as. unless frequent flights were made. . a These additional flights necessi- tated additional inspections and maintenance, thus possibly denying use of the aircraft for the operation. Since there was no assurance as to when a shot would be fired, the Air Task Group was in the position of assuming a calculated risk by withdrawing aircraft from opera~ tion for these inspections. Critical aircraft, such as the RB-36, re- quired special maintenance. Therefore, a maintenance priority was set up giving top priority to the RB-36 sampler-controller and the two B-36 samplers.. Second priority was given to the F-84 samplers, WB-29 weather aircraft, rescue planes, one C-54 photography aircraft, and the inter-atoll airlift aircraft. All other aircraft were considered as third priority jobs. This extended BRAVO-ROMEO interim gave rise to the possibility of firing two or more shots at minimum time intervals to permit a possible make-up in schedule. A thorough study was prepared by the Air Task Group considering this possibility. Information from this study was forwarded to General Clarkson on 23 March, indicating actions which could be taken by JIF SEVEN to improve Task Group 7.4 capability on turn-around. Such things were suggested as elimination of CASSIDY's (B-36 control aircraft) requirement to take crater photos, thus reducing the possibility of contamination; increasing the allowable radiation dosage limits on B-36 maintenance personnel; elimination, when feasible, of the B-36 effects aircraft to free those maintenance personnel for other B-36 work; authorization of one B~36 sampler instead of two; and provision for additional decontamination units. General Clarkson agreed with most of these proposals, stressing that two B~36 - AFWL/HO a = qy a