CHAPTER It!, SECTION 7 SECTION 7 SECURITY GENERAL. The basic security requirements for REDWING were essentially the same as those established for Operations GREENHOUSE, IVY AND CASTLE. The H&N Security Department was responsible for assisting Management in formulating policies and implementing procedures to ensure compliance with existing A&C security directives, and for safeguarding the mission at the Pacific Proving Ground by educating H&N employees, both on-continent and overseas, in security responsibilities. “L” clearance was granted after a check of various national agencies and afforded access to Secret Defense Information and to Confidential Restricted Data. The first “L” clearance was granted on 12 Apmnil 1955. The GSR de termination was based upon the results of local law enforcement agency checks in addition to a review of Personnel Security Questionaires. Personnel with GSR certification could not have access to classified information. The GSR certification was instituted to provide for the build- up of personnel during the construction phase Initially, one Security Officer was assigned to the PPG, but as the Operation progressed, three Assistant Security Officers were added: one at Bikini Atoll and two at Eniwetok Atoll. of the Operation. In the case of high caliber employees willing to undertake overseas employment, few are willing to stand-by for a long period to await security clearance. If they were otherwise employed at the time security processing commenced, events could take place in the long intervening period of processing so that, by the time their clearances were approved, they would for one reason or another not accept the The H&EN Honolulu Office Manager was assigned the responsibilities of Security Representative for Hawaiian Territory activities, under guidance of the Home Office Security Department. could be obtained within six to eight days, difficulties in recruiting resulting from the long security processing period were mostly overcome. All personnel clearances and identification media were processed within the Home Office. cation, much information was obtained from po- Functional control of the security program was the responsibility of the Home Office Security Department. Each applicant for employment was photo- graphed and fingerprinted. A limited non-governmental, pre-employment investigation was conducted on all prospective employees. Any derogatory information which developed as a result of these pre-employment checks, was coded. The cooperation of the various AEC Security Offices contributed greatly to the favorable se- curity record maintained by H&N personnel during the Operation. PERSONNEL CLEARANCE. At the commencement of the Operation, only ‘P” approval and ‘'Q” clearances were in effect, but on 9 March 1955 the Commission authorized the Good Security Risk (GSR) ce:- tification, and on 17 March 1955 the “L” clear- ance, The “P” approval was granted after an evaluation of the fingerprint and name checks on the files of the Federal Bereau of Invests- gation and other national agencies. It afforded access to Secret Defense Information on a ‘“‘needto-know” basis but did not allow access to Restricted Data. The “Q” clearance was granted after the Civil Service Commission conducted a backgroundinvestigation. This clearance author- ized access up to and including Top Secret Restricted Data on a “need-to-know” basis. The Page 3-42 overseas employment. As the GSR certification In the process of checking for GSR certifi- lice files throughout the United States by sending form letters of inquiry to the Chiefs of Police of the towns or cities mentioned in the applicant’s PSQ’S. In addition to police checks, information was obtained from investigations by commercial agencies. This checking generally provided an adequate basis for determining whether or not an employee could be sent tc the Proving Ground in the early stages of the: Operation certified as a Good Security Risk. The first GSR certification was received on 12 April 1955. During the period of the Operation 1692 GSR certifications were requested anv 1386 were approved. Of those not receiving approval, 156 were canceled because of derogatory information and 150 were canceled be cause of medical or other reasons. Of the 138 sent to the Proving Ground, only 15 had to be returned because of derogatory information developed in the later processing for appropris. “L’ or “Q” clearance. In July 1955, the deletion of the ‘“P” avproval program was proposed. As this would # versely affect the build-up in manpower, 6 cussions were held with AEC Security representatives which resulted in the further * e