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Fig. 1
MAP
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Regional and airline distances maps of the Pacific and the Marshall Islands showing
location of Enewetak Atoll. |
Kwajalein. It consisted of two tests. one an airdrop and
the other an underwater detonation. The radiation and
other effects of both of these tests—code-named Able and
Baker—were largely confined to Bikini Atoll, with such
fallout as left the Bikini area being deposited in areas of
open ocean. The sarne could be said of the early development tests, which began at Enewetak in 1947. The selec-
tion of these atolls had been strongly influenced by their
remoteness and by the predictability of wind conditions.
The 1954 operation, code-named Castle, was planned
contemplating use of both atolls Detonation of Bravo. the
SOOZ4Ib~
first test of Castle, drastically altered that plan. The explo
sive power (yield) of Bravo was more than twice that
which had been predicted, and local winds carried the
debris, or localfallout, directly across Bikini Atoll. contaminating much of the land area and rendering the control
area and many of the experimental sites unusable for the
remainder of the Castle operation (Hines, 1962). Some
testing continued at Bikini, but Enewetak, after Bravo.
took on even greater irfiporiance in the atmospheric
nuclear testing program. During the period which ended on
October 31, 1958, Enewetak was the site of 43 nuclear
PASIHe: al agate24
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