2 EL TTR RG hie - ET a UE, Ee SEE ee Limitations to Evacuation Movement As pointed out previously in this paper, shelter of all kinds diminishes rapidly as one moves outward from the center of the city. Shelter is imperative due to dangers from immediate blast and thermaleffects, fallout radiation, and debris of all kinds from defender action. In the Washington target 8 radial miles seems to be the limit of adequate shelter. In addition to shelter, the public air-raid alert system that could warn evacuees to take shelter is rapidly outrun. a ast ff ugh on ee” * * Rochester . J) 4 *eurice shgee | Syracuse at Albomye Oe tne ae a eeie ——— nae ASpringfleld 0a \ x S) / Reodin. f| Bethleheny * 4 i ‘A Washington? Now JP NN Krew nc = ~ = New Bedford~ cAN- Bridgeport PA New York’ wBosion—a——I i oI is Fall River, New Hav ~~ nT > NSetree aan d” ow\New Britain!| Camden a . ™. bi H ™ Trenton —w— Yorkdr NS stl Bristol AN Hazeltone * . ™. =<a—— Wilkes-Barre oe aN > Binghamton % =g—- / a ee A. G nay by G SS ~ Ld . Rtehmond p71 at | Norfolk 2 ee Pa Fig. 11 — Barriers to Distant Evacuations Created by Terrain and Adjacent Targets along the Eastern Seaboard A third factor limiting evacuation is the presence of physical barriers, such as coasts and mountains and the proximity of other targets. Figure 11 indicates evd@cuation limitations for 25 critical target areas along the Eastern Seaboard.” The solid lines indicate the point halfway between one target and the next adjacent target, or the point at which an evacuee from one city would be in equal jeopardy from a weapon aimed at an adjacent city. This device would not be useful for planning purposes, since it assumes equal value for targets and weaponsof equallethality, but it does serve to indicate that the targets 24 ORO—R-17 (App B) ne . — — Sew