entre mit shooting when upper winds indicated possible contamination of any nearby populated areas. This was the lesson of BRAVO, While the delay was not serious, it led to situations of Project Participants (military and civilian personnel sent to the Pacific Proving Ground to witness shots) arriving at Eniwetok when no shot was imminent. To preclwe this from happening, a TWX was forwarded on the seventh of March to SAC and AFSWC, informing them of the shot delays. Further information on the shot delays was dispatched to SAC and AFSWC on 30 March. ROMEO was finally fired on 27 March from a barge in the center of the BRAVO crater in Bikini Atoll. The predicted yield, for the benefit of aircraft positioning, “4 final LASL determination for ee = DELETED ; J (The most significant as- L— pect of ROMEO, from the Task Group 7.4 point of view, was not the over~ all success of the air mission, but the fact that success was achieved in spite of seventeen consecutive twenty-four to forty-eight hour post~ ponements. These seemingly incessant postponements had a bad effect on both personnel and aircraft. The men were "peaked" for the shot's origi- nal firing date and each subsequent rescheduling and postponement resulted in a build-up and let-down of morale. It was also evident that the corrosive salt air would cause increased maintenance and abort rates AFWLJHC P| 2?