Chapter Four q C 7 0 fl C ment to a new social environment. No one tn bOdk Appres hated the extent to which the islanders would have to modity thea lives if Kili were chosen for resetelement. Ronperk and Kwapalei they Ive asst that ther ovennemt ad at seal preoparbacneons \N ie atelatively sunple mation whieh could: be accomplished swately , and’ with becle planning of difficulty. The Americans were as vantages of both sites were posted in their Kwajalein village. The ther prepared to comprehend the islanders’ deep attachment to then ancestial homehind nor were they able to estimate the ace ola population which Rongerik or any other atoll could be ca pected to support. Even if such matters had been unders tocd, there iy no reason to assume that they would lave been piven wany decision was rescheduled for June 1. The Bikintans souplias ad States, While local officals in the Marshalls wha lal the chives responsibility dor che istanders’ welfare evidenced real Comer s The final choice between Kili and Wotho was to be mide by a plebiscite of all adults and not by che council which had select ed Rongerik. ‘To aid the people, aerial photographs and a summary written in Marshallese outlining the advantages and disad plebiscite was scheduled for May 25, but the people could not make up their minds and asked fora postponement. ‘Uhe day of vice from officials and other Marshallese. Vhe former discussed the cwo alternatives buc stressed that the decision was ultimately theirs. A few Marshallese employed as interpreters dele thar Kili was the better choice and they advised the Bikinians accordmyly. The people cast their voces on June 1. ‘Pwo boxes were placed in a sinall room—one was labelled Kili and the other Wo tho, and each bore a photograph and description of the desipnat: ed site. Each adult was given a metal tag, entered the room alone, and droppedhis or her token into the box of his choice. Kili was chosen by a vate of fifty-four to twenty two. The factors determining the islanders’ choice were the island's coconut proves and that it was outside the jurisdiction of any paramount chief. The paramount chief was displeased with the results as the future of his relationship to the people was uncertain and had not been considered (Mason 1954:355). The governor deferred any official action until he onee again examined the possibility of restoring the people to Bikini. When he assured himself chat the evidence was conclusive that they could not return, he recommended their resettlement on Kili. ‘Vhis rec ommendation was approved by both che High Commissioner and the Secretary of the Navy by mid-August. Summary and Analysis For the American administration, the initial relocations of the Bikinians resulted in unanticipated and unwanted consequen- ces. Because of the Americans’ own inexpericnce in Micronesia, priomty over the military and scientific concems of the Uirite over the relocated people, there is little, if any, tacbtoatron thee decision mitkers wn the higher echelons of goverment tn far ode. (vane Warsdorgetons, Ic, pave mare than Passiop weeoat ion Co thi plight of the sural connpbunity. Indeed, cltective action to alle va ate Comelinons at Rongerik occurred onty after it was eviden t chat the rescttheuent lad totally failed and the actons of the Uae d States in the ishinds had become subject co the pressures of worhd opinion and possible censure from the United Nations. For the Bikinians, the period of their Rongerk and Kwaja loin relocanons was one of preat uncertainty and anaiety. Then linvited expostie co the world beyond the boundaries of then own community tnade them ill-prepared to cope with che circum stances they encountered. None of their leaders had any apprec iable os perience in dealing with outsiders, and their chief and Mapistrate was neither experienced nor secure in his status as head of che community. Both factors partially accounted for an absence ot decisive and effective leadership during that pero. Vhe Bikinians? refusal co accept fully che posstbiliry cha then telocation was more than a Cemporary measure was dermed from then mability to believe or to aljust cmouonally to che face thac Wikini could be lost co them forever. They were, how ever, well aware chae cheir hope of returning co Bikini or theit future elsewhere rested in the hands of the Americans. Their ownperception of events during the period confirmed their cas lier impressions of the scope of American power and material wealth, and caused many of them to conclude chat it would be advantageous to have the United States becomea surrogate fos their paramount chief. 97