CHAPTER !, SECTION 1 When the Contractor assumed the responsibility for radiological safety at the Proving Ground, radioactivity levels were such as to require film badges to be worn byall personnel at most work sites in Bikini Atoll and a number of sites in Eniwetok Atoll. Rigid RadSafe control and decontamination by removal of four to eight inches of the contaminated area surfaces permitted operations to proceed without serious threat of overexposure through- out the construction phase. With the firing of the REDWINGshots, practically all sites at Eniwetok Atoll and those at Bikini Atoll, except Nan, became contaminated. Recovery and roll-up missions were accomplished as required and a few men received cumulative dosages above the standard of 3900 mr within a thirteen week period. The overexposures prior to the Tewa event were not excessive. As a result of this event held in Bikini Atoll on 21 July 1956, fall-out occurred at the permanent base camps on Eniwetok Atoll at 1500 hours on that date and continued until 0800 hours on 22 July at which time the reading above background was 110 mr/hr. This was the cause of considerable concern as a large number of personnel received dosages above the established maximum and might have to be evacuated. Therefore, on 24 July, CJTF-7 authorized an increase in the operational tolerance from 3.9r to 7r and the Director, Test Division later authorized Holmes & Narver to retain, during the post operational period, those personnel who had exceeded the 3.9r limit for a thirteen week period provided the average quarterly dose for the last three quarters of 1956 would be less than 3.9r. A check made on 27 July revealed that approximately 100 men then at the Jobsite had received dosages between 3.9r and 8.0r, and there was a possibility that this number would be substantially increased. The change in permissable exposure limitations relieved an unsatis- factory situation. The termination, because of radiation exposures, of a large number of men whose contracts had not been completed could have caused strong resentment and undesirable publicity. By keeping the men on the job the possibility of ensuing claims was reduced. Also, the possibility of the rehire of key personnel was greater. The responsibility of the operational control for radiological safety at the Proving Ground reverted to the Contractor on the clearance of personnel. Close liaison was essential between the Contractor and AEC security representatives for the establishment of workable procedures to resolve the problems arising from these requirements. Consideration was given to overcoming measures which slowed up action in assignment of personnel because of clearance requirements. These included changes in the authority for issuance of travel orders by concurrence of CJTF-7 and Cincpac. This eliminated time losses by the delegation of authority to certain contractual employees to execute functions formerly performed by the Port Control Director, Long Beach Naval Station. In addition, a modified clearance program permitted the assignment of Good Security Risk (GSR) personnel to the PPG. The use of GSR permitted earlier assignments for the build-up phase. Processing for GSR during peak activity averaged eight days, whereas the time for a Q averaged 94 days; for an L, 52 days; for a P, 43 days; and a QR, 24 days. As the P ap- proval and GSR certification did not authorize access to information classified ‘Restricted Data’, a cutoff date of 15 March 1956 - after which all personnel at Jobsite had to be either “Q” or “L” cleared - was established. Because of pressing work, this was delayed until 7 April with permission to retain P and GSR personnel at Fred until 20 April 1956. During the period from 1 July 1954 through 30 June 1956, there were 1,228 Q requested, 865 granted; 2,660 L requested, 2,197 granted; 865 P requested, 657 granted; 1,692 GSR requested, 1,386 granted; 1,388 QR requested, 1,335 granted. The responsibility for the operation of the Pass and Badge Office involving the issuance of identification media was first assumed on 1 July 1955. Policy direction of this office was retained by the AEC. Dependable teletype communications between Eniwetok, Hawaii and the Continental United States were provided through the U.S. Army “ACAN” world-wide teletype network augmented by a Los Alamos-Eniwetok circuit. The Los Alamoscircuit provided the Contractor an alternate route when the ACAN net was jammed, which frequently occurred during the operational period. Radio-phone service between 6 August upon the departure of TU-7 of TG 7.1. The seriousness of the situation at Elmer was well recognized by Management. Decontami- the Home Office and Jobsite was first initiated on 6 December 1955 but because of security requirements and transmission difficulties this system was seldom used. Prior to the activation tinued until the radioactive level presents no tion link between Bikini and Eniwetok consisted nation and rigid control measures will be con- serious problem. This is expected to be about 1 October 1956. of the VHF interatoll system, the communica- of an HF radio telephone and a teletype circuit. During the build-up phase, traffic became heavy The security requirements of the Atomic and delays in communication resulted but with the activation of the VHF circuits, satis- concerning unauthorized disclosure of information, the safeguarding of classified material and good telephone service was maintained. During the build-up phases, exchanges were operated Energy Commission included specific provisions Page 1-24 factory service was provided. Within each atoll,