kee wt * oa ty, AWE Rube In dealing with the situation in North Africa, Mr. Allen Dulles said he would not deal with the situation in Tunisia, which was rather well known to the Council, but would concentrate instead on Morocco and the rapid deterioration of the French and the U. S. situation in that country. The Moroccans are now much excited against the French, and are getting into a state of mind comparable to that of the Tunisians. Algeria wes also heating up again.: We can hardly avoid asking the question as to how far Paris actually controls the actions of French military forces in North Africa. Secretary Dulles commented that we are now facing in North Africa a situation comparable to that we faced a few years ago in Indochina, but more serious, inasmuch as the French are more deeply engaged and enemy forces against the French also more formidable. Secretary Dulles thought the situation likely to evolve in much the same way as had the situation in Indochina. Eventually we maysee a leftist government in Paris which will liquidate the Algerian affair. But unfortunately such a leftist government was likely to liquidate NATO as well. Accordingly, we may have soon to make a choice as to whether to continue to support France and Spain in Europe at the expense of losing all of Africa. The State Department needed the help of the Defense Department on this issue. Turning to the recent Argentine election, Mr. Allen Dulles stated that Frondizi had actually won more decisively than had been contemplated prior to the returns. He had very nearly secured a clear majority of the votes. He got the Peronista vote and most of the Communist vote. Frondizi made a deal with Peron during the campaign--allegedly in writing. In general he had promised that the Peronista Party would be legal, and that he would grant a general amesty to the Peronistas. Of course, we do not know whether he will keep his word, but unless the United States is able to exert _ gome real influence on Frondizi, he is likely to take Argentina along a neutralist path. Of course, it was possible that he may change views when he assumes the responsibilities of his office. The National Security Council: a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to a further Soviet atomic test on this date; the critical situations in Indonesia and North Africa; and the results of the recent Argentine elections. b. Noted and discussed a statement by the Secretary of State as to the serious policy implications for U. 5S. PPR eee a TOP SECRET -