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Mr. Cutler then called upon the Director of Central Intelligence for a report on what the Russians are doing in the field of
shelters, a question which had vexed the discussions at the lower
levels.
The Director of Central Intelligence said that reports
from Moscow tended to cast doubt on the validity of the conclusions
in an earlier estimate. The U. S. Embassy in Moscow had been able
to find few overt signs of a Soviet shelter program. CIA was still
attempting to get the basic facts. However, it was clear that the
Soviets, during the period of their nuclear inferiority in the late
'hOs and early '50s, had been extremely reluctant to inform their
people of the nuclear danger.
They had simply carried forward their
World War II shelter programs (e.g., the Moscow subway).
Mr. Dulles
pelieved a shelter program was in existence in the USSR, but the
earlier estimates may have gone too far in stating its size. The
program was probably limited to new construction of public buildings,
‘- subways, and apartment houses.
It might seem strange that a shelter
‘ program could be concealed, but Mr. Dulles believed concealmentwas _
possible. [iiiiiiiiistiTirrtiitiiniee
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teececeeceeees, The U. S. Embassy in Moscow was not in a good posi-
tion to discover all the facts.
Mr. Dulles estimated that one-sixth
of the Soviet urban population had shelter available, bat this figure
was @ guess and might be too high. The Russians were publicizing
warning, etc., not shelter. Ina month Mr. Dulles hoped to have a
full analysis of the Russian program. However, the Russian program
need not determine action on the U. S. program.
The President wondered whether the discussion was not getting at cross-purposes. The Gaither Committee had not recommended
blast shelters for the present} yet the Director of Central Intelligence was reporting on Soviet World War JI blast shelters. The United
States had very impressive World War II shelters, including one in the
White House, which would be no good against a one-megaton bomb exploded in the Soviet Embassy. The reports on Russian blast shelters
and the Gaither recommendations on fallout shelters were entirely
aifferent.
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The Secretary of State said he thought it was necessary to
consider not only the theoretical aspects but also the practical byproducts of a shelter program. If it were possible by a wave of the
hand to create shelters, we would be better off with them than with-
Pn
out them. But in this area of judgment he believed it would be inpossible to carry through the program contemplated without extremely
serious consequences. Secretary Dulles asked the Council to consider
the impact of a shelter program on the psychology of the American
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Mr. Allen Dulles said the Russians had no fallout shelters
as such, and no blast shelters strong enough to withstand the latest
nuclear weapons.
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