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Questions concerning the use of the atomic bomb and the
information with regard to its capabilities first arose in the Var Council
in connection with the proposed release of the "Extracted Version" of the
Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Svaluation Board for Operation
Crossroads ("Bikini Report}, This report, in eveluating the results of the
ikini tests, emphasized the capabilities of the bomb and suggested a revi-
sion of this country's traditional policy of not attacking an aggressor nation
prior to its attack on the United States, The report also suggested tnat
the Conzress review, in the light of new consicerations, the statement of
policy upon which the Atomic Imergy act is based,
(These recommendations
had been noted for possible deletion by the Joint Chicfs of Staff.)
The
Var Council, on 2 March 1948, tentatively agreed that the report should be
released, subject to the agreement of the State Department, That Depert|
ment, however, strongly recommonded against its release, and after reconsider-—
etion in the War Council it was decided to forward the report to the PresiGent with the rccommondation that it not be made public at that time,
The subject was reconsidered in the War Council at its meeting of
7 December 1948, as a result of (1) an article ty Mr. Bradley Dewey, a
member of the Bveluation Board which had prepared the report, which seriously criticized the withholding of its publication; (2) edvice that the
State Depertmcnt would approve the publication of the report provided tnat
the portions noted by the Joint Chiefs for possible delction wore in fact
dcleted and, further, that the report be trensmitted to tne President
through the National Sccurity Council:sané (5) changes in the intcrnational
situation,
Discussion in the ‘lar Council was inconclusive end the matter
was deferred,
of the report,
Shortly thereafter the Fresident decided egainst the rcelcase
In Nay 1948 the Scerctary of the army requested tac Netional Security
Council to develop the "position of the United States with respect to tne
initiation of atomic warfare in the cvent of war", To this cnc, the NSC
staff submittcd a report (NSC 30) which argued that the risks of public
Po
controversy ond resulting forcign speculation which would follow the
announcement of - decision as to the use of the atomic bomb in the cvent
of war outwoigheé the adventages of a present decision, The paper concluded:
L
Le
"It is recognized that, in the event of hostilitics, the
Netional Military Establishment must be ready to utilize promptly
ona cffectively all appropriate means available, inclucing atomic
weepons, in the interest of national security and must therefore
plan sccordingly.
&,
"The decision as to the omploymcnt of ctomic wompons in the
event of war is to be made ty the Chief Lxccutive when he consiccrs
such decision to be required,
’
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