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Government does not have to consider the welfare of the 40 million
who might become casualties in the absence of shelter. Anything
that can be done to improve either our offense or our defense would
add to our deterrent capabilities. Secretary McElroy believed (and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in his view) that U. S. resour-
ces should be used to develop offensive capabilities and an active
defense as the best deterrent. If we use our limited manpower and
waterial resources on shelters, they will not be avaliable for productive use, a field in which we are competing with the Russians.
If necessary, the United States could build shelters without economically destroying the nation, even though shelter construction
would be a large non-productive use of resources added to the already large non-productive use of resources for military purposes.
Secretary McElroy felt that public support was an important
factor in the shelter program. It would be difficult to ask the peo: ple in the cities, the main source of taxes, to put up the money for
. & shelter program which would give no protection to the cities. This
‘concept of no urban protection would have tremendous implications in
public opinion. In his own hometown a bond issue for a modest civil
defense program had recently been turned down. People would support
@ large shelter program only if they were given a terrific scare by
the Administration.
Admiral Strauss said his notes paralleled the remarks of
the Secretary of State. He felt we had insufficient information on
which to base so radical a project. Aside from the financial aspects,
the arguments were imponderable and could be cited on either side of
the question. Take the deterrent argument, for example: If shelters,
when completed, are a deterrent, then the Russians might be moved by
& big shelter program to strike before the shelters are completed. A
vast shelter program might lead the Europeans to think we had panicked.
Like Secretary Dulles, Admiral Strauss wondered if we could simultaneously encourege an offensive and a defensive psychology. He asked
whether vast shelters would be as accessible and as cheap as individual family shelters. He would recommend that certain unanswered questions on shelters be defined, that the answers be obtained, and that
the subject be considered again by the National Security Council.
Dr. Killian said he wished to make two interpretive points:
(1) A program of fallout shelter does not mean ignoring the cities.
Fallout shelters in a city would protect the city in case of attack
outside the city (e.g., an attack on SAC bases).
(2)
Many persons
feel that a decision not to build shelters imposes a great responsibility for improving our active defenses and assuring the safety of
SAC; and that greater priority should be accorded active defense and
retaliatory capability. We must be able to fend off a surprise attack. Dr. Killian agreed with the comment that more information on
shelters was needed.
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