CONFLDEN (b) Egress from evacuation routes to relocation sites would slow the evacuation rate. If open fields were used under muddy conditions, egress from evacuation routes might be impussible. ( ) Behavioral factors would further degrade the rate: elevator operators and parking- lot attendants might flee their posts. Drivers might collide and create roadblocks. Some cars may be without sufficient gasoline, etc. — w 4 To J | L q | l ' No evacuation “ 10-- 4 wn 1 1-hr evacuation 2-hr evacuation ry ae “ > 4 a 3 BoP. rs id o \n “eg ! 3-hr evacuation o POPULATION DENSITY, THOUS OF PERSONS PER SQ MILE (d) The times based on 1000 vehicles per lane per hour presume a well-practiced plan, with well-marked routes, adequate traffic controls, and someall-over control system for the maneuver. Noneof these conditions now exist. A mass evacuation plan cannot be considered feasible unless realistic, widespread, and frequent practice of the plan is feasible. Some additional points limiting the feasibility of such practice are as follows. 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 DISTANCE FROM CENTEROF CITY, MILES Fig. 10 — Population Density of Washington Target as Function of Distance from Center of City for Three Evacuation Times (a) Practice evacuations are very costly. Indirect losses to the economy through loss of production and consumption of fuel and materielare difficult to assess, but in the Wash- Te er ington target would probably not be less than $1 million per practice, with perhaps two practices per year required. In addition there might be widespread damageto real estate, crops, vehicles, etc. (b) In many targets there is no legal basis for ordering a practice evacuation. (c) Social problems might arise that although undoubtedly minor in time of war might limit the possibility of continuing practice drills in time of peace. In the Washington target such problems might arise when predominantly Negro populations were evacuated to predominantly white areas. (d) As mentioned previously, practice evacuations have shown that large numbers of people do not participate anyway, and that these may be the people who-most need the practice if they are to carry out such a maneuver underthreat of attack. ORO-—R—17 (App B) 28 CONFIDENTIAT