100 RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF ENEWETAK ATOLL discussion, LTG Johnson said that he proposedto meet with Mr. Mitchell and tell him that if he demanded that DNA go for a $190M project (Case 5), it would kill the project. He felt morally obligated to push for the project as currently agreed, even if Mr. Mitchell served notice he would fight for the maximum degree of cleanup. COL Smith, of MSN, stated that there was a necessity to retain reasonableness to the project if it was to get by Congress. LTG Johnsonstated that, on the basis of the discussions at this meeting, DNA would press ahead with the final EIS, seeking ail the help they could get from ERDA. Also, he would go to Honolulu and discuss DNA’s position with Mr. Mitchell and seek an accommodation with him. He invited representatives of the DOI, ERDA, and EPA to accompanyhim onhis trip during the week of 17 March 1975.!66 The Honolulu conference was held on 19 March 1975. LTG Johnson opened with comments to the effect that insistence on ocean dumping of contaminated material and a Case 5 cleanup would delay, if not cancel, the project. He advised that he had consulted with Representative Ichord, Chairman of the House MILCON Subcommittee, who foresaw difficulty in obtaining approval of even a modest program and wantedassurancethat Mr. Mitchell, of MLSC, and the dri-Enewetak Iroijs would appear before the subcommittee to support the project. !6? Mr. Mitchell accepted fhe invitation to appear at the Congressional hearing on the MILCON appropriations for the Enewetak Cleanup but stressed the importance of having Mr. Oscar DeBrum, District Administrator for the Marshall Islands, also present for the hearings. Mr. Mitchell also stated that: a. The MLSC comments on the DEIS asked for the ‘‘ideal’’ cleanup based upon their duty to seek the best possible solution for their clients. b. The dri-Enewetak would make the ultimate decision, not the MLSC or himself. c. He remained unconvinced that he should recommend acceptance of Case 3, but he did not propose to engage in a lengthy court fight to achieve Case 5. He indicated a desire to get on with the cleanup at Case 3 level, if necessary, without foreclosing other possibilities. Mr.Mitchell stressed that he intended to strive for as much as could reasonably be doneto insure the safety and health of the people. He did not want to be facing a situation similar to that of Bikini in which the lack cg * : 4 1 168 iterated the point madein the people’s comments on the DEIS that they did not want money in any amount. They wanted their land in safe and habitable condition, regardless of cost. The cost of cleanup would bea fraction ofthe total cost wt Manning and Progra thitnine ivi The 25 February 1975 meeting of agency representative s in Washington and the meeting with Mr. Mitchell on 19 March 1975 cleared the way for publication of the final EIS. It was published and filed with the Council on Environmental Quality on [5 April 1975. The final EIS was nearly identical to the September 1974 draft, with only a few technic al and clerica] corrections, and the addition of Volume IV which contai ned comments received on the September 1974 DEIS and DNA’s respon ses to them. DNA requested authorization and funds from Congre ss for complete cleanup of physical and radiological hazards in accordance with Case 3 of the EIS.!79 The EIS description of Case 3 cleanup, which the JCS subsequently approved as the DNA mission statement, !7'.172) was contained in paragraph 5.5.3.2 as follows: “eanUp Actions. The following actions would be taken to clean up the atoll: @ Physical hazards would be removed from all islands. @ Obstructions to development of habitations and agricul ture would be removed. ® Radioactive scrap would be removedfromall islands in the atoll. ® Boken, Lujor, and Runit plutonium concentrations greater than 400 pCi/g would be excised and all other concentrations betwee n 400 and 40 pCi/g would be dealt with on an individual basis as described in AEC Task Group Report. Concentrations of less than 40 pCi/g would not be disturbed. Cleanup of plutonium was expect ed to be performed iteratively until a sufficiently low concentratio n level well below 40 pCi/g was attained. Some 79,000 cubic yards of soil were estimated to be in this removal. e@ Plutonium would be removed from the three burial crypts on Aomon. e Unsalvable nonradioactive and noncombustible materia l would be disposed of by dumping in the lagoon at selected locatio ns for forming artificial reefs. Radioactive materials would be disposed of as discussed in Section 5.4.3.2.3, namely by containment in Lacrosse and, if necessa ry, Cactus craters on Runit.!73 . FY 1976 CONCEPT PLANNING: 1974 - 1975 aia of the nuclear test program and should be considered and funded as an extension ofthat program. !69 J PAINTS SUTIBTTITCOTIRU Dt UT Crete rar Fad y ree aa eer oT Engineers contract out the cleanup had begun encountering cost problems in September 1974, Lack of detailed plans and cost estimate s had led Congress to decline authorization of DNA’s original request which had been based on the. 1973 Enewetak Engineering Study estimate of $35.5