficiency. Commander Task Group 7.3 will conduct non-competitive inspections of all elements in the forward area to insure readiness for safe participation in the operation.

c. Filling of operational equipment allowances.

(1) Radiac equipment: BuShips, on request of type commanders, is taking steps to bring all units up to 100% of allowance, and members of the staff of CTG 7.3 are monitoring the progress of this work.

[redacted]

(2) Water spray equipment: Packaged weather deck spray units together with installation plans have been developed by BuShips. These units will be issued by the Supply Officer of the USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) to ships of the task group in the forward area. The purpose of these units is to reduce the hazard of contamination from fall-out.

(3) Film badge dosimeters will be furnished by CTG 7.1 in the forward area.

(4) Decontamination clothing. Decontamination suits equivalent to those described in detail in paragraph 3b (2) (a) of Appendix III of this Annex shall be obtained for personnel of repair parties. Waterproof suits when worn in tropical climates cause heat prostration too quickly to be considered practical for this operation.

d. Maintenance and Calibration of Radiac Equipment. Units of Task Group 7.3 are responsible for the maintenance of their own radiac equipment. For repairs beyond the capacity of ship's force, a radiac instrument repair center and reserve instrument pool will be maintained by CTG 7.3 staff personnel aboard the USS BAIROKO. Radiac instruments needing calibration will ordinarily be brought to the USS BAIROKO for calibration. Training exercises and calibration drills, supervised by staff members of CTG 7.3, will be conducted for all ship's monitoring and decontamination parties aboard the USS BAIROKO.

5. Pre-Shot Phase Specific Requirements

a. BAIROKO (CVE-115)

(1) Assist TG 7.1 to establish the following:

(a) Photo dosimetry laboratory.

(b) Radiological center.

(c) Provide space and power for trailer laboratory on hangar deck.

(d) Provide space for radiac instrument repair shop.

(2) Provide space for TG 7.3 radiac instrument repair center.

(3) Provide facilities for and develop proficiency in decontamination of aircraft on board ship.

[redacted]

(4) Establish liaison with TG 7.4 for, and develop proficiency in, decontamination of aircraft ashore on ENIWETOK Island.

(5) Establish liaison with TG 7.1 for, and develop proficiency in, decontamination of aircraft ashore at BIKINI ATOLL.

b. Patrol Squadron (VP-29)

(1) Train a qualified monitor for each aircraft crew.

(2) Establish liaison with TG 7.4 for, and develop proficiency in, decontamination of aircraft ashore on ENIWETOK Island.

c. Other units as directed.

6. Shot Phase General Requirements.

a. Prior to shot time, ships of TG 7.3 shall note the background activity on low range survey meters at several points on topside. Radiation intensities at these points shall be read at frequent intervals for about a week after shot time. If indication of significant fall-out is noted, the ship's water spray system shall be started and continued in operation until instruments indicate that fall-out is complete, or the vessel is clear of the fall-out area. Significant fall-out is considered to be 5 mr/hr on shot day and 2 mr/hr on post shot days. CTG 7.3 shall be notified immediately of each instance when significant fall-out is detected, and further when the reporting unit is clear of significant fall-out. A simple code and instructions will be published at a later date.

b. If ships of the Task Group are contaminated by fall-out or by contaminated personnel or material coming aboard, every effort shall be made to localize the contamination. Standard decontamination procedures as outlined in USF 82, USF 85, and Appendix III of this Annex shall be used to remove contamination.

c. Decontamination of personnel and disposal of contaminated material shall be as provided in Pacific Fleet Instructions, USF 82, USF 85, and Appendix III to this Annex.

d. In order to detect contamination of vessels of the Task Group from radioactive material in the water of the lagoons, one or more water monitoring devices may be installed aboard certain ships of the Task Group. When these ships are inside a lagoon where a shot has been fired previously, these devices shall be read hourly. Should these devices indicate contamination in the lagoon, it may be necessary for CTG 7.3 to order temporary evacuation of the lagoon. Reporting instructions will be issued at a later date.

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e. During the BIKINI phase of the operation, aircraft operating between ENIWETOK and BIKINI shall report approximate air radiation intensities encountered from H hour to H plus 24 hours. It is not contemplated that aircraft will be scheduled for this specific requirement alone. Reports shall be routed to the RadSafe Office of CJTF SEVEN at the Task Force Command Post by the most expeditious means, and shall indicate the approximate position, altitude, and order of magnitude of radiation encountered. Simple codes and other instructions for these reports will be furnished separately.

7. Roll-up Phase General Requirements

a. All subordinate commands in TG 7.3 shall make the following reports by letter to CTG 7.3, within five (5) days after the final shot and prior to leaving the forward area.

(1) Instances of contamination of either personnel or equipment covering the following: Time after shot when first noticed, intensity, type of radioactivity encountered, estimated initial time of contamination, duration of contamination, dosage received by personnel, methods of decontamination, effectiveness thereof, and final disposition of contaminated items.

(2) Radiac equipment performance, adequacy of spares, etc. Such reports should include operational difficulties in use of equipment and an estimate of the adequacy of personnel training methods.

(3) That all radiac instruments borrowed from CTG 7.3 radiac instrument repair center have been returned, or exception, if any.

b. Unless directed otherwise by CTG 7.3, water spray equipment will be packaged and returned to the Supply Officer of the USS MAUMEE prior to departure from the forward area. Shortages in this equipment will be charged to ship's quarterly allotment.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Appendices
I Radiological Safety Regulations
II Hazards Resulting from Atomic Bomb Explosions
III Decontamination Procedures
IV Radioactive Fallout Reports. Directed for that Times.
V Additional Radiac Measures

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Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

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Appendix I to Annex G

Radiological Safety Regulations

1. The Maximum Permissible Exposures (MPEs) and Maximum Permissible Limits (MPLs) as stated herein are applicable to a field experimental test of nuclear devices in peacetime wherein numbers of personnel engaged in these tests have been previously exposed or will be continuously exposed to potential radiation hazards. It may become necessary from a study of personnel records to reduce the MPE for certain individuals who have recently been over-exposed to radiation. Further, the MPEs and MPLs are subject to revision by waiver from the Task Force Commander in individually designated cases when circumstances indicate the need and justification therefor.

2. Due to the special nature of field tests it is considered that a policy of strict adherence to the radiological standards prescribed for routine work is not realistic. The regulations set forth herein have been designed as a reasonable and safe compromise considering conservation of personnel exposures, the international import of the test and the cost aspects of operational delays chargeable to excessive radiological precautions. In all cases other than emergencies or tactical situations, the ultimate criteria will be limited by the MPEs for personnel. Special instances may arise such as in the case of an air-sea rescue within the Radex, or in the case of a tactical situation, in which operations will be carried out without regard to the MPEs and MPLs prescribed herein. For such emergency or tactical operations the criteria prescribed below for tactical situations will be used as a guide. Wherever possible, however, film badges will be carried and RadSafe monitors will accompany such operations to determine the extent of the actual radiation hazard experienced in order that appropriate medical action may be initiated.

3. a. The MPE for personnel involved in this operation is 3.9 roentgens (gamma only). This exposure may be acquired at any time during a thirteen (13) week period. Provided no previous over-exposure remains for compensation, 3.9 roentgens may be acquired without regard to the individuals past radiation history. This MPE will be considered further augmented (without separate action) by 0.3 roentgens/week for each week in excess of thirteen (13) weeks of the operational period.

b. All exposure to external gamma radiation will be regarded as total body irradiation.

[redacted]

4. Those individuals exposed to ionizing radiation in excess of the value computed in paragraph 3a above will be informed that appropriate remarks will be included in their medical records. Military personnel in this category will be advised that they should not be exposed to further radiation until sufficient time has elapsed in order to bring their average radiation dose down to 0.3 roentgens/week. Civilian personnel in this category will be informed that limitations on further radiation exposure will be as determined by the laboratory or agency having administrative jurisdiction over such personnel.

5. All atoll land and lagoon areas in or near which a detonation takes place will be considered contaminated until cleared for operations by the Task Force Commander. Entry to and exit from contaminated areas will be via RadSafe check points only.

6. Contaminated land and water areas will be delineated as such. Personnel entering these areas will be subject to clearances by the RadSafe Officer, TG 7.1, and will normally be accompanied by a RadSafe monitor. RadSafe clothing and equipment will be issued to these personnel.

7. Contaminated land areas of intensities less than 10 mr/hr (gamma only) shall be considered unrestricted from a RadSafe viewpoint. Areas coming within this limitation will be designated specifically by CJTF SEVEN prior to unrestricted entry.

8. RadSafe monitors assigned to individuals or groups working in contaminated areas or with contaminated equipment during recovery operations shall act in an advisory capacity to keep the recovery party leader informed of radiation intensities at all times. The recovery party leader shall accept this advice and act accordingly. It is the responsibility of both the leader and the members of the recovery party to adhere to the limits established in these regulations. The RadSafe monitor shall limit his activities to monitoring and will not engage in actual recovery operations.

9. a. Film badges, dosimeters and protective clothing (coveralls, booties, caps, gloves, dust respirators, etc.) as deemed necessary shall be issued to personnel entering contaminated areas by appropriate task group RadSafe supply sections. All personnel dosage film badges shall be procured from and returned to the laboratory of TU 7, TG 7.1 where all processing and recording will be accomplished.

b. Film badges shall be worn by all personnel whose tasks bring them in contact with radiological hazards, and by such other personnel as may be designated by CTG 7.3.

c. For the purpose of obtaining film badge dosimeters, names of all individuals who are expected to enter radioactive areas shall be submitted to CTG 7.1, via CTG 7.3, two (2) weeks prior to the first test. Subsequent changes to the original list shall be submitted as they occur.

d. For purposes of estimating the dose received by any ship subjected to fall-out, ten (10) percent of the crew of each ship will receive film badges at the start of the operation. These badges will be retained either until the end of the operation or until called for by CTG 7.3.

10. All personnel within viewing distance of an atomic detonation who are not supplied with protective goggles shall turn away from the detonation point and close their eyes during the time of burst. At least 10 seconds must be allowed before looking directly at the burst.

11. All air and surface vehicles or craft used in contaminated areas shall be checked through the appropriate task group decontamination section upon return from such areas.

12. The Maximum Permissible Limits (MPLs) listed herein are to be regarded as advisory limits for control under average conditions. All readings of surface contamination are to be made with Geiger counters, with shield open unless otherwise specified. The surface of the probe should be held one (1) inch to two (2) inches from the surface that is under observation unless otherwise specified. For operational purposes the contamination MPLs presented below will not be considered applicable to spotty contamination provided such areas can be effectively isolated from personnel.

a. Personnel and clothing MPLs are as follows:

(1) Skin readings should not be more than 1.0 mr/hr. Complete decontamination by bathing will be utilized for readings in excess of this level. If the body is generally contaminated and especially if contamination is on the eyes or gonads, special efforts should be made to reduce the contamination level. In general, however, it is not considered profitable to abrade the skin or epilate the scalp in an attempt to reduce stubborn contamination below 1 mr/hr (about 1000 cpm). Beta radiation exposure to the hands should not exceed 30.0 rep for the overseas operational period.

(2) Underclothing and body equipment such as the internal surfaces of respirators should be reduced to 2 mr/hr.

(3) Outer clothing should be reduced to 7 mr/hr.

b. Vehicle MPLs: The interior surfaces of occupied sections of vehicles should be reduced to 7 mr/hr. The outside surfaces of vehicles should be reduced to less than 7 mr/hr (gamma only) at five (5) or six (6) inches from the surface.

c. Ship and Boat MPLs:

(1) It is desired to point out that the employment of the ships and units in TG 7.3, insofar as radiological safety is concerned, is not considered routine usage within the purview of NavMed P-1325, "Radiological Safety Regulations". Current revision of NavMed P-1325 indicates that its provisions do not apply for special operations such as field tests and that for such operations naval personnel will operate under regulations set forth by the Task Force Commander as approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(2) In general, ships and boats operating in waters near shot sites after shot times may become contaminated. Monitors shall be aboard all such craft operating after shot time, either as passengers or members of the crew, until such time as radiological restrictions are lifted.

(3) Task Unit Commanders shall take necessary action to ensure that personnel of ships and boats are not over-exposed to radiation and that ships and boats are not contaminated excessively. The criterion in both cases is that no personnel shall be over-exposed as defined by paragraph 3a above, except in emergencies or tactical operations, and that after the operational period no personnel shall receive more than 0.3 roentgen per week.

(4) For ships and boats operating in contaminated waters, reasonable allowances shall be made to differentiate between the relative contribution to the total flux from fixed contamination and that due to "Shine" from contaminated waters. Fixed alpha contamination should not exceed 2500 dpm (disintegrations per minute) per 150 cm^2 of area for enclosed areas (cabins, etc.) and 5000 dpm per 150 cm^2 area for open surfaces where ventilation is good.

(5) At the conclusion of the operation, final clearances will be granted by the Task Group Commander, or by Commanding Officers if so ordered, to those ships and boats showing no point of contamination greater than 15 mr/day (beta and gamma) and no detectable alpha. Other ships and boats will be granted operational clearances by the Task Group Commander, or by Commanding Officers if so ordered. An operational clearance implies that contamination exists and that special procedures as necessary are instituted aboard ship.

(6) Individuals on board ships of the task force will be protected collectively from hazards of blast, heat and radioactivity by movement and positioning of the ships.

(7) No ships with personnel shall be permitted inside the 1.0 psi line unless specifically directed otherwise. Bearings of danger from immediate radioactive fall-out for ship operations will be established by CJTF SEVEN on the basis of forecast wind directions at the intended time of detonation. This danger section will be designated as surface Radex. All ships of the task force shall be required to remain outside Radex - danger bearing, radial limitation and time restriction unless specifically directed otherwise. However, if ships are directed tactically into the surface Radex, movement of ships shall be governed by tactical exposure guides.

d. Aircraft MPLs:

(1) The interior surfaces of occupied sections of aircraft should be reduced to 7 mr/hr.

(2) No aircraft in the air at H Hour shall be at slant ranges from ground zero less than as determined by the following effects unless specifically directed otherwise. (Based on maximum predicted yield and 20 mile visibility.):

Blast (at predicted shock arrival): 0.5 psi
Thermal (H Hour): Fabric control surfaces: 1.0 cal/cm^2
Metal control surfaces: 6.0 cal/cm^2

(3) After detonation, no aircraft shall operate inside the air Radex or closer than 10 nautical miles from the rising or visible cloud unless specifically directed otherwise. Non-excepted aircraft involved in routine operations encountering unexpected regions of aerial contamination shall, immediately upon detecting such contamination, execute a turn-out. Cloud tracking aircraft shall execute turn-out from contaminated areas at a level of not more than 3.0 r/hr. If a tactical or emergency situation arises where aircraft must enter the air Radex or visible cloud, tactical exposure allowances shall apply.

(4) All multi-engine task force aircraft in the air at H Hour within 100 miles of the detonation point shall carry a person designated as radiological safety monitor equipped with suitable Radiac equipment and a Radex plot. This monitor shall be capable of calculating allowable exposures under both tactical and operational conditions.

(5) All persons in aircraft at shot time, or at subsequent times when engaged in operations in or near the cloud or Radex track, shall wear film badges.

(6) Crew members of aircraft in the air at H hour will take special precautions to avoid (for at least 10 seconds) the direct and reflected light resulting from the burst. At the discretion of the airplane commander this may be done with protective high density goggles, by turning away from the burst with eyes closed, or by covering the eyes with the forearm.

(7) In the event that it becomes necessary to launch fighter aircraft, the aircraft controller shall make every effort to keep these planes clear of the air Radex to the maximum extent allowed by the tactical situation.

e. In air and water the following continuous levels of radioactivity are considered safe from the viewpoint of personnel drinking and breathing (uc = microcurie):

	Beta-Gamma Emitter
Water	5×10^{-3} uc/cc (calculated to H + 3 days)
Air (24-hour average)	
Particles less than 5 micron diameter	10^{-6} uc/cc
Particles greater than 5 micron diameter	10^{-4} uc/cc

13. In tactical situations the OTC must make the decision regarding allowable exposures. As military personnel are normally subject to only random exposure, health hazards are at a minimum. Current Department of Defense information on exposure to gamma radiation in tactical situations is indicated below:

a. Uniform acute (immediate) exposure of 50 roentgens to a group of Armed Forces personnel will not appreciably affect their efficiency as a fighting unit.

b. Uniform acute exposure of 100 roentgens will produce in occasional individuals nausea and vomiting, but not to an extent that will render Armed Forces personnel ineffective as fighting units. Personnel receiving an acute radiation exposure of 100 or more roentgens should be given a period of rest and individual evaluation as soon as possible.

c. Uniform acute exposure of approximately 150 roentgens or greater can be expected to render Armed Forces personnel ineffective as troops within a few hours through a substantial incidence of nausea, vomiting,

weakness and prostration. Mortality produced by an acute exposure of 150 roentgens will be very low and eventual recovery of physical fitness may be expected.

d. Field commanders should, therefore, assume that if substantial numbers of their men receive acute radiation exposures substantially above 100 roentgens there is a grave risk that their commands will rapidly become ineffective as fighting units.

e. Internal radiation hazards caused by entry of radioactive substances through the mouth, through the lungs or through cuts or wounds do not exist after an air burst. Internal hazards following a contaminating surface explosion may be avoided if ordinary precautions are taken. Only under unusual circumstances will there be internal hazard from residual contamination. This eliminates the necessity for masking and consequent reduction of tactical efficiency.

14. The Radiological Safety Officer, Task Group 7.1 will maintain standard type film badge records of radiation exposures for all Task Force personnel. Records will indicate full name, rank or rate, serial or service number, if applicable, organization, home station or laboratory, date of exposure, and remarks such as limitations on assignment because of exposure. Upon completion of the operation, disposition of these records will be as follows:

a. A consolidated list of exposures listing military personnel, and civilian personnel under military control, by full name, rank or rate, serial or service number (if applicable), organization, home station or laboratory and exposure in milliroentgens together with exposed film badges and control film badges will be forwarded to the Chief, AFSWP.

b. A consolidated list of personnel and exposures will be forwarded to the Director, Division of Biology and Medicine, AEC.

c. Individual records of Navy military and civilian personnel will be forwarded to their unit of assignment for inclusion in the individual's health record (Medical History Sheets and NavMed H-8). For those military personnel exposed to ionizing radiation in excess of that defined by paragraph 3a above, a statement will be included to the effect that the individual is not to be subjected to ionizing radiation before a specific date, the date to be computed by the Radiological Safety Officer, Task Group 7.1 to allow sufficient time to elapse in order to bring the average radiation dose down to 0.3 roentgens per week.

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d. Upon completion of above, letter reports will be submitted through channels to the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery; and the Director, Division of Biology and Medicine, AEC, indicating, in general, the action taken to dispose of individual dose records, comments on over-exposures if applicable, and any pertinent remarks considered of interest to the above offices.

15. This appendix has been designed for reduced security classification in order to facilitate wide dissemination and may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED provided all references to Joint Task Force SEVEN and its subordinate units are deleted.

H. C. BRUTON
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Commander

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Operation Plan
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Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Appendix II to Annex G

Hazards Resulting from Atomic Bomb Explosions

1. Nature of Hazards

a. When an atomic bomb explosion occurs, tremendous quantities of energy in a variety of forms are released. This energy is propagated outward in all directions.

b. The immediate reaction is intense emission of ultraviolet, visible and infrared (heat) radiation, gamma rays and neutrons. This is accompanied by the formation of a large ball of fire. A large part of the energy from the explosion is emitted as a shock wave. The ball of fire produces a mushroom-shapped mass of hot gases, the top of which rises rapidly. In the trail below the mushroom cap, a thin column is left. The cloud and column are then carried downwind, the direction and speed being determined by the direction and speed of the wind at the various levels of air from the surface to base of mushroom cap. Part of the energy from the exposion results in an ocean surface wave which is considered of minor nature directly to the Task Force.

c. All personnel of the Task Force will be well outside of the range of all hazards at the time of detonation, except for the light from the fire ball. The light of explosion is so intense that permanent injury to the eye may result from viewing the ball of fire at close range with the naked eye or through binoculars. Ordinary dark glasses will not suffice and all personnel who do not have the special protective glasses, which will be issued in limited numbers by CTG 7.1, must be facing 180 degrees from the detonation with the eyes closed.

d. The emission of dangerious nuclear radiation can be separated into two time periods. The primary radiation which occurs at the time of the flash is composed of gamma rays and neutrons. Casualties may result from this primary radiation if the exposure occurs within a certain range of ground zero. Secondary radiation is due to activation of the soil around ground zero and to fall-out.

e. Following the detonation, personnel entering shot areas will be exposed to beta particles and gamma rays coming from induced neutron activity in the soil and/or water, and any fission products which might have been deposited on the ground or in the water. There may also be a potential alpha particle hazard from the unfissioned fissionable materials which may be deposited on the ground or in the water.

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2. Protection

a. Against the primary radiological effects, distance will provide protection.

b. Against the secondary radioactivity hazards from radioactive fission products, induced radioactivity and unfissioned residue, detection and avoidance provide the best protection. Suitable instruments indicate both the presence and intensity of radioactivity at a given place. Area reconnaissance, the maintenance of contamination situation maps, the posting of areas of hazard, and minimizing the spread of contaminated material into uncontaminated areas constitute the active measures for reducing the radiological hazard.

c. Personnel within an operational radius of ground zero who are to be facing in the direction of the flash will be required to wear special goggles to protect their eyes against excessive light. Personnel within the above operational radius who are not provided goggles will face, with eyes closed, in the opposite direction from the flash. After ten (10) seconds, such personnel may turn about and observe the phenomena.

3. Anticipated Hazard Areas

a. Immediately under the bomb burst there will be an area of intense radioacitivity extending downward and to some extent crosswind and upwind with gradually decreasing intensity.

b. Extending downwind, (and to some extent crosswind and upwind) an airborne radioactive hazard will exist. Its characteristics will depend on the meterological influences such as wind speed and direction at various altitudes up to the maximum height reached by the cloud.

c. Contaminated water in the lagoon adjacent to the shot site may be of consequence, and will be analyzed by the radiological safety unit of TG 7.1 immediately after shot time and at other intervals.

d. Unless care is exercised, individuals or objects entering contaminated areas may transfer radioactivity to clean areas.

e. By means of instruments, such as Geiger-Mueller counters, ion chambers or photoelectric cells it is possible to detect the area of contamination and to measure the intensity of the radioactivity. Radiation intensity will normally be measured and reported in roentgens per hour. Besides those

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instruments, dosimeters and film badges will be used as indicators of the accumulated exposure to radioactivity. Only personnel involved in work near, or in, radioactive areas will wear film badges to provide a permanent record of exposure, except for a few film badges issued to units of TG 7.3 for an indication of exposures of personnel in the event that unit is caught in "fall-out".

f. The intensity of the radioactive hazard tends to decrease with time due to decay of radioactive materials, and dispersion and dilution, depending upon climatic conditions. As an approximation, the intensity of the radiation from the fission products decreases by radioactive decay inversely with the time after the detonation.

4. This appendix has been designed for reduced security classification in order to permit wide dissemination to all personnel of the command, and may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED provided all references to Joint Task Force SEVEN and its subordinate units are deleted.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
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Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Appendix III to Annex G

Decontamination Procedures

1. General. Radioactive contamination will very probably at some time during Operation CASTLE render an essential area or piece of equipment temporarily unusable. In such a situation, the reduction of such radioactive contamination may be mandatory to successful accomplishment of the operation. Decontamination of units and personnel shall be accomplished on the site to reduce the hazard to operational levels.

a. Definitions (Ref. NavMed P-1325)

(1) Operational Clearance implies that radioactive contamination exists and that special operating procedures are required. Commander, Task Group 7.3 is responsible for authorizing operational clearances.

(2) Final Clearance. Following the completion of decontamination, or if a ship has not been contaminated, Commander Task Group 7.3 may authorize final clearance for a particular ship or unit. This shall apply, also, to final clearance on the decontamination of all forms of equipment, instruments, furniture, and personal items. Final clearance shall imply that the area or object concerned has been monitored and found to have no point exceeding 0.015R/24 hr beta plus gamma and no detectable alpha emitting isotopes. In the event that a unit of the task group has some area or material, at the conclusion of Operation CASTLE, which has not yielded to decontamination, this unit may be released to its type commander under operational clearance.

(3) It should be remembered that radioactive fission products decay as time passes, the most rapid decay taking place within the first few hours after detonation. To compute dosages, see "Radiological Defense", Vol II pp 223-229.

2. Reagents. In most of the decontamination operations which might be required of Task Group 7.3, fresh and/or salt water sprayed under pressure shall be used for gross decontamination. Ordinarily, salt water should not be used on aircraft. Other reagents which are used where water is inappropriate or inadequate are: Standard Cleaner, USN C-152, or 147, 5-10% sodium citrate solution or USAF cleaning compound Spec. 20015 (gunk), kerosene and soap powders. Cleaners with an oil carrier are especially suitable for aircraft decontamination.

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3. General Aircraft Decontamination Procedures.

a. The flight of an aircraft through an atomic cloud or its "fall-out" poses a problem which contains many unpredictable factors, i.e., type of aircraft, pressurizing, if any, type of ducting for cockpit and engine oil cooler location, jet, turbo-jet, or propeller driven, etc.

b. After it has been determined through monitoring that decontamination is necessary, aircraft will be decontaminated at a shore facility at ENIWETOK or BIKINI or on board the CVE, as circumstances indicate.

(1) Decontamination Operations on Board a Carrier (General Criteria). In decontaminating aircraft on board a carrier, the following factors should be stressed:

(a) Area should be well isolated from personnel living spaces, ventilator intakes, etc.

(b) A clear watershed to the sea to prevent contamination of the vessel.

(c) Air circulation.

(2) Decontamination Operations Aboard a Carrier (Specific).

(a) Decontamination personnel shall be in decontamination suits. Decontamination suits shall ordinarily include the following:

Nomenclature	Stock No.
Coveralls	G37-C-2570 (Or equivalent)
Gloves, electricians	G37-G-2295
Goggles	U37-G-3050
Mask, half, filter pad	G37-M-315
Overshoes, rubber N-1	U37-O-69154
Cap, Marine Utility	73-C-59100 through 59104

This decontamination suit provides protection from contamination, and for avoiding heat prostration is much more satisfactory than a waterproof suit.

(b) Decontamination personnel shall be restricted to the immediate area surrounding the contaminated aircraft. Support personnel are in the "clean" background area to manipulate equipment to the decontamination team.

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(c) The decontamination area should be clearly marked and roped off in some manner.

(d) Every effort shall be made to prevent the contamination of the ship in the decontamination area. A disposable waterproof canvas deck cover with chutes to clear water over the side might be used for this purpose.

(e) Provision should be made for disposal of contaminated items in the decontamination area.

(f) All material leaving the decontamination area shall be monitored.

(g) Decontamination operations shall be interrupted intermittently for monitoring of aircraft to determine effectiveness. Work periods should be calculated after intensity levels are measured.

(h) Decontamination operations should continue until the level of intensity drops to what is considered the point of diminishing returns. In the case of helicopters, every effort shall be made to maintain maximum decontamination since these aircraft probably will be required to make repeated flights into contaminated areas. Due consideration should be given to maintaining helicopter operations and further maintaining maximum number of "clean" helicopters, bearing in mind that personnel are allowed only 3.9R for the operation.

(i) Approximately 40% of original contamination should be removed by the first application of cleaning solution and flushing and approximately 10% by the second application; further applications are of dubious value.

(j) Where metal parts are contaminated and there is danger of damaging adjacent items of porous material, such as fabric, scrubbing with cleaning solution is effective.

(k) If initial contamination is driven into paint, apply a solution containing 5 pounds lye, 5 pounds boiler compound, 1 pound starch and 10 gallons of water and scrub with wire brush or scrape to remove all paint. Apply cleaning solution and flush thoroughly with water. REMONITOR.

4. General Ship Decontamination Procedures.

a. Spraying of the topside prior to and during unavoidable exposure of ship to radioactive particles in the fall-out area will probably eliminate

the necessity for decontamination. The interior of the ship is preserved in its "clean" status by setting of the appropriate damage control condition of readiness to seal the ship's envelope.

b. Should the above method fail to prevent contamination, decontamination suits shall be worn to protect the damage control parties who must work on the contaminated sections of the ship. In the use of water after the ship has been exposed to contamination, special techniques are required to control the contaminating spray resulting from hosing operations. If possible, the hosing of an object should be carried on from the upwind side so that the spray will not drift back on the operators. The most satisfactory operating position is from 15 to 20 feet from the surface. On vertical surfaces, the water should be directed to strike the surface at an angle of 30 to 45 degrees. The complication of a brisk wind can be partially offset by using a wind-break. For hosing down large contaminated areas, a rate of approximately 4 square feet per minute should be used. Special attention must be given to the drainage from these operations to allow direct flow to disposal points over the side.

c. Hosing is not the complete answer to decontamination; scrubbing techniques may have to be used.

d. Wooden surfaces, if contaminated, can be decontaminated as outlined below under General Boat Decontamination Procedures.

5. General Boat Decontamination Procedures.

a. If boat exterior, i.e., painted surface, is contaminated from passage through contaminated water, hosing down and scrubbing if necessary should be sufficient to reduce any contamination to well below prescribed tolerances. If boat is water-borne, drainage from hosing down should present no problem. Dispersal of radioactive products in the lagoons is anticipated to be sufficient to prevent recontamination of other boats. If interior of boat is contaminated, hosing down and pumping out over the side should suffice. However, repeated use of this method can concentrate some contamination in the bilge pump system which is not desirable, and this pump should be especially monitored.

b. Contamination can be introduced into boats by contaminated passengers, radioactive "fall-out" from atomic burst, or seepage of contaminated water into bilges. It is considered most likely that any major contamination in the boats will come from contamination on passengers and from sand unintentionally brough on board from contaminated beaches. Unpainted wood will not be as readily decontaminable as described above. Any contamination should be

relatively light. If relatively light and too resistant to normal hosing down, scrubbing and scraping, followed by a coating of shellac, varnish or paint will usually effectively shield out alpha and beta radiation and seal it in until radioactive decay completes the process of removal of any health hazard. It is planned that all boat decontamination will be done in an open sea area (ocean or lagoon) where water disposal from low order of contamination and drainage is no problem.

6. General Personnel Decontamination Procedures.

a. At the completion of decontamination operations on shipboard, personnel concerned should be monitored on the spot - then shed outer (protective) clothing, gloves, booties, etc., disposing of same into covered containers. Personnel then are monitored and if necessary sent to a personnel decontamination center. (See Appendix I of this Annex, para. 12a)

(1) Ships damage control directives usually state that a "decontamination head" shall have an entrance from the weather deck, and a clean exit inside the ship. To prevent contamination from getting inside the ship, it is recommended that a temporary "change house" be installed on the weather deck. This could consist of a simple shower arrangement which drains over the side. A stage over the side could accomplish this, with some provision for storing contaminated clothing.

b. Personnel upon completion of their duties in a contaminated area will be required to utilize the facilities within a "change house" (equivalent to a personnel decontamination head). It should be organized and operate in such a way that it ensures:

(1) Monitoring of suspected contaminated personnel at "change house" ENTRANCE.

(2) Advising each person as to degree of contamination and spots more highly contaminated than others, paying special attention to soles of shoes, hands and hair.

(3) Instruction of incoming personnel where contaminated clothing should be disposed of. This clothing may require laundering or, as a result of decay of radioactive contamination, it may be possible to re-use it after a period of time without laundering.

(4) Monitoring of personnel with and without clothing.

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(5) Collection of dosimeters worn by persons entering decontamination centers.

(6) Shower facilities where personnel will scrub thoroughly with particular attention to hair and hands when contaminated.

(7) Second monitoring after shower at exit to change house and release of personnel if skin count is less than 1 mr/hour. Washing should continue as necessary to assure the above degree of decontamination, or until it is obvious that further washing is useless.

(8) This appendix has been designed for reduced security classification in order to permit wide dissemination to all personnel of the command, and may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED provided all references to Joint Task Force SEVEN, its subordinate units, Operation CASTLE, and geographical locations are deleted.

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Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Eniwetok Atoll, M.I.
8 April 1954, 1800M

Appendix IV to Annex G

Radioactive Fallout Reports

1. For one week following each shot each ship shall report radioactive fallout encountered as follows:

a. A report shall be made of fallout readings (gamma only) of 1 mr per hour or higher.

b. Only the value of gamma radiation shall be reported.

c. Reports will be coded as follows: "Rabbit" followed by a number to indicate average topside activity, the number indicating mr per hour (gamma only); "Cat" followed by a number to indicate maximum activity found on the ship, the number indicating mr per hour (gamma only). Thus a message "Rabbit 2 Cat 7" indicates the average topside activity is 2 mr per hour (gamma only), and the maximum activity found on the ship is 7 mr per hour (gamma only). Fractional numbers will be reported as the nearest whole number. Thus if the average topside activity is 3.8 mr per hour (gamma only) and the maximum activity found on the ship is 8.4 mr per hour (gamma only) the message to be sent is "Rabbit 4, Cat 8".

d. New reports shall be made when the average topside activity increases to more than twice that last previously reported or decreases to less than half that last previously reported.

e. Reports shall be sent by radio or light to CTG 7.3, to the USS BAIROKO, and to the USS ESTES. These reports shall be delivered to the RadSafe Center on the BAIROKO and to the RadSafe Office on the ESTES.

f. Reports shall be sent on TG 7.3 UHF Admin or CW Common or on TG 7.1 Pogo or Admin Nets, as appropriate.

g. One week after each shot every ship shall send to CTG 7.3 a complete letter report on radioactive contamination experienced since the shot occurred. As applicable, each letter shall include a table with estimated average intensity topside in milliroentgens per hour and approximate position of ship in latitude and longitude at fallowing times: Hourly on the hour from How hour to 2000M Dog day; every four hours from 2000M Dog day to 0400M Dog plus two day; daily at 0800M Dog plus two

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53
Change #4

day to Dog plus seven day inclusive. Letters shall be in quintuplet and leave ships not later than Dog plus ten day.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Authenticated:
A. C. DRAGGE
A. C. DRAGGE, LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

Operation plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Appendix V to Annex G

Additional RadSafe Measures Directed for Shot Times

1. If decks and structures are kept wet prior to fallout there is less likelihood of radioactive fallout being absorbed into porous materials and cracks.

2. In addition to RadSafe Instructions listed elsewhere, it is directed that all ships within eighty miles of the shot site from D Day to D/2 day observe the following procedures:

a. From H/10 minutes to H/4 hours:

(1) Clear topsides of all non-essential personnel.

(2) Close all doors, hatches, and ports from topside to the interior of the ship.

(3) Continue to operate the ventilation systems at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, but monitor air coming from topside.

(4) Keep the washdown equipment ready for immediate use.

(5) Maintain the topside in a wet condition by continuous or intermittent use of the washdown system. In order to avoid grounding numerous antennas, ESTES shall not use the washdown system until and unless fallout is detected.

(6) Maintain a constant watch for radioactive fallout on topsides except when washdown system is turned on.

b. From H/4 hours to H/48 hours

(1) Keep the washdown system ready for immediate use, except when this interferes with essential ship activities.

3. All TG 7.3 ships in the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area shall:

a. From H/4 hours to H/36 hours, check the topsides for radioactive fallout every twenty minutes.

b. From H/36 hours to H/72 hours, check the topsides for radioactive fallout every hour.

c. From H/72 hours to D plus 7 days, check the topsides for radioactive fallout every four hours.

d. Maneuver to avoid rainfall and low clouds, as practicable.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

	COLUMN			A	B	C	D
11a	DESTROYER COMMON		CW	3155	0.1A1	C4.5(e)	J-303
11b			HF VOICE	3155	6A3	C4.5(e)	J-303
11c			UHF	305.0 mcs	6A3	T-49	J-303
12a	AIR/SURFACE PATROL			3411	0.1A1	E12(m)	J-304
12b				4101	0.1A1	E12(n)	J-304
12c				6705	0.1A1	E12(p)	J-304
12d				11295	0.1A1	E12(r)	J-304
13a	AIR/SURFACE PATROL AND		PRIMARY	317.1 mcs	6A3	T77	J-305
13b	CONTACT COORDINATION	SECONDARY (P2V-6,	279.4	mcs	6A3	T24	J-305
14	AIR/SURFACE CONTACT COORDINATION			2741	6A3	C3.8(?)	J-305
15a	CAP		PRIMARY	142.2 mcs	6A3	E1.(aa)	J-310
15b			SECONDARY	132. mcs	6A3	E1.(j)	J-310
16a	NAVY HELICOPTERS		BIKINI CONTROL	126.8 mcs	6A3	E1.(z)	J-311
16b			ENIWETOK CONTROL	136.4 mcs	6A3	E2.1(a)	J-311
16c			SPECIAL MISSIONS	132.8 mcs	6A3	E2.(a)	J-311
17a	NAVY PROJECT AIRCRAFT		P2V-5	140.58 mcs	6A3	E1.(u)	J-312
17b			P4Y-2	142.56 mcs	6A3	E1.(bb)	J-312
18a	BOAT	TG 7.3	PRIMARY	48.6 MCS	36F3		J-314
18b	CONTROL	BCAT	SECONDARY	47.5 mcs	36F3		J-314
18c	CIRCUITS	POOL	SPECIAL MISSIONS	42.4 mcs	36F3		J-314
18d		CURTISS	PRIMARY	50.6 mcs	36F3		J-316
18e		BOATS	SECONDARY	48.6 mcs	36F3		J-316
18f		ESTES BOATS		31.7 mcs	36F3		J-315
19a	SEARCH	INTERNATIONAL DISTRESS		500	0.1A1	E14(f)	J-306
19b	AND	U.S. EMERGENCY		8364	0.1A1	E14(e)	J-306
19c	RESCUE	VHF EMERGENCY		121.5 mcs	6A3	E14(a)	J-306
19d		UHF EMERGENCY		234.0 mcs	6A3	E14(j)	J-306
19e		SCENE OF ACTION		4475	6A3	E14(d)	J-306
19f		CONTROL (DAY)		7945	0.1A1	E14(h)	J-306
19g		CONTROL (NIGHT)		3310	0.1A1	E14(g)	J-306
20a	SHOT TIME BROADCAST		VHF	126.18 mcs	6A3	E1.(g)	J-415
20b			UHF	283.4 mcs	6A3	T63	J-307
20c			MOTOROLA	154.57 mcs	6A3		J-105

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
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Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

	COLUMN	A	B	C	D
38a	UDU HARBOR CONTROL PRIMARY	51.8 mcs	36F3		J-317
38b	ENIWETOK SECONDARY	48.6 mcs	36F3		J-317
39a	GUAM WEATHER (RATT)	5452.5	1.08F1		J-403
39b		8105	1.08F1		J-403
39c		11085	1.08F1		J-403
39d		14515	1.08F1		J-403
39e		21810	1.08F1		J-403
40a	ESTES-WEATHER RECON AIRCRAFT	4415	0.1A1 6A3		J-411
40b		7685	0.1A1 6A3		J-411
40c		14450	0.1A1 6A3		J-411
41	PROJECT 3.2 - AIRCRAFT	9020 mcs	6A3		

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Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

e. When radioactive fallout is detected, take appropriate measures in accordance with existing instructions, and report in accordance with Appendix IV of this annex.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGCE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200H

Annex H

Surface Security Unit Employment Plan

1. Intelligence. Refer to Annex B.

2. Mission. Task Unit 7.3.1 will conduct surface, air and anti-submarine searches in the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Area and take other appropriate action to prevent unfriendly forces from gaining intelligence of Operation CASTLE, and to detect and counter hostile action against any unit of Joint Task Force SEVEN.

3. Detailed Tasks of CTU 7.3.1.

a. Tasks to be performed continuously or as required throughout entire operational phase:

(1) Maintain at least one (1) DDE as TE 7.3.1.0 at or in the close vicinity of ENI ETOK Atoll to:

(a) Provide air search, air control and communications services for CTE 7.3.2.2 on a continuous basis.

1. Provide sufficient qualified air control officers in this ship to permit keeping one appropriately qualified air control officer on watch in CIC at all times.

2. Maintain communications with TG 7.4 AOC ENIWETOK, TG 7.4 Tower ENIWETOK and CTU 7.3.3 for CTE 7.3.2.2.

3. Direct the air control officer on watch to comply with all orders and procedures promulgated by CTE 7.3.2.2 for scrambling of fighters and investigation of unidentified aircraft.

4. Keep CIC manned to conduct interception of aircraft as directed by CTE 7.3.2.2.

5. Transfer the air control officers and any additional personnel required to a relieving ship or the TG 7.4 AOC in the event the ship departs from the vicinity of ENIWETOK Atoll for any purpose other than shot evacuation.

(b) 1. Assist CTU 7.3.8 in identification of UDU contacts.

2. Investigate and develop unidentified contacts reported by the Underwater Detection Unit.

(c) Conduct intermittent underway surface and ASW patrol in the near vicinity of ENIWETOK Atoll, principally in section DB.

(2) Develop submarine contacts made by ships of the task unit.

(3) Provide surface escorts for ships transporting special devices, as directed.

(4) Provide surface units to investigate and develop submarine contacts made by TU 7.3.3 (Patrol Plane Unit), as directed.

(5) Provide surface units to warn and divert shipping from the Danger Area or significant sector, as directed.

(6) Maintain one (1) surface unit in upkeep status, as required, normally anchored in the near vicinity of CURTISS, to provide that vessel with additional warning of and protection from attack as practicable.

(7) During shot phase evacuations, provide escort, plane guard, and other services, as directed.

(8) Repel an attempted hostile landing on one of the atolls, or an attack on a unit of the task force.

(9) Provide inter-atoll transportation for TG 7.2 ground forces in an emergency.

(10) Carry out post-shot evacuation of personnel, as directed.

(11) Carry out search and rescue operations.

(12) Station one (1) DDE between ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls during BIKINI shot phases to assist in the control of aircraft.

(13) Assist in recovery of free floating buoys, as directed.

(14) Conduct supplementary air radar searches at BIKINI, as requested by CTU 7.3.3 (Commanding Officer, USS BAIROKO).

b. Patrols and surveillances to be conducted during BIKINI phases only (preparation phase and periods prior to BIKINI Shots).

(1) Phase X - preparation phase and periods prior to shots No. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6.

[redacted]

(a) Conduct a continuous one (1) ship surface and ASW patrol in sector DA.

(b) Conduct one (1) ship intermittent underway surface and ASW patrol in sector DD, or an at-anchor surface radar and sonar surveillance of the lagoon entrances in this sector, as practicable.

(c) Conduct one (1) ship intermittent underway surface and ASW patrol in sector DE, or an at-anchor surface radar and sonar surveillance of the lagoon entrance in this sector, as practicable.

(d) Assign tasks (b) and (c) above to a single ship, when necessary.

(2) Phase Y - period prior to shot No. 7.

(a) Conduct a continuous one (1) ship surface and ASW patrol in sector DD.

(b) Conduct a one (1) or two (2) ship intermittent underway surface and ASW patrol in sector DE or an at-anchor surface radar and sonar surveillance of the lagoon entrance in this sector, with occasional underway sweeps into sector DA, as practicable.

c. Patrols and surveillances to be conducted during ENIWETOK phase only (Period prior to shot No. 4).

(1) Conduct a continuous one (1) ship underway surface and ASW patrol in sector DC.

(2) Conduct a one (1) or two (2) ship intermittent surface and ASW underway patrol or an at-anchor or underway radar and sonar surveillance of the lagoon entrances at BIKINI Atoll, as practicable.

x. (1) Underway patrols normally should be conducted within six (6) miles of the reef, with occasional sweeps out to greater distances.

(2) Patrolling ships should avoid patrolling in fixed patterns.

(3) All ships, including the upkeep ship, at the shot atoll normally will get underway about twenty-four (24) hours prior to each shot. Patrols will then be intensified at the shot atoll until about six (6) hours before shot time, when all ships will be withdrawn to safe distances.

[redacted]

(4) The following is the general priority of tasks assigned CTU 7.3.1:

1. Repel landing on an atoll or attack on force unit with all available means.

2. Develop any possible submarine contact made by TU 7.3.1 ships.

3. Develop any possible submarine contact made by TU 7.3.3 aircraft.

4. Provide inter-atoll transportation of TG 7.2 ground forces in an emergency.

5. Warn and divert unauthorized craft from the Danger Area.

6. Carry out search and rescue missions.

7. Conduct post-shot emergency evacuation of personnel.

8. Provide air control, air search and communications services to CTE 7.3.3.2 and provide ASW protection at ENIWETOK.

9. Escort ships transporting special devices.

10. During BIKINI shot periods provide a control (homing) station between atolls.

11. Escort and furnish plane guards during evacuations.

12. Provide an underway patrol in the vicinity of next shot site.

13. Provide entrance surveillance and intermittent patrols of remainder of atoll.

14. Maintain one ship in upkeep status.

15. Supplement BIKINI radar air search.

16. Assist in recovery of floating fall-out collector buoys.

4. Replenish fuel at every available opportunity when fuel on hand falls below eighty percent. Report fuel on hand as required in Annex X.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200H

Annex H

Surface Security Unit Employment Plan

1. Intelligence. Refer to Annex B.

2. Mission. Task Unit 7.3.1 will conduct surface, air and anti-submarine searches in the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Area and take other appropriate action to prevent unfriendly forces from gaining intelligence of Operation CASTLE, and to detect and counter hostile action against any unit of Joint Task Force SEVEN.

3. Detailed Tasks of CTU 7.3.1.

a. Tasks to be performed continuously or as required throughout entire operational phase:

(1) Maintain at least one (1) DDE as TE 7.3.1.0 at or in the close vicinity of ENIWETOK Atoll to:

(a) Provide air search, air control and communications services for CTE 7.3.2.2 on a continuous basis.

1. Provide sufficient qualified air control officers in this ship to permit keeping one appropriately qualified air control officer on watch in CIC at all times.

2. Maintain communications with TG 7.4 AOC ENIWETOK, TG 7.4 Tower ENIWETOK and CTU 7.3.3 for CTE 7.3.2.2.

3. Direct the air control officer on watch to comply with all orders and procedures promulgated by CTE 7.3.2.2 for scrambling of fighters and investigation of unidentified aircraft.

4. Keep CIC manned to conduct interception of aircraft as directed by CTE 7.3.2.2.

5. Transfer the air control officers and any additional personnel required to a relieving ship or the TG 7.4 AOC in the event the ship departs from the vicinity of ENIWETOK Atoll for any purpose other than shot evacuation.

(b) 1. Assist CTU 7.3.8 in identification of UDU contacts.

2. Investigate and develop unidentified contacts reported by the Underwater Detection Unit.

(c) Conduct intermittent underway surface and ASW patrol in the near vicinity of ENIWETOK Atoll, principally in section DB.

(2) Develop submarine contacts made by ships of the task unit.

(3) Provide surface escorts for ships transporting special devices, as directed.

(4) Provide surface units to investigate and develop submarine contacts made by TU 7.3.3 (Patrol Plane Unit), as directed.

(5) Provide surface units to warn and divert shipping from the Danger Area or significant sector, as directed.

(6) Maintain one (1) surface unit in upkeep status, as required, normally anchored in the near vicinity of CURTISS, to provide that vessel with additional warning of and protection from attack as practicable.

(7) During shot phase evacuations, provide escort, plane guard, and other services, as directed.

(8) Repel an attempted hostile landing on one of the atolls, or an attack on a unit of the task force.

(9) Provide inter-atoll transportation for TG 7.2 ground forces in an emergency.

(10) Carry out post-shot evacuation of personnel, as directed.

(11) Carry out search and rescue operations.

(12) Station one (1) DDE between ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls during BIKINI shot phases to assist in the control of aircraft.

(13) Assist in recovery of free floating buoys, as directed.

(14) Conduct supplementary air radar searches at BIKINI, as requested by CTU 7.3.3 (Commanding Officer, USS BAIROKO).

b. Patrols and surveillances to be conducted during BIKINI phases only (preparation phase and periods prior to BIKINI Shots).

(1) Phase X - preparation phase and periods prior to shots No. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6.

(a) Conduct a continuous one (1) ship surface and ASW patrol in sector DA.

(b) Conduct one (1) ship intermittent underway surface and ASW patrol in sector DD, or an at-anchor surface radar and sonar surveillance of the lagoon entrances in this sector, as practicable.

(c) Conduct one (1) ship intermittent underway surface and ASW patrol in sector DE, or an at-anchor surface radar and sonar surveillance of the lagoon entrance in this sector, as practicable.

(d) Assign tasks (b) and (c) above to a single ship, when necessary.

(2) Phase Y - period prior to shot No. 7.

(a) Conduct a continuous one (1) ship surface and ASW patrol in sector DD.

(b) Conduct a one (1) or two (2) ship intermittent underway surface and ASW patrol in sector DE or an at-anchor surface radar and sonar surveillance of the lagoon entrance in this sector, with occasional underway sweeps into sector DA, as practicable.

c. Patrols and surveillances to be conducted during ENIWETOK phase only (Period prior to shot No. 4).

(1) Conduct a continuous one (1) ship underway surface and ASW patrol in sector DC.

(2) Conduct a one (1) or two (2) ship intermittent surface and ASW underway patrol or an at-anchor or underway radar and sonar surveillance of the lagoon entrances at BIKINI Atoll, as practicable.

x. (1) Underway patrols normally should be conducted within six (6) miles of the reef, with occasional sweeps out to greater distances.

(2) Patrolling ships should avoid patrolling in fixed patterns.

(3) All ships, including the upkeep ship, at the shot atoll normally will get underway about twenty-four (24) hours prior to each shot. Patrols will then be intensified at the shot atoll until about six (6) hours before shot time, when all ships will be withdrawn to safe distances.

(4) The following is the general priority of tasks assigned CTU 7.3.1:

1. Repel landing on an atoll or attack on force unit with all available means.

2. Develop any possible submarine contact made by TU 7.3.1 ships.

3. Develop any possible submarine contact made by TU 7.3.3 aircraft.

4. Provide inter-atoll transportation of TG 7.2 ground forces in an emergency.

5. Warn and divert unauthorized craft from the Danger Area.

6. Carry out search and rescue missions.

7. Conduct post-shot emergency evacuation of personnel.

8. Provide air control, air search and communications services to CTE 7.3.3.2 and provide ASW protection at ENIWETOK.

9. Escort ships transporting special devices.

10. During BIKINI shot periods provide a control (homing) station between atolls.

11. Escort and furnish plane guards during evacuations.

12. Provide an underway patrol in the vicinity of next shot site.

13. Provide entrance surveillance and intermittent patrols of remainder of atoll.

14. Maintain one ship in upkeep status.

15. Supplement BIKINI radar air search.

16. Assist in recovery of floating fall-out collector buoys.

4. Replenish fuel at every available opportunity when fuel on hand falls below eighty percent. Report fuel on hand as required in Annex X.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

5. Make contact and amplifying reports as prescribed in Annex J. Ships underway include CTG 7.3 as information addressee for sonar messages.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Appendicies

I BIKINI Patrol Sectors
II ENIWETOK Patrol Sectors

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

3. General Aircraft Decontamination Procedures.

a. The flight of an aircraft through an atomic cloud or its "fall-out" poses a problem which contains many unpredictable factors, i.e., type of aircraft, pressurizing, if any, type of ducting for cockpit and engine oil cooler location, jet, turbo-jet, or propeller driven, etc.

b. After it has been determined through monitoring that decontamination is necessary, aircraft will be decontaminated at a shore facility at ENIWETOK or BIKINI or on board the CVE, as circumstances indicate.

(1) Decontamination Operations on Board a Carrier (General Criteria). In decontaminating aircraft on board a carrier, the following factors should be stressed:

(a) Area should be well isolated from personnel living spaces, ventilator intakes, etc.

(b) A clear watershed to the sea to prevent contamination of the vessel.

(c) Air circulation.

(2) Decontamination Operations Aboard a Carrier (Specific).

(a) Decontamination personnel shall be in decontamination suits. Decontamination suits shall ordinarily include the following:

Nomenclature	Stock No.
Coveralls	G37-C-2570 (Or equivalent)
Gloves, electricians	G37-G-2295
Goggles	U37-G-3050
Mask, half, filter pad	G37-M-315
Overshoes, rubber N-1	U37-O-6915
Cap, Marine Utility	73-C-59100 through 59104

This decontamination suit provides protection from contamination, and for avoiding heat prostration is much more satisfactory than a waterproof suit.

(b) Decontamination personnel shall be restricted to the immediate area surrounding the contaminated aircraft. Support personnel are in the "clean" background area to manipulate equipment to the decontamination team.

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[redacted]

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200Z

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Appendix I to Annex H

BIKINI Patrol Sectors



AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DeMCG
LCDR
Flag Secretary

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

[redacted]

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Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Appendix II to Annex H

ENIWETOK Patrol Sectors



H.C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

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Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Annex I

Aerial Search and Fighter Defense Plan

Reference: (a) PacFleet Shipping Control Manual - 1953

1. Aerial Search - TU 7.3.3 (Patrol Plane Unit)

a. The following tasks will be carried out:

(1) Conduct aerial search and anti-submarine patrol in the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area which lies within the latitudes 10° 15' N and 12° 45' N and longitudes 160° 35' E and 166° 16' E to detect and assist in denying entry into this area to unauthorized vessels and aircraft. In performing this task, contact identification and development procedures prescribed in Annex J apply. Surface units of TU 7.3.1 will assist in search and ASW operations in accordance with Annex H.

(2) Before each shot as directed by CTG 7.3, patrol out to 800 miles to detect, report, warn and divert shipping from the significant sector.

(3) Conduct searches, patrols and combatant missions as directed.

(4) Conduct special searches as directed.

(5) Conduct Search and Rescue missions, as directed, in accordance with Annex E.

b. Aerial search and ASW operations will be conducted in accordance with doctrines set forth in ATP 1, other pertinent publications and Annex J. Other missions will be conducted in accordance with existing doctrines as set forth in appropriate directives and publications.

c. Search aircraft will take off with thirteen (13) hours supply of fuel including reserve. Each search mission shall be of approximately ten (10) hours duration. Unless otherwise directed, search aircraft will carry the following bombs and ammunition:

2 Mark 54 Bombs
1 Mark 34-1 Mine
2000 rounds 20MM ammunition
800 rounds 50 cal. ammunition
Standard loading of expendable equipment (sonobuoys, flares, float lights, etc.)

[redacted]

d. Standard form messages (Rainbow forms) for assigning and reporting operation missions will be used to direct operations. Refer to reference (a).

e. During BIKINI operations maintain one (1) standby aircraft available on forty-five (45) minute notice at all times at KWAJALEIN. During ENIWETOK operations maintain a similar standby aircraft at ENIWETOK Island.

f. Basic plans for patrol of the BIKINI/ENIWETOK Danger Area are prescribed in Appendix I. The plans flown will be changed and take-off times varied so that no set pattern for searches will be established. In general the amount of coverage given will increase as shot time approaches and decrease between shots. During the period forty-eight (48) hours before shots, patrol as directed the significant sector out to 800 miles to detect, report, warn and divert any shipping. Unless otherwise directed, all patrol aircraft will land on KWAJALEIN not later than 30 minutes prior to the scheduled time of each shot. Resumption of security patrols will be directed consistent with radiological safety situation.

g. In Flight Reports. Point YOKE at latitude 11° 22' N, longitude 162° 22' E is established as a reference point for reporting purposes. This point is the approximate location of the low frequency radio beacon on the north tip of ENIWETOK Island and is in the immediate vicinity of the USCG Loran Station. Make the following routine reports via radio to CTG 7.3:

(1) Departure and Arrival Reports. Standard "out" and "in" reports shall be made using the form contained in Appendix II.

(2) Position and Weather Reports. Position and weather reports will be made at half-hourly intervals commencing one half hour after the "out" report is made. The form and code prescribed in Tab A of Appendix II will be used.

(3) Contact and Amplifying Reports. Contact and amplifying reports in accordance with ATP 1 and Annex J.

2. Fighter Defense - TU 7.3.2 (Carrier Unit)

a. The following tasks will be carried out:

(1) Maintain radar surveillance and conduct interceptions of unidentified air contacts within the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area to deny entry into this area to unauthorized aircraft. Contact identification and development procedures prescribed in Annex J apply.

(2) Conduct special missions as directed. See Hostile Alert Plan, Annex L.

b. Fighter Defense missions will be conducted within the ENIWETOK/ BIKINI Danger Area in accordance with the procedures set forth in USF 4, USF 15, and other pertinent publications.

c. Aircraft will take off with a full load of internal fuel and a full load of service ammunition. External fuel loading may be prescribed by Commander, Task Group 7.3.

d. Intercept units will normally consist of two (2) aircraft. Two (2) aircraft will be kept in readiness condition TWELVE at ENIWETOK and at BIKINI Atolls at all times. In the event that these conditions of readiness cannot be maintained, a prompt report shall be made to CTG 7.3. Communications in accordance with Annex F.

e. Combat Air Patrols will be flown on an irregular schedule commensurate with pilot flight proficiency requirements and the availability of aircraft. All other missions will be call missions subject to the prescribed conditions of readiness. Fighter aircraft normally will be shore based and divided equally between ENIWETOK and ENINMAN Islands. As directed by CTG 7.3 BIKINI fighters will be based on the CVE during BIKINI shot phase evacuation periods.

f. Positive control of the planes in the air on these combat air patrols and interceptions will be exercised by the BAIROKO or the ENIWETOK Fighter Element Commander as applicable.

g. The ~~ready duty DDE~~ TE 7.3.1.0 at ENIWETOK will usually be in the vicinity of the airstrip and its facilities and personnel will be made available to the ENIWETOK Fighter Element Commander for the exercise of this control. In addition, Commander Surface Security Unit will make available to the ENIWETOK Fighter Element Commander an adequate number of qualified air controllers aboard the ENIWETOK ready duty DDE to provide for the continuous manning of the CIC.

h. In the event the ~~ready duty DDE~~ TE 7.3.1.0. is ordered to depart from the vicinity of ENIWETOK Atoll without relief, the facilities of any Task Group 7.3 ship with air control facilities will be used as directed by CTG 7.3. If no ships possessing this capability are present, control will be exercised from the CTG 7.4 Air Operations Center on ENIWETOK Island.

i. The ENIWETOK AOC will supply the BAIROKO and the ENIWETOK Fighter Element Commander with information concerning the movement of all TG 7.4 aircraft plus all other known or expected aircraft movements as required for the execution of the air defense mission. the ESTES TE 7.3.1.0.

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Operation Plan
6TG 7.3 No. 1-53

j. Communications. In accordance with Annex F.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral,
Commander

AUTHENICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

Appendices

I Basic ASW Patrol Plane
II Patrol Plane in Flight Reports.
TAB "A" Patrol Plane Weather Reporting Code
TAB "B" Visibility table.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Appendix I to Annex I

Basic ASW Patrol Plans



[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

PLAN ~~BAKER~~ George.



TAKE OFF - ENIWETOK ISLAND
LAND - KWAJALEIN ISLAND
TOTAL MILEAGE - 1568NM
TRACK SPACING - 35 NM

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

PLAN [redacted] Item



TAKE OFF - KWAJALEIN ISLAND
LAND - KWAJALEIN ISLAND
TOTAL MILEAGE - 1738 NM
TRACK SPACING - 40 NM

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

PLAN ~~DOG~~ BAKER.



[redacted]

PLAN [illegible] How



TAKE OFF - ENIWETOK ISLAND
LAND - ENIWETOK ISLAND
TOTAL MILEAGE - 1537 NM
TRACK SPACING - 38 NM

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

[redacted]

PLAN EASY



TAKE OFF - ENIWETOK ISLAND
LAND - ENIWETOK ISLAND
TOTAL MILEAGE - 1537 NM
TRACK SPACING - 38 NM



PLAN

J.S.

TAKE OFF - ENIWETOK ISLAND
LAND - KWAJALEIN ISLAND
TOTAL MILEAGE - 1765 NM
TRACK SPACING - 38 NM

I-I-7

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

PLAN [redacted]AB/c



[redacted]

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Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 NO. 1-53

PLAN [redacted] Dog.



TAKE OFF - KWAJALEIN ISLAND
LAND - ENIWETOK ISLAND
TOTAL MILEAGE - 1676 NM
TRACK SPACING - 35 NM

[redacted]



TAKE OFF - KWAJALEIN ISLAND
LAND - ENIWETOK ISLAND
TOTAL MILEAGE - 1563 NM
TRACK SPACING - 35 NM

FROM KWAJ.

AUTHENICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

I-I-10

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Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Appendix II to Annex I

Patrol Plane in Flight Reports

1. In Flight reports include the following: Departure reports, arrival reports, position and weather reports, contact reports, and amplifying reports. Positions other than those reported in submarine contact and amplifying reports (See Annex L), will be given in bearing and distance from point YOKE. Following are forms and instructions for the various reports.

a. Departure Reports. As soon as a flight is airborne the plane commander will transmit a departure report to CTG 7.3. The date-time group of the transmission will indicate the time of take off. These reports shall contain the following:

(1) Aircraft Radio Call.
(2) The word "out".
(3) The point of departure.
(4) If on prescribed search mission, the search plan to be flown.
(5) If not on a prescribed search mission, the point of departure and the destination and ETA.

b. Arrival Reports. When an aircraft flight is over its destination the plane commander will transmit an arrival report to CTG 7.3. The date and time group of the message will indicate the time over the destination. The following information will be sent:

(1) Aircraft Radio Call.
(2) The word "in".
(3) The place of arrival.

c. Position and Weather Reports. Position and weather reports will be transmitted to CTG 7.3 in four (4) groups of five (5) digits each. True bearings from point YOKE and distances in nautical miles will be reported. When distances are less than 100 miles, zeros will precede the distance. Message will be sent in accordance with the forms and codes shown in Tabs A and B.

d. Contact and Amplifying Reports will be sent in accordance with instructions contained in Annex J.

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
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Commander

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Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

TAB A to Appendix II to Annex I

PATROL PLANES WEATHER REPORTING CODE
OPERATION CASTLE

Astance Position.
~~POSITION~~ ~~DISTANCE~~ TIME W W P D D F F V A A

[redacted]

POSITION – Bearing in degrees (T) from ENIWETOK Island.
DISTANCE – In Nautical Miles.
TIME – Zebra

WW	Comprehensive Weather Description (two numbers)
P	Precipition; Sector of Visual or Scope Observation Covered by Rain, Reported Directly in Tenths from 0 to 9.
DD	Surface Wind Direction, 10's of Degrees, Estimated, (daylight only; transmit 99 at night).
FF	Surface Wind Speed, Knots, Estimated (daylight only; transmit 99 at night).
V	Visibility (table).
AA	Altitude, Hundreds of Feet.

~~*Shackle First 2 Groups Using Current PAC Code~~ Shackle Code

~~TRANSMIT REPORT BY RADIO~~

AUTHENTICATED:

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Commander

[redacted]

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Int Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Order
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

TAB B to Appendix II to Annex I

VISIBILITY TABLE

0 Under 50 YD.
1 50-200 YD.
2 200-500 YD.
3 500-1000 YD.
4 1000 YD-MILE
5 1-2 MILE
6 2-5 MILE
7 5-10 MILE
8 10-30 MILE
9 30 MILE OR OVER

		COMPREHENSIVE WEATHER DESCRIPTION									
		RANDOM Cu OR Cb	Cu OR Cb in GROUPS, NO LINES	Cu OR Cb, DEFINITE LINES	MIDDLE OR HIGH CLOUDS, NOT MERGING	MIDDLE OR HIGH CLOUDS, MERGING	RANDOM Cu OR Cb	Cu OR Cb in GROUPS, NO LINES	Cu OR Cb, DEFINITE LINES	MIDDLE OR HIGH CLOUDS, NOT MERGING	MIDDLE OR HIGH CLOUDS, MERGING
CLEAR (<1/10)		00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09
SCATTERED 2/10-6/10	NO SHEAR	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
	MOD. SHEAR	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
	MARKED SHEAR	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
BROKEN 6/10-9/10	NO SHEAR	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
	MOD. SHEAR	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59
	MARKED SHEAR	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69
OVERCAST 9/10 +	NO SHEAR	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79
	MOD. SHEAR	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89
	MARKED SHEAR	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99
		SMALL TO MODERATE VERTICLE IN DEVELOPMENT "IN Cu OR Cb."					GREAT TO EXTREME VERTICLE DEVELOPMENT "IN Cu OR Cb"				

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

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Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Eniwetok, M.I.
30 JAN 1954 1200 M

Annex J

Contact Identification and Development Procedure

1. Tasks

a. Detect, warn and escort out of the BIKINI-ENIWETOK Danger Area all unauthorized ships and aircraft.

b. Provide early warning of and counter any hostile act by enemy vessels or aircraft.

c. Deny entry of unauthorized surface craft, submarines and aircraft into designated Closed and Exclusion Areas.

2. Definitions

a. ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area is bounded as follows: Beginning with a point at 10°15' North latitude and 160°35' East longitude, north along the meridian 160°35' East Longitude to a point at 12°45' North latitude, 160°35' East longitude, thence east along the parallel of 12°45' latitude to a point at 12°45' North latitude and 166°16' East longitude, thence south along the meridian of 166°16' East longitude to a point at 10°15' North latitude and 166°16' East longitude, thence west to the point of beginning.

b. (1) ENIWETOK Closed Area is bounded by the territorial waters of ENIWETOK Atoll.

(2) BIKINI Closed Area is bounded by the territorial waters of BIKINI Atoll.

(3) It is considered that the territorial waters are those within a three mile limit on the ocean side of the atoll and all waters inside the atoll.

c. SUBMARINE Exclusion Area is the area within thirty miles of a prospective shot site. No friendly submarines will be in the ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area.

d. AIRCRAFT Exclusion Area is the area within fifty miles of ENIWETOK or BIKINI Atoll or a major unit of Joint Task Force SEVEN.

e. POINT YOKE. The reference point for some of these reports is:

Lat 11°22'N Long 162°22' E

[redacted]

CHANGE # 2

3. Action to be taken and the conditions under which it is to be taken based on CinCPacFlt ltr FF1-1, A16-1 serial 0024 of 13 January 1954, CJTF SEVEN ltr J-3/S-37-54E of 23 January 1954 and CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT Instruction 003360.2B dated 14 April 1953.

a. Unauthorized surface vessel enters the ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area.

(1) A surface security ship making contact with an unauthorized surface vessel inside the ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area but outside the ENIWETOK or BIKINI Closed Areas shall:

(a) Make contact report as outlined in para 4 of this Annex.

(b) By means of flashing light, flag hoist, hailing, blackboard, radio (500 kc), hand keyed sonar using International Code Signals (H. O. 87 and 88), or other method, attempt to communicate the following message to the unauthorized vessel:

"YOU ARE IN A DANGEROUS AREA X PROCEED IN A _____ DIRECTION X DO NOT APPROACH BIKINI OR ENIWETOK ATOLLS."

(c) Identify the vessel. Pass close aboard exercising due caution with respect to possible hostile action; note vessel's name, home port, house flag, nationality and/or any other significant details. Take photographs (black and white preferred) if possible.

(d) If communication is established with the unauthorized vessel as outlined in para (b), escort it to the limit of the ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area.

(e) If communication cannot be established:

Case A. Vessel will not pass within thirty miles of either BIKINI or ENIWETOK Atolls: Track the vessel until clear of the ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area.

Case B. Vessel will pass within thirty miles of either ENIWETOK or BIKINI Atolls: Fire a warning shot ahead of the vessel. The shot shall be fired with the surface security ship between the vessel and nearest atoll and with the line of fire in the direction in which the vessel should proceed.

(f) Make additional reports in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

(2) An aircraft of TG 7.3 making contact with an unauthorized surface vessel inside the Danger Area, but outside the ENIWETOK or BIKINI Closed Areas, shall:

(a) Make a contact report in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

(b) By means of signal lamp, radio (500 kc CW), message drop, or other method, attempt to communicate the following message to the unauthorized vessel:

"YOU ARE IN A DANGEROUS AREA X PROCEED IMMEDIATELY IN A _____ DIRECTION X DO NOT APPROACH BIKINI OR ENIWETOK ATOLLS."

(c) Identify the vessel. Pass close aboard; note vessel's name, home port, house flag, nationality and any other significant details. Take photographs (black and white preferred) if possible.

(d) If communication is established with the unauthorized vessel as outlined in para (b), and the vessel complies with the message, track it with radar to the limit of the ENIWETOK-BIKINI Danger Area. This tracking shall be done while continuing standard search pattern, as practicable.

(e) If communication is not established:

Case A. Vessel will not pass within thirty miles of either BIKINI or ENIWETOK Atoll: Track the vessel until clear of the Danger Areas as outlined in para 3a(2)(d).

Case B. Vessel will pass within thirty miles of either ENIWETOK or BIKINI Atoll: Buzz the vessel by flying across the bow and off in the direction of a course to clear the Danger Area. If there is still no response from the vessel after several passes, fire machine gun bursts well clear of the vessel into the water as a further warning. Warning shots shall be fired with the tracking aircraft between the vessel and nearest atoll with the line of fire in the direction in which the vessel should proceed. This procedure shall be repeated as necessary until the vessel complies.

(f) Make additional reports in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

b. Unauthorized surface vessel enters ENIWETOK or BIKINI Closed Area

(1) A surface security ship of TG 7.3 shall:

(a) Make contact report.

(b) Board ship and require it to clear the Closed Area and Danger Area without delay and under escort, pending further instructions from CTG 7.3.

(c) Make additional reports in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

(2) An aircraft of TG 7.3 shall:

(a) Make contact report and await instructions.

c. Submarine committing hostile act.

A submarine shall be considered to commit a hostile act when:

Case 1. There is very strong evidence that the submarine has made an attack on a unit of Task Force SEVEN or another authorized ship in the Danger Area, or

Case 2. An unidentified submarine continues submergence in position to attack a unit of Task Force SEVEN or another authorized ship in the Danger Area, or

Case 3. An unidentified submarine persists in submergence within a SUBMARINE Exclusion Area.

(1) A surface security ship making contact with a submarine in any of the above cases shall:

(a) Make a contact report as outlined in para 4 of this Annex.

(b) Attack by all means available.

(c) Make additional reports as outlined in para 4 of this Annex.

(d) In Cases 2 and 3 above, if submarine surfaces, cease attack and take all necessary precautions against surprise offensive action on the part of the submarine.

(e) In Case 2 above, if submarine surfaces after attack:

1. Do not allow submarine to submerge until clear of friendly forces and until amplifying instructions have been received. If submarine again submerges in a position to attack, resume attacks on it.

2. Determine nationality; obtain photographs (black and white preferred); offer assistance and offer to provide escort to nearest U. S. controlled port outside of Danger Area.

3. If escort to nearest U. S. controlled port outside of Danger Area is declined but escort to another port is requested, provide escort initially and inform CTG 7.3 who will issue amplifying instructions.

(f) In Case 3 above if submarine surfaces after the attack, force the submarine to remain in vicinity where it has surfaced, and request amplifying instructions from CTG 7.3.

(g) Make additional reports in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

(2) Aircraft of TG 7.3 shall, insofar as possible, take action paralleling that prescribed for surface security vessels.

d. Unidentified submarine is contacted in the Danger Area under circumstances other than those covered in para 3c, and the submarine takes no action which would be considered hostile.

(1) A surface security ship making contact with a submarine under the the above circumstances shall:

(a) Make a contact report as outlined in para 4 of this Annex.

(b) By means of flashing light, flag hoist, hailing, blackboard, radio (500 kc CW), hand keyed sonar using International Code Signals (H. O. 87 and 88), or other means, attempt to communicate the following message to the submarine:

"YOU ARE IN A DANGEROUS AREA X PROCEED IN A _____ DIRECTION X DO NOT APPROACH BIKINI OR ENIWETOK ATOLLS."

(c) 1. Attempt to identify the submarine and obtain photographs (black and white preferred), giving consideration to 2. below.

2. Take no action which could be considered hostile, except in self-defense. Be alert for hostile action by the submarine.

(d) Maintain contact with the submarine until it clears the Danger Area, and until released by CTG 7.3.

(e) Make additional reports as outlined in para 4 of this Annex.

(2) An aircraft of TG 7.3 making contact with a submarine under the above circumstances shall:

(a) Make a contact report as outlined in para 4 of this Annex.

(b) Track the submarine using standard doctrine until relieved by a surface security vessel or another aircraft.

(c) Make additional reports in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

e. Unauthorized aircraft in Danger Area, but outside of Aircraft Exclusion Area.

(1) A surface security ship making contact with such aircraft shall:

(a) Make a contact report in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

(b) Attempt to communicate with the aircraft by radio (121.5 mc or 8364 CW), or other method, and send the following message:

"YOU ARE IN A DANGEROUS AREA X PROCEED IN A _____ DIRECTION X DO NOT APPROACH BIKINI OR ENIWETOK ATOLLS."

(c) Identify plane by any means available. Take photographs if possible (black and white preferred).

(d) Track aircraft and be prepared to take over fighter control.

(e) Make additional reports in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

(2) An aircraft of TG 7.3 making contact with such aircraft shall:

(a) Make a contact report in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

(b) Attempt to communicate with the aircraft by radio (121.5 mc or 8364 CW), or other method, and send the following message:

"YOU ARE IN A DANGEROUS AREA X PROCEED IMMEDIATELY IN A _____ DIRECTION X DO NOT APPROACH BIKINI OR ENIWETOK ATOLLS."

(c) If communication with the aircraft is established and if the aircraft proceeds in the assigned direction, track it until it clears the Danger Area.

(d) Identify by any means available. Take photographs if possible (black and white preferred).

(e) If communication cannot be established with the aircraft, fly in the vicinity (if possible across the bow) of the unauthorized aircraft, take a heading which will clear the Danger Area and rock wings, indicating that the aircraft is to follow. Repeat this procedure as necessary and if it fails, fire a machine gun burst across its bow as a warning. This burst shall be fired between the aircraft and the nearest atoll (ENIWETOK or BIKINI) and in the direction in which the unauthorized plane should proceed.

(f) Make additional reports in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

f. Unauthorized aircraft entering Aircraft Exclusion Area

(1) An aircraft of TG 7.3 contacting such an aircraft shall:

(a) Make contact report in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

(b) Attempt to identify the aircraft.

(c) If aircraft takes hostile action or is identified as USSR or USSR Satellite, attack immediately with all means available.

(d) If aircraft is identified as one of the following, divert it from the Aircraft Exclusion Area and Danger Area, utilizing the methods prescribed in sub-para 3(e) above:

1. US Military or Commercial aircraft

2. Commercial aircraft of any nation (except USSR and Satellites)

(e) If aircraft remains unidentified and does not approach ENIWETOK or BIKINI Atoll, divert it from the Aircraft Exclusion Area and Danger Area by one or more of the methods prescribed in sub-para 3.e. above.

(f) If aircraft remains unidentified and persists in approaching ENIWETOK or BIKINI Atoll, fire one or more close warning bursts. If aircraft then does not turn away, attack with all means available.

(g) Take photographs if possible.

(h) Make additional reports in accordance with para 4 of this Annex.

(2) A surface security ship making contact with such an aircraft shall take action corresponding, as nearly as practicable, to that prescribed for TG 7.3 aircraft.

g. Hydrophone contacts. For full description of hydrophone system see Appendix I to this Annex.

(1) On contact by hydrophone, TE 7.3.8.0 shall:

b. Surface Vessel Enters ENIWETOK or BIKINI Closed Area.

(1) Contact Report. Same as 4.a.(1).

(2) Amplifying Report. Same as 4.a.(2).

(3) Action Reports. Ships and aircraft make Action Reports in accordance with NWIP 10-1.

Paragraphs c. and d. below are in accordance with CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 003360.2B dated 14 April 1953, made applicable to this operation by CINCPACFLT.

c. Submarine Committing Hostile Act

(1) Contact Report

FROM: (INTERNATIONAL CALL)
TO: CTU 7.3.1, CTG 7.3, CJTF SEVEN, CINCPACFLT
INFO: COMSUBPAC, CNO, SECNAV

PRECEDENCE: SITUATION ONE - FLASH (CC)
SITUATION TWO - OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE (OP) OR HIGHER
SITUATION THREE - FLASH (CC)

CLASSIFICATION: PLAIN LANGUAGE

CODE NAMES: SITUATION ONE - "IMCOSE", "LILT", "TROPE", "LAMPOON"
SITUATION TWO - "CHESTY", "MULLUSK", "HUNDOUT", "SALTAIR"
SITUATION THREE - "DUSTY", "FOOZIE", "JAUK", "GASKIN"

SAMPLE MESSAGE: SITUATION ONE - LILT LAT 35-35N LONG 46-00E 150935Z
SITUATION THREE - FOOZIE LAT 29-00N LONG 166-00E 071615Z X BADLY DAMAGED X DEAD IN WATER X REQUIRE TOW

(2) Amplifying Reports

FROM: (INTERNATIONAL CALL)
TO: CTG 7.3, CTU 7.3.1, CJTF SEVEN, CINCPACFLT
INFO: CNO, SECNAV

PRECEDENCE: EMERGENCY FOR INITIAL AMPLIFYING REPORTS AND FOR SUBSEQUENT REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT ACTION

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET OR HIGHER
NO REPORT OF ATTACKS MADE AGAINST SUBMARINE SHALL BE MADE IN LESS THAN TOP SECRET CLASSIFICATION.

MESSAGE: Same as 4.a.(2).

(3) Action Reports. Ships and aircraft make Anti-Submarine Action Reports in accordance with NWIP 10-1.

d. Submarine Not Committing Hostile Act

(1) Contact Report

FROM: (INTERNATIONAL CALL)
TO: CTG 7.3, CTU 7.3.1, CJTF SEVEN, SECNAV, CNO, CINCPACFLT

PRECEDENCE: OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFICATION: PLAIN LANGUAGE

CODE NAMES: "CHESTY", "MOLLUSK", "DUMBOAT", "ALTAR"

EXAMPLE OF COMPLETE CONTACT REPORT: "CHESTY LAT 36-09N LONG 178-00E

(2) Amplifying Reports.

FROM: INTERNATIONAL CALL
TO: CTG 7.3, CTU 7.3.1, CJTF SEVEN, SECNAV, CNO, CINCPACFLT

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY IS MINIMUM: HIGHER PRECEDENCE MAY BE USED IF INDICATED

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

MESSAGE: Same information as 4.2.(2)

(3) Action Reports. Ships and aircraft make Anti-Submarine Action Reports in accordance with NWIP 10-1.

e. Unauthorized Aircraft enters ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area

(1) Contact Report

FROM: (CALL SIGN)
ACTION TO: Own Task Unit Commander, CTG 7.3
INFO TO: All Task Unit Commanders TG 7.3, CJTF SEVEN

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

PRECEDENCE: EMERGENCY

CLASSIFICATION: PLAIN LANGUAGE

MESSAGE: "BOGIE BEARING (FROM YOKE) DISTANCE (IN MILES)

(2) Amplifying Reports

FROM: CALL SIGN
TO: CTG 7.3, [illegible] Task Unit Commanders
INFO: All Task Unit Commanders TG 7.3, CJTF SEVEN
PRECEDENCE: EMERGENCY

CLASSIFICATION: PLAIN

MESSAGE: Same as in 4.2.(2)

f. Unauthorized aircraft enters ENIWETOK or BIKINI Exclusion Area

Same as 4.2.
Action Reports same as 4.b.(3).

g. Hydrophone Contact

As stated in para 2.a.(2) of Appendix I to this Annex.

h. Final Reports. A complete report shall be made to CTE 7.3 by any unit which makes a contact inside the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area giving all significant details.

i. Channels

(1) Surface Ship; TG 7.3 Communication Plan, Channels 12, 13 and 14.

(2) Patrol Planes: TG 7.3 Communication Plan Channels 12 and 13.

(3) Fighter Aircraft: TG 7.3 Communication Plan Channels 15 and 16.

(4) Hydrophones: Telephone.

H. C. DUTCH

Appendix
I Hydrophone Contact Development Procedure ENIWETOK

AUTHENTICATED:
R. C. DRAGGE, LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

CHANGE #2

(a) Submit contact and amplifying reports in accordance with para 2.a.(1) of Appendix I to this Annex.

4. Reports. The proper action and information addressees vary with the employment of the ship or aircraft which makes a contact. Each ship and aircraft should have available to the commanding officer and communication center, form message reports with Action and Info addressees indicated in pencil, based on the current employment of the ship.

a. Unauthorized Surface Vessel Enters ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area.

(1) Contact Report

FROM: (CALL SIGN)
ACTION TO: CTG 7.3 and own Task Unit Commander
INFO TO: All TU Commanders of TG 7.3, CJTF 7

PRECEDENCE: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

CLASSIFICATION: PLAIN

SAMPLE MESSAGE: (SKUNK) BEARING (TRUE FROM YOKE) DISTANCE (IN MILES FROM YOKE)

(2) Amplifying Reports

FROM: (CALL SIGN)
ACTION TO: CTG 7.3 and own Task Unit Commander
INFO TO: CJTF 7 and All Task Unit Commanders, Task Group 7.3

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE: THIS IS MY (FIRST, SECOND OR AS APPLICABLE) AMPLIFYING REPORT X (THE BALANCE OF MESSAGE SHOULD ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS)
HOW: Method by which contact was made.
WHO: Identification if possible.
WHITHER: Course and Speed of contact.
WHAT: Action taken by contact and ship or aircraft making contact
WHEN: _____M
Date Time

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Enivetok, M. I.
30 January 1954, 12COR

TAB A to Appendix I to Annex J

Diagram of UDU Installation



The hydrophone stations indicated shall be plotted on H.O. Field Chart 2009 to permit initiating search expeditiously.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

Joint Ta Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
31 December 1953, 1200R

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Appendix I to Annex J

Hydrophone Contact Development Procedure ENIWETOK Atoll

1. General. The underwater detection system in use is the Acoustic System Mark 6 Mod 0, a passive listening device which receives underwater sounds in the audio frequency band. Pairs of hydrophones are connected by submarine cable to the control equipment ashore. A line of hydrophones, spaced 300 to 350 yards apart, is located on the bottom across the Deep Entrance and across the Wide Passage of ENIWETOK Atoll. The rectangular area surrounding each pair is the approximate area in which that pair of hydrophones might be expected to detect the presence of a submarine attempting to enter through the channel by stealth. These areas are numbered to correspond with the tactical numbers of the respective pairs of hydrophones, numbers one through three being located in the Deep Entrance and numbers four through seventeen being located in the Wide Passage. This system is not capable of discriminating between an underwater contact and a surface contact, nor positively between a large ship and a smaller craft. This requires that each contact via hydrophone be checked visually, if possible, or else by radar to ascertain whether the suspected contact is a surface contact, and if on the surface, the type of contact. Because of the experimental nature of the MK 6 Mod 0 Acoustic System, the contact reports indicated in Annex J (Contact and Identification Development Procedure) and based solely on MK 6 Mod 0 Acoustic System indication shall not be sent to addressees outside of the Forward Area except by CTG 7.3.

2. Tasks:

a. TE 7.3.8.0 (Underwater Detection Element) shall:

(1) Report suspected contacts by telephone, and/or radio on the harbor circuit 2716 kcs, to CTU 7.3.8 and to CTE 7.3.1.0 using the following message system:

CODE		MEANING
MOG MOG	-	Underwater Detection Unit.
1 THROUGH 17	-	Station number of hydrophone indicating contact.
RED	-	Definitely unfriendly contact.
YELLOW	-	Unidentified contact.
WHITE	-	All clear. Contact definitely identified as false or as friendly.

Thus, a message "MOG MOG 14 YELLOW" would indicate an unidentified contact at Station 14. Following this, a report of "MOG MOG 14 WHITE" would indicate that the Underwater Detection Unit station reporting contact on Station 14 had definitely identified the contact as false or as friendly. Whenever possible, the UDU watch shall attempt to identify all contacts by visual means prior to reporting as unidentified.

(2) Continue listening to unidentified contacts and make amplifying reports (using code below) until contact lost:

ABLE	-	Contact appears to be a ship.
BAKER	-	Contact appears to be a boat or small craft.
CHARLIE	-	Contact appears to be a submarine.
DOG	-	Contact is entering lagoon.
EASY	-	Contact has entered lagoon.
FOX	-	Contact has stopped screws.
GEORGE	-	Still have contact.
HOW	-	Contact lost.
ITEM	-	Contact getting stronger.
JIG	-	Contact getting weaker.
KING (Number of Station)		Contact now picked up by station(s) _____.

"Interrogatory", "Affirmative" or "Negative" may be used separately or with any of the foregoing with the usual meanings.

b. CTU 7.3.8 shall:

(1) Notify Commander ENIWETOK Fighter Element, Commander Surface Security Unit, Commander ENIWETOK Surface Security Element, and patrolling ASW aircraft of unidentified contacts.

(2) Coordinate all efforts to identify the reported contact as friendly, unidentified or hostile.

(3) After evaluation, relay reports of unidentified and hostile contacts to CTG 7.3.

[redacted]

(4) Relay all amplifying information to CTG 7.3, as it becomes available.

(5) During daylight, request CTG 7.4 to launch a helicopter to investigate contact.

(6) Augment radar and visual surveillance of Deep Entrance and Wide Passage using units afloat as practicable.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRUGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200Z

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Annex K

Typhoon and Tidal Wave Plan

1. a. General Characteristics of Typhoons.

(1) A typhoon is defined as a violent cyclonic storm of tropical origin with a wind force of at least 64 knots. The area of destructive winds within a typhoon is extremely variable, ranging between an approximate circle of 50 miles in diameter, to as large as a circle 900 miles in diameter.

(2) The typhoon season in the Pacific is between the months of May and January. Typhoons, however, may occur in any month of the year. The MARSHALL Islands are located on the eastern fringe of the "Typhoon Belt" of the Western Pacific and are frequently subjected to tropical storms, a few of which attain typhoon intensity. For example, typhoon HESTER passed over ENIWETOK Atoll in December, 1952.

(3) The destructive force of a fully developed typhoon cannot be overestimated, and the surest invitation to disaster is to ignore its capabilities.

(4) Mooring buoys for major units are designed to hold in winds up to approximately 50 knots.

b. The following conditions of typhoon readiness are established:

(1) Condition I. Winds of 50 knots or more anticipated within 12 hours.

(2) Condition II. Winds of 50 knots or more anticipated within 24 hours.

(3) Condition III. Winds of 50 knots or more anticipated within 48 hours.

2. Mission.

a. To avoid the path of the typhoon, or if this is not possible, to make maximum preparations and take all possible precautions to minimize its effect.

3. Tasks. (Upon receipt of a typhoon warning).

a. CTU 7.3.0 - Special Devices Unit

(1) Evacuate personnel and critical material from shot locations as required by CTG 7.1

[redacted]

(2) Sortie as directed.

b. CTU 7.3.1 - Surface Security Unit

(1) Fuel to capacity.

(2) Sortie as directed.

(3) Provide plane guard for BAIROKO.

(4) Screen CURTISS, during and after CURTISS' sortie.

(5) Direct PC 1546 to moor to a large ship mooring buoy.

c. CTU 7.3.2 - Carrier Unit

(1) Evacuate personnel as directed.

(2) Fuel DDEs, as requested by CTU 7.3.7 or 7.3.8.

(3) Recover aircraft and sortie as directed.

(4) Report weather to CJTF SEVEN every three (3) hours or more often if significant changes occur.

d. CTU 7.3.3 - Patrol Plane Unit

(1) Evacuate aircraft, as directed, coordinating with CO, NAVSTA KWAJALEIN and CTG 7.4.

e. CTU 7.3.4 - Joint Task Force Flagship Unit

(See CTU 7.3.8)

f. CTU 7.3.5 - Utility Unit

(1) Assign ATFs to stand by shot barges containing special devices in the lagoons.

(2) Sortie as directed.

(3) Take YAGs in tow, as directed.

g. CTU 7.3.6 - AW Ship Countermeasures Test Unit

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

(1) Sortie, with YAGs in tow if necessary, as directed.

(2) If the YAGs cannot be manned due to radiological hazards, be prepared to moor them to buoys in the lagoon.

h. and i. CTU 7.3.7 and 7.3.8 - BIKINI and ENIWETOK Harbor Units

(1) In the absence of CTG 7.3, take necessary action, keeping CTG 7.3 advised.

(2) Formulate plans with other task groups, and execute such plans as necessary, for the following:

(a) Beaching or mooring harbor and small craft.

(b) Evacuation of personnel and material.

(3) In the absence of CTG 7.3, designate small craft to be loaded in LSD, if present.

(4) Fuel DDEs to capacity.

(5) Large ships sortie as directed.

j. CTU 7.3.9 - Transport Unit

(1) Load any barges with special devices in LSD, as directed.

(2) Load AVR, LCUs, LCMs and LCPLs in LSD, as directed.

(3) Load AINSWORTH with personnel of the other task groups, as directed.

x. (1) When directed, all ships larger than PC 1546 put to sea. PC 1546 and smaller non-amphibious craft, except small boats, shall be moored to heaviest moorings available. Amphibious craft and small boats shall be moored, anchored or beached, as practicable.

(2) All ships and boats take maximum precautions against heavy weather.

(3) All commanding officers shall be thoroughly familiar with Appendix II to Annex O of CinCPacFlt OpOrder 201-52.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

4. In the event of a tidal or TSUNAMI type of wave, advance warning will precede the event by a very small amount of time. No damage from this type of wave is expected to occur to a ship at sea. However, damage might occur to ships moored at a pier or inside the lagoon. Upon receipt of warning of a tidal wave which might affect the operational area, all ships and craft prepare to get underway with despatch. If it is not possible to get underway before the tidal wave is expected to arrive, veer chain if moored to a buoy or anchored. Sortie as directed by CTG 7.3, CTU 7.3.7 or 7.3.8. Shot barges containing special devices shall not be moved unless ordered by CJTF SEVEN.

5. Logistics.

a. None

6. a. This plan effective for planning on receipt and will be executed on signal by CTG 7.3, CTU 7.3.7 or 7.3.8.

b. CTG 7.3 in BAIROKO, or on PARRY Island, as announced.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200h

Annex L

Hostile Action Alert Plan

Reference: CINCPAC General Emergency Operation Plan No. 11-53 dated 20 June 1953.

1. General.

a. This Annex supplements Annex K to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53 of 10 November 1953, the provisions of which are applicable to all ships and units of this command.

2. Intelligence. Refer to Annexes D and K of CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53 of 10 November 1953, and to Annex D of this OpPlan.

3. Mission. The mission of TG 7.3 in connection with this Plan, is, broadly stated, to maintain the security of the Joint Task Force SEVEN operating area in order to prevent the enemy from gaining information concerning or prosecuting a successful attack against Joint Task Force SEVEN forces and activities.

4. Tasks assigned Commander Task Group 7.3 are repeated for convenience:

a. WHITE Alert

(1) Be prepared to implement the conditions of a RED Alert.

(2) Maintain strict surveillance of the Danger Area to detect and report the location and movement of hostile forces and their probable direction of attack.

(3) Deny entry to the Danger Area to all unauthorized vessels.

(4) Prepare to assist CTG 7.2 in the defense of the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Atolls through the use of naval aircraft in close support and intercept missions where feasible.

(5) Provide necessary surface vessels to transport the TG 7.2 combat security force to threatened areas.

(6) Through coordination with CTG 7.4, prepare to augment the airlift capability of TG 7.4 in accomplishment of his missions.

(7) Be prepared to assist CTG 7.1 in the disposition of critical materials and equipment where required.

(8) Prepare to evacuate key personnel designated by ATCOM ENIWETOK by ship and to disperse ships with escorts.

[redacted]

b. RED Alert

(1) Defend ENIWETOK and BIKINI Atolls from attack by enemy vessels and protect sea lines of communication in the Danger Area.

(2) Assist in the evacuation of key personnel when such evacuation is ordered by ATCOM ENIWETOK. Coordinate evacuation with other task groups.

(3) Deny entry to Danger Area of all unauthorized vessels.

(4) Assist CTG 7.2 in the defense of atolls through the destruction of enemy aircraft and vessels.

(5) Transport the TG 7.2 combat security force to threatened areas as required.

(6) Augment the TG 7.4 airlift capability as required.

(7) Coordinate with and assist ground units by naval gunfire, air support and disruption of enemy ship to shore activities in the event of hostile amphibious action.

(8) Disperse ships when directed by ATCOM ENIWETOK.

(9) Assist CTG 7.1 in the disposition of critical materials and equipment where required.

5. Tasks of Subordinate Units:

a. TU 7.3.0 - Special Devices Unit shall:

(1) Upon WHITE Alert

(a) Be prepared to protect shot sites by gunfire.

(b) Prepare to, and commence if directed, evacuation of scientific equipment, personnel and sensitive material.

(2) Upon RED Alert

(a) Protect shot site by gunfire, while completing evacuation of scientific equipment, personnel and sensitive material, as required.

(b) Coordinate gunfire of escort ships assigned.

b. TU 7.3.1 - Surface Security Unit shall:

(1) Upon WHITE Alert

(a) Intensify anti-submarine and surface patrols, as practicable.

(b) Provide escort and gunfire support element for TU 7.3.0.

(c) Provide escort and plane guard element for TU 7.3.2 upon sortie.

(d) Provide additional escorts, as directed.

(e) Be prepared to supply fast surface troop inter-atoll transportation to CTG 7.2.

(f) Fuel to capacity, as practicable.

(2) Upon RED Alert

(a) Provide gunfire support as directed.

(b) Protect units under escort.

(c) Provide fast surface troop inter-atoll transportation to CTG 7.2, as directed.

c. TU 7.3.2 - Carrier Unit shall:

(1) Upon WHITE Alert

(a) Maintain one fighter aircraft in condition 11 at each atoll, remainder in condition 12.

(b) Assist CTG 7.2 in inter-island deployment of troops at BIKINI with helicopters.

(c) Recover key personnel with helicopters, as directed.

(d) As directed by CTG 7.3, get underway and recover aircraft. Be prepared to arm aircraft for either close troop support or intercept missions, as directed.

(2) Upon RED Alert

(a) Place all fighter aircraft in condition 11.

(b) Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft.

(c) Provide close air support to CTG 7.2, as directed.

(d) Recover key personnel with helicopters, as directed.

d. TU 7.3.3 - Patrol Plane Unit shall:

(1) Upon WHITE Alert

(a) Intensify air patrols of the Danger Area.

(b) Deny entry to the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area to all unauthorized vessels.

(c) Assist CTG 7.4, by augmenting his airlift capability with scientific support project aircraft, when directed.

(2) Upon RED Alert

(a) Deny entry to the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area to all unauthorized vessels.

(b) Provide bomber support for CTG 7.2, as directed.

(c) Provide air escort for surface units, as directed.

e. TU 7.3.5 - Utility Unit shall:

(1) Upon WHITE Alert

(a) Assign one ATF to each device barge containing special device for evacuation of critical material and equipment.

(b) Prepare to render towing and firefighting services to other ships of the task group.

(2) Upon RED Alert

(a) Evacuate personnel and critical material and equipment as directed.

(b) Assist other ships with salvage services as directed.

f. TU 7.3.7 and 7.3.8 - BIKINI and ENIWETOK Harbor Units shall:

(1) Upon WHITE Alert

(a) Prepare to, and commence, if directed, the evacuation of personnel (of other task groups) and critical material and equipment.

(b) Assist CTG 7.2 in deploying ground forces.

(c) Fuel surface units as practicable, with priority to Surface Security Unit and small ships.

(2) Upon RED Alert

(a) Evacuate personnel and critical material and equipment, as directed.

(b) Assist CTG 7.2 in movement of ground forces.

(c) As practicable, load boats in LSD.

x. (1) All units, upon WHITE Alert shall:

(a) Assume an advanced condition of readiness.

(b) If moored or at anchor, get ready to get underway, and get underway, as directed.

(c) Recall personnel.

(d) Prepare to implement conditions for a RED Alert.

(e) Load personnel of the other task groups, and critical material and equipment, as directed.

(f) Prepare to land landing forces.

(2) All units, upon RED Alert

(a) Assume the highest condition of readiness.

(b) Load personnel and critical material and equipment, as practicable.

(c) Repel attacks with all means available; destroy enemy vessels and aircraft; provide gunfire support for ground forces, as directed.

(d) Get underway, sortie, and proceed as directed.

(e) In event of evacuation, destroy all military and critical material as practicable to avoid capture.

(f) Land landing forces, as directed.

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

(3) In the absence of specific instructions from CTG 7.3, the SOPA shall take such action as the local situation requires in the light of the overall mission of TG 7.3, keeping CTG 7.3 informed.

6. Logistics.

a. None.

7. Command and Communications.

a. Communications, See Annex F.

b. CTG 7.3 in BIKOKO or on RAKU Island, as announced.

8. This plan is effective for planning purposes upon receipt, and will be executed on signal from CTG 7.3, or when a hostile attack is made on one of the operational atolls.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Annex M

Shot Phase Evacuation and Reentry Plan

1. Refer to Appendix II to Annex C of this Operation Plan, which supplements Annex R to CJTF SEVEN Operation Plan No. 3-53.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED

A. C. DRAGGE, LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D.C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Annex N

Airlift Plan

1. General. This annex supplements Annex Q of CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53 which is effective for all ships and units of TG 7.3.

2. Inter-Island Airlift Operations.

a. At BIKINI Atoll.

(1) Responsibility for scheduling and dispatching all TG 7.3 helicopters (and such TG 7.4 helicopters as may be assigned) at BIKINI or on board the CVE is delegated to CTU 7.3.2 (Commanding Officer, RAIROKO).

(2) Detailed requirements for helicopter lift at BIKINI shall be submitted direct to RAIROKO, prior to the day the lift is required insofar as possible.

(3) In the event joint task force lift requirements exceed the available lift, the matter cannot be resolved to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned by the Commanding Officer, RAIROKO, the matter shall be referred to CTG 7.3. In the event CTG 7.3 cannot resolve the matter by mutual agreement, he will refer it to CJTF SEVEN (or his designated representative on site) for decision.

b. At ENIWETOK Atoll.

(1) Detailed requirements for inter-island airlift at ENIWETOK shall be submitted direct to CTG 7.4, or such representative as he may designate, prior to the date the lift is required insofar as possible.

3. Inter-Atoll Airlift Operations.

a. Requirements for inter-atoll airlift shall be submitted direct to CTG 7.4, or such representative as he may designate, prior to the date the lift is required insofar as possible.

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Annex O

Boat Plan

1. General. This Annex supplements Annex P to CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53 which is effective for all ships and units of TG 7.3.

2. At BIKINI Atoll.

a. CTU 7.3.7 (Commanding Officer, USS BAIROKO) is designated the representative of CTG 7.3 to serve as a member of the joint task force boat scheduling panel at BIKINI, with authority to delegate this responsibility to CTE 7.3.7.0 (Commanding Officer, USS BELLE GROVE), or to CTE 7.3.7.1 (Officer in Charge, TG 7.3 Boat Pool).

b. CTG 7.3 representative, or an officer designated by him, shall participate in all major boat scheduling operations at BIKINI (such as the preparation of the over-all boat schedule for the following day). An officer or senior petty officer of TU 7.3.7 shall be present on ENIMAN Island whenever other boat scheduling operations are in progress there.

c. Ships and units of TG 7.3 at BIKINI shall submit requirements for boat pool craft at BIKINI direct to Officer in Charge, Navy Boat Pool for coordination and submission to the scheduling panel, as necessary. Requirements should be submitted prior to the day the lift is required, insofar as possible.

3. At ENIWETOK Atoll.

a. CTU 7.3.8 (Commanding Officer, USS ESTES) is delegated responsibility for the operation of craft of the TG 7.3 Boat Pool stationed at ENIWETOK.

b. Ships and units of TG 7.3 at ENIWETOK shall submit requirements for boat pool craft direct to ESTES, prior to the day the lift is required, insofar as possible.

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE
LCDR
Flag Secretary

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Annex P

Weather Plan

1. General. This Annex supplements Annex M to CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53 of 10 November 1953 which is effective for all ships and units of Task Group 7.3.

2. Tasks.

a. CTU 7.3.0 and 7.3.2 shall:

(1) Take hourly surface and twice daily upper air soundings (rawindsondes) and transmit to Task Force Weather Central in accordance with current procedures and Annex F.

(2) Be prepared to make special weather observations when requested by CTG 7.3.

b. CTU 7.3.1 shall:

(1) Assist CTU 7.3.0 and 7.3.2 as requested in connection with upper air soundings.

(2) Cause detached units to make special weather reports as directed.

c. CTU 7.3.3 shall:

(1) Direct patrol aircraft to make and transmit weather observations every half hour during their patrols in accordance with Annex I.

d. CTU 7.3.4 shall

(1) Make available appropriate facilities for the establishment of a Task Force Weather Central when CJTF SEVEN transfers his command to the ESTES.

(2) Make and transmit to the Task Force Weather Central normal hourly surface observations.

(3) Transfer to the Task Force Weather Central appropriate aerological personnel when that activity is established ashore.

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. DRAGGE, LCDR
Flag Secretary

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

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Operation Plan
CTG 7.3 No. 1-53

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953, 1200R

Annex Q

Photography Plan

1. General. This Annex supplements Annex T to CJTF SEVEN OpPlan 3-53 of 10 November 1953 which is effective for all ships and units of Task Group 7.3. Particular attention is invited to paragraph 3a of that Annex.

2. Tasks of TG 7.3. Task Group 7.3 will:

a. Support CTG 7.1 as required in photographic recording of operations, both technical and non-technical, involving this task group, and

b. Make documentary and technical photography records as necessary in the execution of the security measures for the protection of JTF SEVEN and the Danger Area.

3. Tasks of subordinate units.

a. TU 7.3.1 shall:

(1) Take black and white still photographs of any unauthorized craft intercepted.

(2) Photograph area of contact when sonar contact on possible submarine is held.

(3) Photograph any depth carge explosions when practicable after a depth charge attack is made.

(4) Photograph any submarine or debris which comes to the surface as a result of depth charge attack, or other procedures.

b. TU 7.3.2. shall:

(1) Keep gun cameras of F4U-5N aircraft operable.

(2) Take gun camera photographs of all unidentified aircraft, surface craft, or submarines intercepted.

(3) Take simultaneous gun camera photographs of unidentified or unfriendly aircraft, surface craft or submarines which are attacked.

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(4) Take post firing gun camera photographs of unidentified or unfriendly aircraft, surface craft or submarines which have been warned or fired upon, to document any damage or target action which results from such firing.

(5) Develop all documentary or technical film exposed by units of TG 7.3 and delivered to USS BAIROKO, complying with the supervision, security and classification procedures established by CJTF SEVEN.

c. TU 7.3.3 shall:

(1) Take black and white still photographs of any unauthorized craft intercepted.

(2) Photograph area of any underwater contact.

(3) Photograph any sonobuoy patterns laid.

(4) Photograph any explosion of underwater ordnance.

(5) Photograph area in which underwater ordnance has exploded, or in which any submarine or debris comes to the surface as a result of underwater explosion or other procedure.

d. TU 7.3.4 shall:

(1) Develop all documentary or technical film exposed by units of TG 7.3 and delivered to USS ESTES, complying with the supervisory, security and classification procedures established by CJTF SEVEN.

x. All units of TG 7.3 shall:

(1) Turn in any film exposed during Operation CASTLE to the USS BAIROKO or USS ESTES for developing, printing, classification and distribution in accordance with CJTF SEVEN directives. All exposed film shall be turned in for developing by the most expeditious means available.

(2) Insure that no film exposed during or incident to Operation CASTLE is developed or printed at any activity other than USS BAIROKO or USS ESTES.

(3) Insure that strict economy is practiced in the use of film, other photographic materials and critical supplies.

AUTHENTICATED:

H. C. DRAGGE, LCDR
Flag Secretary

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

[redacted]

Joint Task Force SEVEN
Task Group 7.3
Washington 25, D. C.
7 December 1953: 1200R

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Annex X

REPORTS

1. The following reports are required from all ships and units, unless otherwise indicated, of Task Group 7.3.

NAME OF REPORT & FORMAT	REFERENCES	DATE REQUIRED
Fuel (Required from Commander, Surface Security Unit only, for DDE's and PC)	Annex C, Appendix I, para 1.c.(5)	~~Daily~~ Monthly on last day of report & the fifteenth as required only if changes occur.
Fuel (Required from CO's of all ships, except DDE's and PC)	Annex C, Appendix I, para 1.c.(5)	Weekly, each Monday
Cost Report (special format)	Annex C, para 2.a.(4)& CTG 7.3 instr 7310.1	Monthly, by 15th. of following month
Medals & Awards (Special format)	Annex C, para 2.d.(6)& CJTF SEVEN SOP 30-1	When occurring
Evacuation of Personnel	Annex C, Appendix II, para 7	When occurring
Roster of Officers (NavPers 353)	CTG 7.3 instr 5041.1 of 4 Sept 53	Monthly, on first day
Personnel Status Report of Boat Pool and UDU (letter) (This report required from CinC, TG 7.3 Boat Pool only)	Memo from CTG 7.3 to CinC, BP	Monthly, on first day
Officers Fitness Reports (NavPers 310) (CO's under the Command of ComCortDesDiv 12 are excluded)	CTG 7.3 instr 1610.1A (to be issued)	Semi-Annually
Personnel Clearance Status Report	CTG 7.3 Instr 05041.2 of 5 Oct 1953	15th and last day of each month
Compliance Reports	CTG 7.3 Instr 005510.7 para 6 a,b,and c	as instructed
Security Termination Statements Type "A" or "B"	CTG 7.3 Instr 5521.1 Section IV	Prior to departure from Forward Area

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NAME OF REPORT & FORMAT	REFERENCES	DATE REQUIRED
Departure Statement	CTG 7.3 Instr 5521.1 Section IV	Prior to departure from Forward Area
Doubtful Character or Loyalty	Annex D, Part II, para 7	When appropriate
Espionage	Annex D, Part II, para 7	When appropriate
Sabotage	Annex D, Part II, para 7	When appropriate
Suspicious aircraft, surface or submarine vessel	Annex D, Part II, para 7	When appropriate
Confiscated items of contraband	Annex D, Part II, para 7	When appropriate
Electronic Failure	Annex F, para 5.a.(3)	When occurring
Crystal Procurement	Annex F, para 5.b.(1)	Twenty days prior departure for Forward Area
Radio Interference	Annex F, para 9	When occurring
CASTLE Communication Report	Annex F, para 18	Fifteen days after completion CASTLE operational phase
Atomic Defense Drill and Inspection	CTG 7.3 instr 03440.1A of 17 Sept 1953	Arrival in Forward Area
Fall-Out Report	Annex G, Para 6.a	When occurring
Contamination of Personnel and Equipment	Annex G, para 7.a.(1)	Upon completion of Operation
Performance of Radiac Equipment	Annex G, para 7.a.(2)	Upon completion of Operation
Return of Radiac Equipment	Annex G, para 7.a.(3)	Upon completion of Operation
List of Personnel Issued Film Badges	Annex G, Appendix I, paras 9 and 14	When occurring

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NAME OF REPORT & FORMAT	REFERENCES	DATE REQUIRED
Report of Destruction of Classified Correspondence of Confidential or higher classification	CTG 7.3 instr 5510.8 (to be issued)	Within thirty days after completion of operational phase
~~Semi-monthly status report (Note: Will be discontinued at a later date yet undetermined)~~ No longer required	CTG 7.3 ltr Ser 00293 of 8 July 1953 to type commanders	First and Fifteenth of each month
Request for Helicopter Lift (At Bikini)	Annex N, Para 2.a.(2)	When occurring
Request for Helicopter Lift (At Eniwetok)	Annex N, Para 2.b.(1)	When occurring
Request for Helicopter Lift (Inter-atoll)	Annex N, Para 3.a	When occurring
Request for boats at Bikini	Annex O, Para 2.c	When occurring
Request for boats at Eniwetok	Annex O, Para 3.b	When occurring

H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral
Commander

Authenticated:

A. C. DRAGGE, LCDR
Flag Secretary

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