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people. There were practical difficulties im the way of maintaining,
at one and the same time, both an offensive and a defensive mood. We
had béen operating on the theory that the best war preventive was a
retaliatory capability in cooperation with our allies. Secretary
Dulles felt that we would be capable of preventing an atomic war
against us as long as we had the capability to retaliate by devastating the Soviet Union. This was a sound policy from which we
should not deviate. It was difficult to combine a strong offense
and a strong defense. Burrowing into the ground would inevitably
have a bad effect on our offensive mood and capability.
It had been suggested, Secretary Dulles continued, that
shelters would make our diplomats bolder. He was not sure such would
be the case. Even with shelters, there would be large numbers of
casualties in the event of nuclear war. He thought a peace-at-any. price mood might result from the fact that large numbers of people in
' the urban centers would be unprotected. A shelter program would
' bring home to the people our lack of faithin our capability to deter
war, and would make us less bold.
Secretary Dulles also thought that the effect on our allies
of a Fortress America complex would be serious. A shelter program of
the magnitude contemplated would have serious effects on our economic
aid program, which is vital because the termination of economic aid
could mean loss of the cold war. Since it was not possible to have
all desirable programs, a shelter program would tend to get the people to concentrate on the United States as a Fortress America.
Moreover, the concept of shelter varied from year to year;
in the last five years Secretary Dulles had heard constantly differing suggestions for civil defense. The present proposals, which
were entirely different from their predecessors, might be out of
date in a few years.
Secretary Dulles said the Gaither Report suggested helping
our allies to build shelters. He wished to point out that our allies
have no shelter programs on this scale. If we adopt greater protec-
tive measures than our allies (who can't afford it), we will place
strains on our alliances.
out a great progran.
We should try to do the best we can with.
For such reasons as these, Secretary Dulles did not think
we should adopt a shelter program of the magnitude suggested. However, he did not mean that we should pay no attention to shelter.
Undoubtedly some form of shelter should be encouraged in new con«
struction. in conclusion, Secretary Dulles said he was not opposed
to a quiet program along the lines suggested by Mr. Gray, in order
to develop a higher degree of protection.
The Secretary of Defense said he agreed with most of what
the Secretary of State had said. The shelter problem was a knotty
one because the opponents of such a program question whether the
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