‘V2 samplers should participate whenever possible, but that one would be acceptable should the shot interval be less than seven days. He also stated that if necessary the B-36 effects aircraft could be eliminated on all shots except YANKEE and NECTAR.* During this, the BRAVO-ROMEO interim, planning got underway on the roll-up, the final report and the Eniwetok Five-Year Plan. The successful air operation was due partly to a calculated risk taken by General Estes, Basing his decision upon a thorough study of radiological and weather forecast analysis, General Estes decided that an announced postponement would in reality be longer than the twenty- four to forty-eight how period officially announced. This theory Anvolved a certain amount of calculated, but obviously necessary, risk. Each day, Weather Central at Eniwetok gave the same weather briefing to General Clarkson and General Estes. at the projected weather one day ahead. However, General Estes looked While General Clarkson was con= sidering the next day as D-day, General Estes was considering the next day as D-day and D plus 1. If the trend locked unfavorable for D and D plus 1, General Estes then considered that he was in Dminus 3 and directed his commanders to fly their aircraft and still have two days for inspection and maintenence. If D and D plus 1 looked favorable, he cautioned his commanders not to fly their aircraft. While this proce- dure permitted the line and flight crews to do the best possible maintenance job of keeping aircraft in a quality maintenance condition, it placed the Air Task Group in an awkward position should a rapid unforecasted change in the weather suddenly place everyone in D minus l. *The B-36 effects aircraftwasflown on all missions. hOoR AFWL/HO mad te bat wy cer’ M9