and CASTLE this ship was the USS ESTES (AGC-12). During IVY it was assumed that since the ship was primarily designed to provide communications support to a command afloat, that it wae capable of performing the communications mission assigned without thoroughly checking the adequacy or operational readiness of the equipment or opera- ting personnel. This mistake was not repeated for CASTLE since training was instituted and modifications implemented to insure the success of that ship's role in the communications network, The difficuity of extending radioteletype cperations to Task Force ships, particularly for on-line cryptographic operations, is one of major proportion since the ships are primarily designed for continuous wave (CW) operations. Under normal tactical operations the CW installations are beth adequate and efficient, however, the system required slow off-line encrypticn of classified messages, In a large nuclear test operation, heavy volumes of highly clas~ sified traffic are handled and normal CW facilities are too slow for satisfactory service. Teletype equipment is capable of rapidly handling a large volume cf traffic and is particularly suitable for the fast handling of classified traffic when on-line crypto facilities are provided in conjunction with the radicteletype terminals. t This equipment requires considerably more space than terminal equip ment on the same number of CW circuits and adequate space is normaily not available in the communications quarters of most ships. Another problem ever present in joint operations is the one of constant coordination and follew-up required to execute gatis- <c5