CHAPTER VI, SECTION 1 rations; designating assembly areas and embarkation points for each Task Group; and the allocation of berthing spaces afloat. On 22 July 1956, preparations were made to evacuate the main base camps in Eniwetok Atoll because of the fall-out from the last event of the test series. The fall-out ceased after levels of 110 mr had been reached. The raising of the maximum permissible exposure (as discussed under Radiological Safety in this report), combined with effective decontamination measures, eliminated the need for evacuation of Eniwetok Atoll. A chronological schedule of the evacuations and re-entries at Atoll is shown in Table 6-1. Bikini As a result of the experience with the loss of personal effects after the Bravo event of CASTLE,all employees required to evacuate a camp in this Operation were instructed to mail excess belongings stateside or forward them to Elmer for safekeeping. It was emphasized that the Atomic Energy Commission would not re- cognize individual claims for personal effects or equipment abandoned in an evacuated camp and consequently lost or damaged. The re-entry plans for the evacuated sites covered measures to be taken in case of postponement, and for reoccupation consistent with safety from radiological hazards. The plans designated key employees by name and the duties assigned to re-entry personnel for checking operating units and rapidly establishing util- ity services. These first re-entry personnel were scheduled for evacuation by the Badoeng Strait, from which helicopters provided transportation to all the critical sites. In order to render emer- gency assistance for the Cherokee event, one Contractor Assistant Resident Manager and three utility servicemen remained in Station 70 at Nan along with the firing party. In anticipation of the need for supporting scientific personnel who were required to work at odd hours in contaminated areas, five LCUs’ were outfitted as houseboats. A houseboat operating manual was prepared, covering controls, safety and service. During evacuation periods these boats were moored off Nan, completely stocked and maintained in a state of readiness for early service after each detonation. As the first target date approached and the work load decreased men surplus to the needs of the Operation were returned stateside. Reduction in personnel had to be cautiously approached. Men required to work in contami- nated areas might receive the limit of permissible exposure necessitating their evacuation, and their replacements had to be available. The capability of providing construction and support services for events to take place in either Atoll had to be maintained. Paqe 6-4 For technical reasons, changes were made in the schedule of events. The Huron (Station 10) and the Apache (Station 12) events were re-scheduled to take place in the Mike crater west of Gene. Station 10 had actually been positioned in its originally scheduled location off Fox; all personnel had been evacuated to sea for this detonation and the count-down had reached minus two minutes when it was cancelled. The site of the Tewa detonation was changed from off Fox to a position between Charlie and Dog, and the Pawnee event was deleted from the program. The changes in site locations of Zero stations required modifications or additions to participating stations. An example was the reactivation of Station 1611, with the addition of a collimating wall for the Huron event rescheduled to the Mike crater. Station 1611 had been stripped of User equipment and had been partially mothballed. In the earthmoving operations required to establish a clear line of sight from Station 10 to Station 1611, radioactive levels of 2.5 roentgens were encountered. To keep from overexposing the operators involved with the earth moving, the seats of the equipment used were lead-shielded. Most of the work sites were contaminated from the various test detonations. In order to keep from overexposing personnel, a greater number of men with a wider variety in job classifications were needed than would ordinarily be required. Illustrative of this was the repair of a break in an underground power cable at Yvonne resulting from the Erie event. The area was so highly contaminated that the work had to be accomplished in 15-minute shifts to limit the dosage of each person involved to 2.5 rs. The work group actually effecting the repairs consisted of a DUKW operator, RadSafe monitor, laborers, and electricians. Such a break in an uncontaminated area would normally require two or three men to effect repairs. The fact that the forward base at Nan re mained uncontaminated throughout the tes period greatly facilitated operations in Bikin Atoll. Considerable damage was incurred t buildings and facilities along the lagoon beac as a result of inundation at the time of tt Navajo event. A number of buildings were d stroyed, several transformers were shorted, co siderable shore line erosion occurred, and de: fish and silt were deposited in the inundat area. Temporary repairs and clean-up we effected as necessary in order to continue w test operations. A damage survey was made after each ¢ onation for reporting purposes and for de mining the repairs required for the facilities ; ticipating in succeeding events. Information damage incurred is not included in this re as post-shot damage reports have been forwa’ to the Atomic Energy Commission.