138 RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL Air Force planners proposed to continue contracting out the airfield operation to H&N under a Field Command-MACagreement as had been done since early 1976. The Air Force also planned to contract out the _ communications support operation to H&N. However, the Air Force General Counsel determined that this would be contrary to the MILCON Appropriation Act, which he interpreted to require use of military personnelfor the specific cleanup functions the Air Force had been tasked to provide.334 This interpretation, in its strictest sense, was upheld by the DOD Assistant General Counsel.335 DNA and the other Services, however, did not construe the Act as precluding the Services from contracting for support for their specific cleanup functions, since the Act . only specified that troops would be used to accomplish the cleanup. Support for those cleanup troops could be provided by whatever means the Services might choose, based on Service policy.336.337 The latter interpretation was applied by DNA, the Army, and the Navyin providing support for the project. This interpretation was also concurred in by the DOD Assistant General Counsel; i.e., the Air Force could not contract 7 — A-Team with H&N for the communications function because that specific operational function was assigned to the Air Force, but the Army could contract with H&N to operate the messhall for its troops on Lojwa because the Army’s specific operational function was cleanup, which they were doing, not operating messhalls. Planning and Programming d. DNA and ERDA had not agreed on the details of certification by ERDA. Requirements for personnel and materiel were not complete by the end of the conference, but they had progressed well enough that most requisition actions could be initiated. On his return trip, BG Lacy briefed the CINCPAC staff on results of the conference and plans for the cleanup project.339 EARLY RETURN TO JAPTAN: MARCH 1977 During the second OPLAN conference, BG Lacy and Mr. Oscar DeBrum completed an agreement for the early return of approximately 50 dri-Enewetak to Japtan Island. These officials visited Ujelang Atoll on 25 February 1977 to coordinate with the people on plans for early return,340 On 15 March1977, the two iroijs, Johannes and Binton, with over SO driEnewetak, returned to Enewetak Atoll to live on Japtan during the cleanupproject and to consult and advise on the cleanup and rehabilitation effort (Figure 2-Il). Existing Quonset buildings on Japtan had been renovated to provide suitable temporary housing. Ceremonies and a banquet marked the event which was recorded by an American Only four major issues remained unresolved at the end of the second OPLAN conference:338 a. The Army believed that at least three landing craft, utility (LCUs) would be required. The Navy representatives did not believe they could man more than two LCUs. A strict limitation had been imposed by the Chief of Naval Operations on the numberof Navy personnel to be provided for the project. b. The Army believed that two doctors would be required, one for Enewetak Base Camp and the other to be stationed at Lojwa Base Camp. The Air Force, which was to provide medical services, contended that only one doctor would be necessary, as the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)helicopters could transport patients from Lojwa to Enewetak wherethe facilities would be more complete. The Army ‘was not so much concerned about emergency medical treatment as about the day-to-day supervision ofall health and safety aspects that a doctor could provide at the primitive and hard-working ea c. The Army, which wasto provide four helicopters, wanted them to be used for MEDEVACand search and rescue (SAR) missions only, while Field Command believed they should be available to the CJTG for command and control purposesalso. 139 FIGURE 2-11. EARLY RETURN OF THE PEOPLE TO JAPTAN.