mn mn
en
of coordination between the Ministries concerned.”
Critical
point 1s not the display of insubordination (tself but Governe
ment's acceptance of it and ite failure to take disciplinary
action against the offenders,
(C), The lack of tnformation apparatuss
‘The Governscnt
was not only unable to control or coordinate press statencnts
by burcéucrats and government doctors or to restrain slanderous
attacks on the US but it was also unable to have tts cwn statee
wents and-corrections published, Formal assurances of ccntralte
zation of all press stat ..-nts in offictal committee have bees
and are being repeatedly bL cached. ‘The Govern-ent's disavowal
of the burcaucrats tendent ous April 21 stater..at went unreported,. -
as did suiseaquent press ca. ference by the Minister of Welfare
using US a4tertals tot
i & to quiet public hysteria or cirding
nelear contaminations, We *nnot help but feel that «ts
uoverninent was Tess than st.-nuous in these instances, fcr we
know of no previous case in which the press has successfully
{faposed complete black-out of Government statements,
(D) The extent of national atomle vulncrabilitys
These
crowded industrialized 1slinds hive long been recognized as
perhaps the world's inost susceptible nuclear targets, and not
less so because of direct World War [I experience, What must
now be recognized is the depth of Japanese [car of nuclear weapons,
their conviction of doom in the event of war, and, as a con-
sequences of their readiness to panic and their intense gulli-
bility in nuclear matters, Throughout the past eight weeks, no
report of long-range air or sea contamination, no story of food
or water pollution, no theory of genetic deterioration secmed
too wild for acceptance. To unlimited taryets of opportunity
in Jan, to total lack of civilian defense organization must
now be added this dangerous psychological vulnerabllity of Japinese
to wexpons and devices of nuclear technology. If the Communists
understand this latter element, and there is no reason to bee
liove it has escaped their attention, the consequences for our
mililary planning with respect to Japan could be extremely grave,
In the cvent of war or an lintnent threat, if Cornuntsts astutely
~cnage and carefully prepare a poychologtcal mil tt. ry operattog
involving threat of nuclcar weapons ayainst Japan, this might
well on the basis of the orescnt record produce a nattonal
stampede that would cweep over any Japanese Government that ase
weompted to halt tt.
In this process our own bases could be
‘colated and even made unter:ble,
(E) Strength of neutralfsm and tsolattonism:
Finally,
the reeard of the pertod has revealed that certain national
traits liive not been extinguished in postvar Japins A feverish
cense Of uride and sovereignty, willingness to cacrifice lengterm Adventaces for short-term gains, and tendency to go it alone,
‘the chriliness and baselessnezs of attacks on US good will and
"sincerity" throughout the entire period are indicative of centie
ment to disencare from t¢
“We-rhernd-—noe ondercstimite the
force of this sent tr. peSeteytts welattcns to our efforts to estate
Yish a system of cotfeetive.wetion tn the Far E1st, £6 greatly
etrengthens the s®ulralists appeal,
:
8. For the present, assessment of the lastin
by the incident must be Incomplete.
The position
&
oe
=
ete,
dapage
of neyfralieta,
Department nt °---gy
Historian's Ott ce
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