Aireritie a sensationalist press. Then Communist and pacifist and neutralist agitation and propaganda apparatus moved into the situation that was made to order for them to (a) alilenate Jaran from the US; (b) derive nuclear intelligence; (c) pose as champions of Asian ractalism; (d) attempt delay or have sus- pended the 1954 thermonuclear tests. Press treatment of their charges and complaints tur:ed from mere sensationalism to an avalanche of abuse agai: :t the US, American doctors were vilifled; US offers of assist nce were portrayed as attempts to conceal evidence or minim ze injury to Japan; Fmbassy expressions of regret over the neident were denoun .d as either belated or insufficient] >i ‘usive. National responses to the combined exertions cf wim iists, scientists, and press izvesponsibivity “sag frmiedia+ and overpowering. The most :enitoe tevels of the Governient under incessant prodding from the Eabassy at first attempted half-heartedly to gain control of the situation. They persevered for about three weeks; they were routed, . The record of their attempts disclosed the following; (A) Lack of domestic security framework: Access to the FUXURYU KARU itself was not restricted until March 18, five days afier return to port. As late as March 27 reporters and photographers were freely allowed aboard. Samples of fall-out ash were removed, officially, from the vessel, but no inventories of these samples were taken and no contro] maintained.: Unknown quantities were removed unofficially by various visitors, analyses of ash constituents were widely published in all newspapers, Access to paticnts was uncontrolled until removal to Tokyo ‘arch 28, and has since been partially restricted for medical reasons but without any security screening of visitors, In-< variable Government reply to Embassy representations has heen to claim that due to occupation reforms, no laws exist restricsting publication of scientific data or permitting the screening of scientifte personnel. The claim is, of course, legalistic and inmaterial in the cmergency sttuation, (B) Tack of control over burcaucracy: Inability of the Cabinet to enforce discipline inside the administrative organ“z2-~ tion has characterized the cntire period. The Government was unable to compel or persuade civil servants to actions they oprose@j3 direct orders from Prine Minister to Cabinet and from ministers to staff vere flouted; formal commitments to US were icnored. Governi.ent suffered and accepted a series of humiliating retreats, Over the cpposition of Welfare and education Ministries hurcaucrats, government was unible to comply with successive Em~ tassy requests; (41) to turn the FUKURYU F4RU over to the US Navy for decontamination; or (i1) to sell it to the US; (111) to purchase it from the owner and sink it. The ship will be retained for research, Repirding the -pabbents,the Government ts not only unable to provide acéess for ¢xAfitnation by US physicians, but appointrents mide at Cabinet lcvel for them tq visit patients wore refused by bureiucestgein charge. Regarding inspection of reported cases of additional raddTeactive fish and vessels, the Ccvernment was unable to carry out arrangements confirmed *f, the Poreign Office for access by US experts because of "failure * -3- Reet, aa a Department of Y Historian's Otlice ARCHIVES

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