EWETAK ALOLL RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF EN 98 facility, one constructed contrary to inherit yet another temporary storage no changein erence ended with ERDA’s advice.!55 The 24 February conf helped set the stage for a topit but ions on disposal, the Agencies’ posit level policy conference. ENT: FINALIZING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEM APRIL 1975 ment on the DEIS, which was The normal! period for review and com on 11 November 1974.15 However, filed on 7 September 1974, end ed Enewetak, was allowed almost2 MLSC, the legal counsel for the dri- of consideration for the pravity ° nel monthsto prepare comments out Mi nS d on the document. Mr. commitments that would be made base >. uary Febr on! ts men d the com Executive Director of MLSC, submitte ul n take had le peop the tion posi These comments confirmed the basic they nor the MLSC hae wavere her neit h whic from and 1973 in Majuro ed total cleanup of the atoll, SPOS \ throughout the project. They demand rial away from the ato , a of the radiological contaminated mate 05 e, to its original state." restoration of the atoll, insofar as practicabl on ials offic action agency LTG Johnson called a conference of e policy decisions ition and to mak February 1975 to discuss the MLSC pos of the project. Confereesveu e7 se cour re futu the necessary to establish Dr. * , Ernest A. Graves, Dr. W. A. Mills, of EPA; Major General Mr. Joe Deal, and Mr. gommy William Forster, Mr. Joseph Maher, ha en, of DOI; Captain E. D. McCraw, of ERDA; Mr. Harry Brown, senior and , MSN of h, USA, USN, of ASD(ISA); Colonel A. M. Smit — ials, 158 tion. me situa the of sis with his analy Oonaohason opened the meeting to be ares appe 1974 r embe S of Sept plans for cleanup described in the DEI e som se impo they ough alth and, technically and economically feasible, ts esen repr ns ictio restr e thes , etak unwanted restrictions on the dri-Enew goal of maximum Teening the the een betw se romi comp le onab a reas well-being. The AEC guide inest i need to guard the people’s health and excess! ely e who felt they were been adopted, although there were som oactive material was prefer radi of restrictive. Although ocean dumping at le or,r ssiboe Me legally impo g t be legal is migh i ed that this i had to be recogniz by some, it , entomb ment was adopted e. Based on these a s a reasonable alternativ d to be a reasonable consensus among compromises, there had appeare published. !5° those involved at the time the DEIS was ared that the consensus was appe It Now, according to the Director, within ERDA, and consensus eV en disappearing. It seemed there was no Add TGA CEI ab PURE ig ay he had lost confidence that the original AEC guidelines could be cited as authoritative. They had been challenged by some at AEC-NV. Ocean dumping continued to be proposed by some in AEC. There were demands that the craters be lined with thick walls of concrete and steel liners. With the apparent lack of consensus within the Government, the engineering and fiscal feasibility were becoming more and more doubtful. !69 The new proposals were both time-consuming and expensive. With inflation at 10 percent per year, the additional time and effort required to authorize and accomplish ocean dumping could cost an additionat Sil million. The Director estimated that, if the complete cleanup demanded by MLSC were adopted, the project would cost between $200 and $300 million. The Congress had opposed a $40 million price for the project. LTG Johnson was beginning to believe that he might be compelled to recommend to the DOD that the project was economically and technically infeasible. He felt very strongly, however, that the Government had a moral obligation to do everything within reason to accomplish the cleanup. Therefore, he proposed to reject the more stringent and expensive proposals and to publish the final EIS essentially as it appeared in the draft. If opposition to that proposal were sufficiently strong. then he must find some acceptable lesser alternative, such as returning the dri-Enewetak to the southern islands only, or conclude that the project was infeasible. !6! LTG Johnson received the support he sought. MG Graves advised that he saw no problem with crater disposal. ERDA hadfelt all along that, if it were not for the law, deep-ocean dumping would be preferable. However, they believed crater entombment was acceptable provided it was done carefully. MG Graves mentioned the possibility of the crater leaking and added that the effectiveness of crater containment could be a problem. All those present seemed to realize that radioactive material was leaking out of the crater even then and would continue to do so.!62 However, the discussion raised the question, “If this crater containment breaks up in time, who is responsible to right this wrong?’’ LTG Johnson quickly answered that it was not DNA’s responsibility after the cleanup was finished; it would be the responsibility of the United States. It was assumed that by the United States he meant ERDA.!63 LTG Johnson askedif there wasstil! aconsensus on the AEC standards. His question was evoked by remarks attributed to an ERDA-NYV official that the standards adopted by the AEC Task Group might not stand up. MG Gravesassured him that there wasstill a consensus at ERDA and that ERDA on , Dr.W. A. Mills, EPA, stated that entombment was the way to go in disposing of the radioactive debris for two reasons: (I) it would be recoverable from the crater, if the need or desire ever arose to do so; and (2) EPA was generally not in favor of ocean dumping.!® After further