ef . ant ve * ec? . . .* . HELFRICH AND RAY 2 act LS av a aw - N { wy «Oba { wows “, . o* aavanse wart teahianas +S, aals 20am STOn fufewetan aTOu GuAte. SeROuime aTOu ww, os 6 . . , ELAN ~\ aye —_ : if aes . ee wr Oe ndwace . , awasacoe y fe anos * - * . . . CANTON 5. aerl “ gu eenr “oy ot SC. omr% - mEm Guinta wet <a . Cs Te Otek] = of $F, eats - -" sane ° Sa anO$ . ~» o. _ REGIONAL MAP me . +o. , . anor _ om wb he LES an - “| Ae 7 ze = ° yee —_— . “ee ENEAET AS : ~ _ vee 4 a i108 , o/ . a ” beEE a Cvaw Pa _ Lee - oe __ ae se 7 ate pee a Sey —— ae oO ~~, ee age ee mA ens ee ‘ a ee on ao — OTacta eT AIRLINE DISTANCES ac Fig. 1 MAP scat Regional and airline distances maps of the Pacific and the Marshall Islands showing location of Enewetak Atoll. | Kwajalein. It consisted of two tests. one an airdrop and the other an underwater detonation. The radiation and other effects of both of these tests—code-named Able and Baker—were largely confined to Bikini Atoll, with such fallout as left the Bikini area being deposited in areas of open ocean. The sarne could be said of the early development tests, which began at Enewetak in 1947. The selec- tion of these atolls had been strongly influenced by their remoteness and by the predictability of wind conditions. The 1954 operation, code-named Castle, was planned contemplating use of both atolls Detonation of Bravo. the SOOZ4Ib~ first test of Castle, drastically altered that plan. The explo sive power (yield) of Bravo was more than twice that which had been predicted, and local winds carried the debris, or localfallout, directly across Bikini Atoll. contaminating much of the land area and rendering the control area and many of the experimental sites unusable for the remainder of the Castle operation (Hines, 1962). Some testing continued at Bikini, but Enewetak, after Bravo. took on even greater irfiporiance in the atmospheric nuclear testing program. During the period which ended on October 31, 1958, Enewetak was the site of 43 nuclear PASIHe: al agate24 Seat Ma