weapons. Greenhouse, which produced the largest atomic explosion to that date, provided convincing proof of the soundness of Teller's design for the hydrogen bamb. So extensive and camplex were the logistics for the Pacific test series that Greenhouse consumed the efforts of appreximately 6,000 military and civilian personnel, and 2,580 scientists and technicians from the Commissicn.*4 Cammission scientists quickly analyzed the Greenhouse data. To coordinate the final drive for the hydrogen bamb the Cammission called a conference at Princeton University in June 1951. Meeting for two cays the Cammissioners and key scientists discussed every aspect of the thermonuclear program. All agreed - "success was at last possible." The scientists could embark on the last leg of the journey with a feeling of confidence. Yet the hydrogen bomb had caused bitter civi- sions among scientists over both the ethics of building the fusion bard and the resources which the thermonuclear program would cammanc ‘from other priorities. Never satisfied with the resources allocated to the hydrogen bamb program, Edward Teller finally resigned from Los Alams in September 1951. He remained close to the program, however, as a consultant. +>. The technical advances at Ranger and Greenhouse raised questicns about the rete of the production of enriched uranium and plutonium. The rapid strides in developing fission weapons resulted in greater demancs for both types of fissionable materials. As the Commission consicerec the issue, Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, asked the Commission "to estimate the cost of (a) increasing by 50 percent, (b) doubling, and (c) increasing by 150 percent cur existing and presently planned material and atomic bambs." capacity for producing fissicrsble So camplex were the issues involved 8 in